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Three Essays on the Microstructure of the BIST 
Osman Ulas Aktas, Ph. D. 
Concordia University, 2016  
 This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay (chapter 2) examines the accuracy of five 
algorithms for classifying trades as buyer- or seller-initiated for BIST-30 index constituents over a period 
including the Lehman collapse. The highest classification accuracy rate (over 95%) is for the one-second 
lagged Lee & Ready (LR) algorithm. The LR’s classification accuracy is highest (lowest) for trades 
representing mixed agency and principal (pure principal) relations between clients and executing brokers. 
Unlike for U.S. markets, almost all trades are classifiable with accuracy rates of 90-plus percent for both 
long and short trades. As for U.S. markets, higher misclassification rates occur for trades in the first 
versus last 30 minutes of the trading day, as the time between consecutive trades decreases, and for 
decreasing trade sizes. 
 The second essay (chapter 3) examines the trade price effects and their determinants for BIST-30 
index constituents for a period that includes the Global Financial Crisis and the Lehman collapse. 
Consistent with theoretical predications, we find that informed trades in the BIST tend to be large. Our 
findings that price discovery appears to be fairly rapid on the BIST and that the average multi-sample 
stock trade price effect of less than 30 basis points is competitive with other markets have important 
implications for the purchase and execution decisions of investors. Our finding of positive mean price 
effects for short trades that are larger for seller-initiated trades and larger than for long trades has 
implications for the ongoing debate about the regulation of short sales since it suggest that the average 
short sales does not depress prices. Furthermore, the higher price effects of (especially buyer-initiated) 
trades in the last minutes of a trading session and the variation in price effects with whether the client-
broker relationship is agency, principal or mixed have important implications for market regulators in 
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terms of refining their surveillance systems to better control any inappropriate stealth trading or end-of-
session price manipulation.  
 The third essay (chapter 4) examines the price-limit hits for members of the BIST-50 index during 
the March 2008 through March 2009 period. The effects of price-limits are not homogeneous for upper 
and lower hits when they occur and if they continue in a subsequent trading session. Our results are 
supportive of the no-, dampening and spillover effects on volatility hypotheses, overreaction and no-effect 
price hypotheses, magnet price effect hypothesis, and greater informational asymmetric effect on market-
quality hypothesis. They are not supportive of the price-delay hypothesis, and trading interference 
hypothesis. The results are robust using equi-distant and trade-by-trade returns and volatility measures 
ccounting for the autocorrelations in these return series. The results have implications for regulators 
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 Despite the differences in their structures, regulations and functioning, security markets have 
important roles in price discovery, market efficiency, and the determination of the liquidity, risk, return 
and volatility of the assets traded therein. We empirically analyze some of these important roles in the 
three essays of this thesis. 
 Determining trade direction has become more important as intraday quote and trade data have 
become more available globally. Determining the initiator of each trade (buyer or seller) is used in 
assessing the role of information flow, order imbalances and liquidity providers when examining the 
efficiency of markets or the impact of corporate actions. Of the trade classification algorithms that are 
used to study various issues in finance, the one developed by Lee and Ready (1991) is most commonly 
used for stocks on various stock markets and the Ellis, Michaely and O`Hara (2000) or EMO algorithm is 
often used for NASDAQ stocks. In addition, the tick, quote and at-the-quote rule are also among the trade 
direction algorithms widely used in the market microstructure literature. In Essay 1, we examine the 
accuracy rates of five trade classification algorithms for a trade venue in a developing market, the Borsa 
Istanbul (BIST), for the seven months ending with December 2008 that is centered on the month of 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Our propriety dataset from the BIST allows us to use the more accurate 
chronological approach (Odders-White, 2000) as a benchmark for assessing the accuracy rates of five 
trade classification algorithms since we have the order and trade IDs time stamped to the closest second. 
The traders are also classified in three main groups by the exchange (pure principal, pure agent, and 
mixed) which allows us to analyze each group separately.  
 We find that the one-second lagged version of the Lee-Ready (LR) algorithm outperforms the other 
four trade classification algorithms that we assess. To the best of our knowledge and despite the period 
examined, we document the highest accuracy rates for the LR algorithm (lagged one second) in the 
market microstructure literature of above 95%. We find significant differences in classification accuracy 
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for buyer- versus seller-initiated trades among the five classification algorithms. For the four quote-based 
algorithms, the EMO algorithm exhibits the highest accuracy rate (over 95%) in classifying seller-
initiated trades and lowest accuracy rate (<77%) in classifying buyer-initiated trades. In contrast, the LR 
algorithm places second in classification accuracy for seller-initiated trades and first for buyer-initiated 
trades (over 92% except for the use of contemporaneous quotes). 
 Using the three-way trader classification applied by the BIST, we document that the trade 
classification algorithms show significantly inferior accuracy in classifying trades that take place in the 
portfolios of the brokerage firms (pure principal) compared to the trades that take place in the accounts of 
the institutional and retail clients of the brokerage firms (pure agency), and the trades that take place at 
the investment funds managed by the brokerage firms (mixed).   
 In Essay 2, we examine the magnitude and duration of temporary and permanent price effects of 
trades of different sizes, which has important implications for price discovery, trade-price impact, market 
efficiency and the choice of trade-execution strategies. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain 
the price effects associated with large trades, including that these trades are from informed traders. We 
examine the price effects associated with trade for the 38 companies during their tenure in the BIST-30 
index during the twelve months from April 2008 through March 2009 which accounts for around 70% of 
the total trade volume on the BIST for our sample period and contains the global financial crisis and the 
Lehman collapse. 
 Most studies report differences in terms of market impacts of large trades between the buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades. A limitation of most of these studies is that their trade classifications depend on 
what proportion of the trades can be classified using the tick or Lee and Ready (1991) or Ellis et al. (2000) 
algorithms, and on the accuracy of the classifications for those trades that can be classified. Although a 
large portion of the trades remain unclassified in other studies, reported classification accuracies for the 
LR algorithm vary from 69.2% for long trades in Chakrabarty et al. (2012) to 93.0% in Lee and 
Radhakrishna (2000). Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) report a 93% accuracy rate for the Lee and Ready 
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algorithm for a sub sample of 15 stocks from the TORQ dataset after eliminating approximately 40% of 
the trades in TORQ that could not be unambiguously classified as being either buyer- or seller-initiated. 
 In this second essay, we examine the price effects of a trade on a developing market where order 
arrival times are available to the closest second, short sale trades are identified and the IDs of each order 
and trade are available for matching purposes. We are able to successfully identify more than 99.5% of 
the trades for the selected sample as being buyer- or seller-initiated using the chronological method as in 
Odders-White (2000).  
 In this essay, we also provide a more precise assessment of the market impact of trades accounting 
for whether one or both sides of the trade(s) involve a short trade. Since short selling is not prohibited on 
the BIST during the crisis of 2008, it gives us an opportunity to compare the restriction of short sales as 
was the case for the financial companies during the same period in the U.S. and U.K. 
 We document that all mean permanent price effects are highly significant and positive for all short 
trade samples, and are substantially greater in magnitude for seller- versus buyer-initiated short trade 
seconds. These price effects are (highly) significantly more positive for the samples of short versus long 
trade seconds. Our evidence suggests that short trades are more informed than long trades (Battalio and 
Mendenhall, 2005; Hvidkjaer, 2006). 
 The second essay also fills a gap in the price effects literature by examining trade price impacts 
differentiated by whether large traders have a pure agency, pure principal and mixed relationship with the 
brokerage firms executing their trades based on the following trader classifications provided by the BIST: 
institutional and retail clients of the brokerage firms; portfolios of the brokerage firms; and investment 
funds managed by the brokerage firms. It is documented that the trades of retail investors move equity 
prices (Barber et al., 2009; Hvidkjaer, 2008). The trading dynamics of these two types of investors appear 
to be based on very different interpretations of information (Griffin et al., 2003). Furthermore, lottery-
type stocks are over-weighted in the portfolios of retail but not institutional investors (Kumar, 2009). 
 We find that the smallest and largest negative mean total price effects are associated with the seller-
initiated trades for the portfolios of the brokerage firms and trades for the institutional and retail accounts 
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of the brokerage firms, respectively. This suggests that the former traders or their brokers are better in 
either trade execution or the timing of their trades. Furthermore, we find that the smallest (largest) 
permanent price effects are associated with the small buyer- (small and large seller-) initiated trades for 
the institutional and retail accounts of the brokerage firms.  
 End-of-session price effects may have important implications because stock exchanges and 
regulatory agencies around the world devote considerable human, technological and financial resources to 
curb market manipulation and to promote price discovery, market efficiency and market integrity. In the 
second essay, we find weak evidence for manipulators having incentives to realize high prices at the close 
as opposed to earlier in a trading session. When we examine price effects for a three-day announcement 
day (AD) period centered on the Lehman announcement compared to the three-day periods pre- and post-
AD, we find that the mean total price effects are highest AD, and that the mean temporary and permanent 
price effects are highest for small-sized buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds. 
 In Essay 3, we examine several hypotheses on the effects of price limits which are applied in order to 
prevent any consequences from high volatility in asset prices over a short period of time, especially in 
emerging markets. We re-examine the impact of price limits of the Borsa Istanbul using intra-day trades 
and quotes for all the firms that are included in the BIST-50 index during the thirteen-month examination 
period of March 2008 through March 2009. The hypotheses we examine are the volatility spillover and 
dampening hypotheses, the overreaction and delayed price-discovery hypotheses, magnet-effect 
hypothesis, trading interference hypothesis, and the market quality hypothesis. As a robustness test we 
use trade-by-trade returns adjusted for their associated serial correlations. 
 Among the hypotheses mentioned above, we find evidence to support the volatility no-effect, 
dampening and spillover hypotheses. We find that the impact of a price-limit hit on volatility depends on 
whether it is a lower or upper limit hit and on the time of the day when the price-limit hit begins and when 
it ends. 
 Our evidence supports the market overreaction hypothesis. We also find some support for the no-
effect hypothesis since the returns in the post-hit windows are not significant for the other two samples of 
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lower price-limit hits. Thus, our findings are supportive of the overreaction and no-effect hypotheses but 
not the price-delay hypothesis which can be interpreted as price-limit hits do not inhibit price discovery.  
 We document accelerating prices as they approach the price limit-hit. We report that the slope 
coefficients of the time-series trajectories of the mean returns up to the price-limit hits are highly 
significant and positive (negative) for the price-limit hits triggered at the upper (lower) limits using the 
equi-distant returns. This may be considered as an evidence for the magnet effect which may lead to the 
price overreaction behaviour prior to the price-limit hit. 
 Regarding the market quality hypothesis, we find that the lower price-limit hits significantly increase 
proportional quoted and effective spreads and significantly reduce share and TRY depth. We find that the 
median (not) mean composite measure of liquidity (i.e., proportional quoted spread divided by TRY depth) 
is generally significant (and higher) post-hit for both the lower and upper price-limit hits. Thus, price-
limit hits generally have a significant adverse effect on spread and depth measures of market quality. We 
conclude that our findings are consistent with the greater informational asymmetry effect on market-
quality hypothesis.  
 We test the robustness of some of our results using equi-distant returns and autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) modeling, and trade-by-trade returns. The ARIMA model helps to alleviate 
some of the bias due to the autocorrelations in returns. Our findings show that our previous corresponding 












TRADE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR THE BIST 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Much of the microstructure literature and applications thereof require a determination of whether a 
trade is initiated by the buyer or the seller (commonly referred to as trade signing or trade direction). 
Some early examples include the asymmetric-information and inventory-control theories of specialist 
behaviour (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1988), the effect of order imbalances and returns on NYSE stocks during the 
crash of October 1987 (Blume, MacKinlay and Terker, 1989), and the price impact of large trades (briefly 
reviewed in section two herein). Commonly used trade classification algorithms include the tick test, the 
Lee and Ready (1991) (hereafter LR) algorithm and the Ellis, Michaely and O`Hara (2000) or EMO 
algorithm (see Table 2.1 for a description of the ones used herein).  
[Please place Table 2.1 about here] 
 Various papers illustrate the consequences of inaccurate trade classification in empirical finance. For 
example, Boehmer, Grammig and Theissen (2007) show analytically and empirically that inaccurate 
classification of trades leads to downward-biased PIN (probability of informed trade) estimates and that 
the magnitude of the bias is related to a security’s trading intensity. Using two separate periods around the 
NYSE’s change to a tick size of $1/16 in June 1997, Peterson and Sirri (2003) report that actual execution 
costs are overstated by up to 17% using effective spread estimates that incorporate errors in trade 
direction and benchmark quote assignments, and that the highest biases occur for small trades and for 
trades of larger firms. 
 To the best of our knowledge, the only study that examines trade classification accuracy for a 
developing market is by Lu and Wei (2009) for the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Thus, the primary purpose of 
this paper is to test the accuracy of five trade classification algorithms described in Table 2.1 for an 
important, active and representative market in a developing country, namely, the Borsa Istanbul (BIST). 
The BIST was the eighth most active market in equity trading out of 26 exchanges ranked in the category 
‘Europe /Africa /Middle East’ by the World Federation of Exchanges for 2008.1 We argue that a study of 
                                                          
1
 The BIST with 46.0 million equity trades in 2008 placed between the SIX Swiss Exchange and Saudi Stock 
Market (Tadawul) with 42.0 and 52.1 million trades, respectively. The BIST with 114,307.7 million shares traded in 
2008 placed between the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the BME Spanish Exchanges with 82,580.6 and 
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this market can provide some methodological support for the use of trade classification algorithms and the 
credibility of the resulting research for the BIST and other similar markets (i.e., fully-computerized 
markets with an order-driven mechanism via continuous auction, no official market maker and a small 
representation of short sales in total trading) when the data set available to the researcher requires that the 
order book be constructed or does not allow for the use of the more accurate chronological approach 
(defined later) to determine the true initiator of a trade. 
 We examine stocks in the BIST-30 because these stocks account for about 70% of total trades on the 
BIST during our chosen time period. This choice was also dictated by the extensive time need to clean the 
raw data provided by the BIST using 20-minute intervals for each company before constructing the limit 
order book in order to obtain the BBO (best bid and offer) for each second during each trading day for 
each of the 35 stocks in our sample due to quarterly index revisions. The accuracies of the trade 
classification algorithms are examined over the seven months of June through December 2008 which 
includes two quarterly index revisions. The test period is also centered on the month of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (namely, September 2008) to provide a first test of the accuracy of the five trade 
classification algorithms during a period including the effects of a financial crisis and the Great 
Recession.
2
 Our choice of time period extends the work of Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) and 
Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) who use two months in 2005 that the former authors (page 
472) characterize as: “These two months also offer the advantage of capturing a recent, relatively 
“normal’’ time in the markets — after decimalization, but before the financial crisis and the scrutiny of 
short sellers that followed …”   
 Since the times and IDs of each order and trade are available for our propriety dataset from the BIST, 
we use the more accurate chronological approach as the benchmark for the true initiator of a trade.
3
  We 
find that the one-second lagged version of the LR algorithm outperforms the other four trade 
classification algorithms that we assess. To the best of our knowledge and despite the period examined, 
we document the highest accuracy rates for the LR algorithm (lagged one second) in the market 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
119,701.2 million shares traded, respectively. For greater details, see: http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2009/equity-markets/total-number-trades-equity-shares-and-number-shares-traded 
2
 Turkey and the following countries/territories went into economic recession in the third quarter of 2008: Euro-
using nations in the European Union as a whole, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Italy, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. They were followed into technical recession in the fourth quarter of 2008 by Spain, Switzerland, 
Taiwan and the United States. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Recession 
3
 When trader IDs are not available (Lee and Ready, 1991), the immediacy approach defines the trade initiator as the 
trader who demands immediate execution (i.e., places a market order) and the non-initiator as the trader who is a 
liquidity provider but does not require immediate execution (i.e., places a limit order). 
 8 
 
microstructure literature of above 95%.
4
 Like Odders-White (2000), we find that the highest 
misclassification rates occur for trades that occur at the quote mid-spread. We find significant differences 
in classification accuracy for buyer- versus seller-initiated trades among the five classification algorithms. 
For the four quote-based algorithms, the EMO algorithm exhibits the highest accuracy rate (over 95%) in 
classifying seller-initiated trades and lowest accuracy rate (<77%) in classifying buyer-initiated trades. In 
contrast, the LR algorithm places second in classification accuracy for seller-initiated trades and first for 
buyer-initiated trades (over 92% except for the use of contemporaneous quotes).  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine classification accuracy for trades 
differentiated by whether the trader has an agency or principal relationship with the brokerage firm 
executing the trade. To this end, we use the BIST’s three-way trader classification that is included in our 
proprietary data set. We document that the trade classification algorithms show significantly inferior 
accuracy in classifying trades that take place in the portfolios of the brokerage firms (pure principal) 
compared to the trades that take place in the institutional and retail clients’ accounts of the brokerage 
firms (pure agency), and the trades that take place at the investment funds managed by the brokerage 
firms (mixed). This has important implications for the use of trade classification algorithms for the 
determination of the probability of informed trading when the proportion of pure principal trades is 
material. 
 Our findings have implications for the ongoing debate on whether short trades are seller-initiated, and 
whether they consume liquidity more often than they provide it. We find significant differences in the 
accuracy rates of the trade classification algorithms that generally are higher for long versus short trades. 
Unlike Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) and Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) who examine 
US data for June and December 2005 provided under the SEC’s Reg SHO initiative,5 we find accuracy 
rates of at least 90% using one-second lagged quotes for both long and short trades for the quote, at-the-
quote and LR algorithms. Like these authors, we find that long sellers appear to consume liquidity more 
often than they provide it while short sellers appear to provide liquidity more often than they consume it. 
Like these studies, we find that short sales are predominantly buyer-initiated which is consistent with the 
expectation advanced by Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) but not Asquith, Oman and Safaya 
(2010) whose prior is that short sales should be predominantly seller-initiated. This interpretation depends 
on the somewhat strong implicit assumption that any differential immediacy costs associated with the 
short-side of a trade are not material. To further illustrate the importance of this implicit assumption, we 
                                                          
4
 According to Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010, p. 158), the degree of accuracy of the LR algorithm ranges from 
72% to 93% depending on the study.  
5
 Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) also examine data for March 2005. 
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note that Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) report that the proportion of buyer-initiated trades involving 
short sellers is significantly lower in the absence of short-selling restrictions like an uptick rule on the 
NYSE or a bid price test on NASDAQ.
6
  
 Our findings also have implications for tests of informed or manipulative trading at the close of a 
trading session. We find that a relationship exists between the misclassification of trade initiator and the 
time of the trade day. We find that misclassifications tend to be higher in the first 30 minutes compared to 
the last 30 minutes of the morning and afternoon trading sessions for our sample. As the time between the 
trades decreases, the misclassification rates increase with the exception of the tick algorithm. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review of 
the literature that examines the performance of trade classification algorithms. In the third section, some 
descriptive information on trade execution on the BIST is presented. In the fourth section, the sample and 
data are discussed. In the fifth section, we deal with the conceptual question of who is the trade initiator 
especially when the trade includes a short-sale side. In the sixth section, the hypotheses to be tested are 
specified and our results for the tests of these hypotheses are presented and discussed. We conclude with 
section seven. 
 
2.2 BRIEF REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE  
 In this section, we discuss the studies summarized in Table 2.2 that test the accuracy of various trade 
classification (or signing) algorithms. Lee and Ready (1991) use the immediacy approach and the 
available BBO to obtain a benchmark for assessing trade classification accuracy of their individual trade 
classification or LR algorithm against the tick and the quote algorithms for 150 NYSE firms for 1988. 
They identify a delay between the reporting of quotes and their respective trades that should be reflected 
when classifying trades, and that classification performance deteriorates for trades inside the quoted 
spreads (i.e., when trade improvement occurs).  
[Please place Table 2.2 about here] 
 Two studies use unique data sets with more complete data on quotes and trades (including some trader 
identities and/or trade direction indicators) for NASDAQ firms.
7
 Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) 
                                                          
6
 Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) could not provide a totally clean test of the effect of short selling 




document accuracy rates of 77%, 76% and 81% (lower for trades within the bid-ask quotes) for the tick, 
quote and LR algorithms, respectively, for a sample of 313 Nasdaq stocks over the 12 months starting 
with September 1996. Chakrabarty et al. (2007) present a new algorithm that first divides the spread into 
ten incremental deciles and then uses the quote rule when transaction prices are closer to the ask or bid 
and the tick rule when transaction prices are closer to the mid-spread. Their classification algorithm 
outperforms the tick, LR and EMO algorithms by 1.12%, 2.10% and 0.72%, respectively, for a sample of 
750 NASDAQ firms over the three-month period of April-June 2005. 
 Various studies use the TORQ database.  Since TORQ provides details on the parties to a trade, order 
submission times and the prior-to-execution handling of orders electronically routed (SuperDot) at the 
NYSE, information about the trader's identity (e.g., individuals versus institutional traders) and order 
characteristics (e.g., whether seller- or buyer-initiated) are directly observable for 144 NYSE stocks for 
the three months starting with  November 1990. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) report a 93% accuracy rate 
for the LR algorithm for a sub-sample of 15 stocks from the TORQ dataset after eliminating 
approximately 40% of the trades in TORQ that could not be unambiguously classified as being either 
buyer- or seller-initiated because they were market “crosses”, stopped market orders, and pairings of 
market with executable limit orders. Odders-White (2000) reports an 85% classification success rate for 
the LR algorithm with systematic misclassifications of the transactions at the mid-spread, small 
transactions, and for large or frequently traded stocks. Based only on an analysis of signing accuracy for 
the LR algorithm by trade size, time between trades, number of transactions, and firm size, Odders-White 
(2000) finds that classification accuracy increases with the omission of trades at the mid-spread. She also 
reports overestimation of the number of buys and underestimation of the number of sells for small trades, 
and that the use of incorrectly signed trades leads to the overestimation of order processing costs.  
Including only those trades with a market order on one or both sides of the trade, Finucane (2000) reports 
a similar performance for the tick and LR algorithms that is superior to that for the reverse tick test. He 
also reports that the accuracy rate for the tick test is below that reported by Lee and Ready (1991) but 
better than that reported by Aitken and Frino (1996) and Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000).  
 Based on the assumption that their algorithm correctly assigns trades, Blais and Protter (2012) report 
that the signing accuracy of the LR algorithm for trades is around 56% for both 30 liquid and 30 illiquid 
stocks drawn from the Morgan Stanley Order Book for stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7
 The data set used by Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) identifies whether a trade is by market makers, brokers 
and customers but only provides the names of market makers and brokers since this field is blank for customers. 
Chakrabarty et al. (2007) use data from the two largest ECNs, INET and ArcaEx, which provide buy and sell 
indicators. Using a proprietary dataset from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) that reports trade 
direction, Savickas and Wilson (2003) report accuracy rates of 59%, 83%, 80% and 77% for the tick, quote, LR and 
EMO algorithms, respectively. 
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and LSE over the period of July 1 to December 19, 2003. Using a modeling approach that considers 
information strengths, microstructure effects and classification correlations for 2800 US stocks, Rosenthal 
(2012) reports 1 to 2% higher accuracy rates compared to other classification algorithms across dates, 
sectors and spreads for the ArcaTrade dataset that provides the non-initiating (first arriving) trade 
classification for all trades on the Archipelago ECN for December 2004. Using clean data unlike previous 
studies, he attributes the improvements in forecast accuracy to the use of information strengths (1 to 
1.3%) and from estimating quotes (0.9% and 0.7% for Nasdaq and NYSE stocks, respectively).  
 Some studies test the accuracy of the trade classification methods for non-US, developed markets. 
Aitken and Frino (1996) report a 74% and 90% accuracy rate when using a tick algorithm to determine 
actual trade direction for about 1100 stocks in the Australian Stock Exchange when zero ticks are 
included and excluded, respectively. The tick algorithm outperforms the LR algorithm for their data 
sample except for seller–initiated and small buyer-initiated trades.  Using the definition of true 
classification based on whether the Makler (the equivalent of the specialist on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange) bought or sold shares, Theissen (2001) documents accuracy rates of 72.2% and 72.8% for the 
tick and LR algorithms, respectively, for 15 stocks from 26 September to 25 October 1996.   
 For a developing market, Lu and Wei (2009) conclude that their adjusted version of the LR algorithm 
is the most appropriate algorithm examined for 684 stocks traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the 
six-months ending June 30, 2006.
8
 Due to the existing price limits and the absence of designated market 
makers on this exchange, Lu and Wei suggest that the lack of bid or ask quotes can be solved by first 
classifying trades using the quote and then the tick algorithm.   
 Findings on the trade classification accuracy of the LR algorithm are less supportive for short sales. 
Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) find that the tick, quote and LR algorithms often misclassify short sales 
as buyer-initiated based on a sample of 100 stocks from each of NASDAQ and NYSE during the three 
months of March, June and December 2005. The LR algorithm performs the best with a 33.4% accuracy 
rate for short sales when measured against a prior that short sales should be seller-initiated. In the absence 
of trader IDs, Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) use a modified chronological approach for 
determining the true trade initiator that should be highly reliable. Using a prior that short sales should be 
buyer-initiated, Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) report that the misclassification rate is higher 
than 30% for individual short sales and is reduced to 21% using one-second lagged instead of 
contemporaneous quotes for a sample of 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks from NASDAQ for June and 
December 2005. Since the misclassifications of buyer- and seller-initiated trades are almost evenly 
                                                          
8
 Their revised quote rule classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if there is only a bid-side (ask-side) quote available. 
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distributed, they report that the LR algorithm correctly identifies most short sales as buyer-initiated and 
most long sales as seller-initiated at the aggregate daily level. The generalizability of their results are 
based on how representative trades in the accounts of the electronic trading platform INET were of the 
wider market given that it only represented around one-quarter of total and total short-sale volume for the 
two months they studied, on the effect of INET not enforcing NASDAQ’s bid price test for short sales 
during their sample period (Diether et al., 2009b), and of the acquisition of Instinet by NASDAQ which 
was announced in April 2005 and closed in December 2005 (Morcroft, 2005). 
2.3 THE BORSA ISTANBUL (BIST)
9
 
 National Market firms require daily average trading volumes (number of trades) of >1% (≥ 4%) of 
the total for all National Market listings.
10
  National Market listings have increased from 325 (December 
31, 2008) to 397 (November 14, 2012). Other markets on the BIST during our studied time period 
include: the Second National Market for small- and medium-sized firms that are temporarily or 
permanently delisted from the National Market; the New Economy Market for telecommunication, 
electronic, internet and computer manufacturing firms considered as fast growing and in need of 
financing; the Exchange Traded Funds Market for ETF transactions; and the Watchlist Market for 
companies under special surveillance and investigation due to extraordinary stock transactions.  
 Trading for BIST-30 (and BIST-100) constituents is fully computerized and order-driven with buy and 
sell order matching based on price and time priority.
11
 The opening of a session for BIST-30 (and BIST-
100) constituents is designed as a call market. During the opening of a session, trades in the limit-order 
book are executed at the price that provides the maximum executable amount of trade for each stock. 
However, this opening price is not used to generate a new base price and price limits in the continuous 
auction market phase. If an opening price for a particular stock is not obtained, all the orders entered into 
the system are carried over to the continuous auction session where market makers have no role.
12
 
 Up to October 13, 2008, the time period for order collection, order matching and continuous trading 
are 9:30 to 9:40, 9:40 to 9:45 and 9:45 to 12:00, respectively, for the first daily trading session.  
Thereafter, the time periods for each of the three functions are 9:30 to 9:45, 9:45 to 9:50 and 9:50 to 
12:30, respectively. The second daily session for our sample time period is from 14:00 to 17:00 where the 
                                                          
9
 A more extensive description of the BIST listing categories and trading mechanics is available from the authors. 
10
 The listing requirements are given in detail in the BIST Operations Manual 2008 and 2009 available at 
www.ise.org The daily average trading volume and number of trades of all companies are reviewed quarterly. If a 
company fails to meet the minimum circulation criteria during one of these reviews, it is transferred to the Second 
National Market.  
11
 The exchange was founded on December 26, 1985 and became fully automated from October 21, 1994. 
12
 Based on communications with the BIST. 
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first five-minute period consists of electronic order transmission. All of these changes are reflected in our 
subsequently reported results. 
2.4     SAMPLE AND DATA 
2.4.1 Sample 
 Our sample consists of all the firms in the BIST-30 Index which in the aggregate accounts for about 
70% of the total trading volume on the BIST for the seven-month period ending in December 2008 and 
centered on September 2008 (the month of Lehman’s collapse). The BIST-30 index is updated quarterly 
and consists of the 30 most frequently traded firms on the BIST chosen from National Market listings and 
the stocks of real estate investment trusts and venture capital investment trusts listed on the Collective 
Products Market. Since the sample period covers two (at the end of June and September) of these 
quarterly index revisions when five firms were replaced, our sample consists of 35 firms. The aggregate 
market capitalization and total value of shares traded for the BIST-30 Index in 2008 was $11 billion and 
$248 billion US, respectively. Figure 2.1 plots the monthly closing levels and aggregate number of shares 
traded for the BIST-30 Index for our seven-month sample period. This is a period of generally increasing 
trade activity and decreasing index levels. 
[Please place Figure 2.1 about here.] 
2.4.2 Data Manipulation 
 The raw data provided by the BIST consists of incoming order and trade files that provide the date, 
time (up to the closest second), order number, order type, quantity, and price information. The uncleaned 
order file contains some entry errors due to, for example, the inclusion of orders cancelled by phone, 
altered orders (by order type or quantity) and multiple order entries. Using a search over 20-minute 
increments for each stock (i.e., 2499 20-minute intervals for the seven-month period examined herein), 
we identify order file errors as those orders that appear in the order but not trade book and cause the 
spread to be non-positive. We eliminate any identified order errors, and then recheck each 20-minute time 
interval until no additional errors are identified.  
 We construct the limit order book consisting of the ten best different bids and ten best different offers 
and their corresponding volumes for each second of the trading day based on price and then time priority 
by using the order flow and trade data.  Our second-by-second limit order book for each stock is updated 
when new orders are added, existing orders are canceled or existing or new orders are executed.  A new 
buy (sell) order is placed in the buy queue after (before) all orders to buy (sell) at the same price or after 
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(before) all orders to buy (sell) at a higher (lower) price if the queue does not already include an order to 
buy (sell) at the same price.  A trade removes an order from the inside of the book (oldest buy order at the 
highest buying price or the oldest sell order at the lowest selling price). The unique 15 or 16-digit ID 
number and timestamp up to the closest second attached to each order allows us to perfectly match orders 
between the order-flow and trade data sets. This makes it possible to obtain the chronological ranking of 
the orders and trades and the trade initiator using the chronological method as in Odders-White (2000). 
 Our initial “cleaned” sample consists of 8,375,672 trades of which we can classify 99.5% or  
8,332,218 trades using the chronological method since the chronological method cannot classify executed 
orders that arrive at the same time (i.e., have the same time stamp).  The sample of trades is further 
reduced to 7,894,420 trades with the deletion of the first five minutes of continuous trading of the trading 
day,
13
 and to 7,889,985 trades after deleting trades that could not be classified using the five classification 
algorithms used herein. A total of 46.1 billion shares were traded for our final sample of trades over the 
seven months examined herein. 
 Thus, our final sample of the number of trades represents 94.2% of all the trades in the original 
sample. This elimination rate of 5.8% is much lower than that reported in the literature for other markets. 
Some elimination rates for studies using TORQ trades are 25% in Finucane (2000), 25.1% in Odders-
White (2000) and about 40% in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000). Elimination rates using other datasets 
include 24.6% in Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000).  
2.5   WHO IS THE TRADE INITIATOR? 
 Before proceeding to our examination of the performance of the various trade classification algorithms 
for the BIST, we need to discuss how the identity of the actual initiator of each trade or comparison 
benchmark is determined. In the absence of short sales and given full information on trades and quotes 
(such as time and trader identification), the actual trade initiator is the party to the trade that pays the 
largest “immediacy premium’’ that reflects both a time and cost dimension. 
 The two common approaches for determining the trade initiator are based on the implicit assumption 
that all trades are long-long.  When trade IDs are not available, a trade is assumed to be initiated by the 
trader whose market order has been executed against a standing limit order. The advantage of this 
immediacy approach is that it considers both dimensions of liquidity for trades that match a market with a 
limit order that are on opposite sides of the market. However, as noted by Odders-White (2000), this 
                                                          
13
 Continuous trades began at 9:45 am for trades up to October 13, 2008, and from 9:50 thereafter. Thus, we use 
trades from 9:50am and 9:55am, respectively. 
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approach cannot identify the actual trade initiator for crossed market orders, limit-limit order matches and 
stopped market orders. Odders-White reports that crossed market orders and limit-limit order matches 
account for about 12% and 17%, respectively, of the transactions in the TORQ data set. When trade IDs 
are available, the chronological approach is used where the trade initiator is identified as being the trader 
who places an order last chronologically. The two-part rationale behind this approach is that: (i) the first-
in party to the trade acts as the liquidity provider at its chosen price; and (ii) the last-in party pays the 
“immediacy premium” for the rapid execution of the trade. The advantage of this approach is that it 
considers both dimensions of liquidity for a wider set of order type pairings.  
 There is a divergence of opinion in the literature on who is the trade initiator when one side of the 
trade includes a short sale.  While Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) argue conceptually that short sales 
should be predominantly seller-initiated, Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) argue that by using 
INET order data they can correctly identify the true trade initiator for short sales as being predominantly 
buyer-initiated. Given different conceptual benchmarks, it is not surprising that they arrive at different 
conclusions about the reliability of using the LR algorithm for classifying trades when the LR algorithm 
classifies most (majority of) trades involving short sales as being buyer-initiated for stocks (not) subject 
to either the uptick or inside bid rule depending upon the trading venue examined. 
 We argue that it is not possible to obtain an unambiguous determination of the true trade initiator for 
trades that involve short sales even if the researcher has access to trader IDs. We argue that it is not 
reasonable to assume that other trade immediacy costs are symmetrical for both trade sides for a trade that 
involves a short sale, since the short side incurs various additional immediacy-related trade costs 
(Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004) that are not incurred by the long side even in the absence of an uptick 
rule. As noted by Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010), these include at a minimum the need to locate a 
security to borrow and to accept a below-market rebate rate (i.e., the equivalent of the overnight repo rate 
minus the lending fee on a daily basis).
14
 The existence of these additional trade costs only for the short 
seller means that both parties pay an “immediacy premium” for rapid execution of the trade. Thus, the 
competing actual trade initiator benchmarks differ based on the assumption made in terms of the relative 
importance of these additional trade costs. If they are not material, one arrives at a benchmark that trades 
involving short sales should be predominantly buyer-initiated as advocated by Chakrabarty, Moulton and 
Shkilko (2012). If they are material and sufficiently large, one arrives at a benchmark that trades 
involving short sales should be predominantly seller-initiated as advocated by Asquith, Oman and Safaya 
(2010). 
                                                          
14
 Other indirect costs associated with the short side are recall risk, and the short term adverse consequence of the 
marking to market of collateral when the price moves against the borrower (short seller). 
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 The empirical evidence finds that lending fees (rebate rates) are material but not sufficiently large for 
most stocks to either conclude that the actual initiator of a trade involving a short sale should be 
predominantly buyer- or predominantly seller-initiated. Two examples are the studies by D’Avolio (2002) 
and Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) both of which use proprietary databases of stock lending activity 
from a large (different) institutional investor. For  the period of April 2000 through September 2001, 
D’Avolio (2002) reports that for the 91% of the firms not “on special” (defined as a loan fee greater than 
1% per annum), the typical loan fees are around 20 basis points per annum. For the period of September 
1999 to August 2003, Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) report mean (median) annual loan fees of 0.39% 
(0.13%) and 3.94% (3.93%) for firms above and below the median value of market equity of firms listed 
on the NYSE. They also note that the loan fee for retail borrowers is typically equal to the interest rate on 
cash funds since retail investors typically receive no interest on their proceeds from the short sale. For the 
rebate rates based on the small proportion of short sales collected by Takasbank,
15
 we observe that almost 
all rebate rates exceed one percent annually. 
 Thus, given that lending fees are firm-specific and time-varying and not available for most traded 
stocks (especially over the longer time periods examined in many microstructure studies), no 
unambiguous benchmark of the identities of the actual trade initiators is possible for trades involving 
short sales. However, if such data became available, a researcher could adjust the mid-spreads used in the 
LR algorithm upwards to account for estimates of these differentials. 
 
2.6      HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS 
 Before proceeding to a presentation of the hypotheses to be tested and the test results, our primary test 
for goodness-of-fit is the chi-square test,   . We also use the G-test, which is also known as a (log-) 
likelihood ratio test, as an alternative test since the chi-square test is simply an approximation to the G-
test for convenient manual computation and the G-test is based on the multinomial distribution without 
using the normal distribution approximation.  The chi-square and G- test statistics are computed as:
16
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15
 The major purpose and activity of the Takasbank is to provide clearing, settlement and custody services within the 
capital market and related exchange regulations of Turkey as well as rendering investment banking services within 
the scope of the Banking Law and other banking regulations. As the central clearing and settlement institution to 
Borsa Istanbul, Takasbank is authorized to provide cash and securities settlements for transactions for equities, debt 
securities, foreign securities, derivatives and precious metals. 
16
 The two statistics will converge for large sample size n since the two measures differ by terms of the order of 
    . For greater details, see: http://www.statsref.com/HTML/index.html?g_contingency_table_test.html 
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where     and    are the observed and expected frequencies for cell i, j, respectively, in the contingency 
table; ln is the natural logarithm; and the sum is taken over all non-empty cells. 
2.6.1   Total Sample (not) Differentiated by Time of the Trading Day 
2.6.1.1 Hypotheses 
 Since many studies that were reviewed earlier find that the LR algorithm tends to have the highest 
accuracy rate for markets in developed countries, we expect that such will also be the case for the BIST 
even though it is situated in a developing country. Therefore, our first hypothesis in its alternate form is: 
  
 : The LR algorithm has a better rate of accuracy for the total sample not differentiated by time-
of-day than the tick, quote, at-the-quote and EMO algorithms for trade classification. 
 Researchers generally exclude trades for short periods after the opening and near the closing of a 
trading day. For example, Odders-White (2000) excludes the first fifteen minutes of trading from her 
analysis based on the argument that the concept of an initiator is not applicable for this period of time due 
to the opening auction. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) exclude the orders entered prior to the market 
opening when they document a significant difference between the posted and effective spreads paid by 
investors.  In the spirit of Odders-White while minimizing the loss of trades, we only exclude the first five 
minutes of continuous trading for the first trading session of each trading day when examining the rates of 
accuracy of the five classification algorithms for the first and last 30 minutes of both the morning and 
afternoon trading sessions. We also account for the change of trading times on October 13, 2008 that was 
discussed earlier. Therefore, our second hypothesis in its alternate form is: 
  
 : The accuracies of the trade classification algorithms differ during the first and last 30 minutes 
of each trading session.  
 The first potential determinant of trade misclassifications examined in the literature is the lag length of 
the quote used in some of the trade classification algorithms.  According to Lee and Ready (1991), 
misclassifications are reduced significantly by comparing a trade to the quote in effect five seconds 
earlier. Although her highest misclassification rate of 20.1% occurs for trades that are less than five 
seconds apart, Odders-White (2000) finds that the five-second rule only affects 4% of her data sample and 
that the rule changes the classification for only 1,218 out of 318,364 transactions. Since the elimination of 
the five-second rule causes more misclassifications, she concludes that the increased misclassification of 
trades that are less than five seconds apart is not due to the failure of the five-second rule. Chakrabarty, 
Moulton and Shkilko (2012) report that the misclassification rate drops by one third when one-second 
lagged quotes are used in the LR algorithm instead of contemporaneous quotes. We also expect to have 
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better results using one- versus five-second lagged quotes given the fully computerized nature of the 
order-driven market on the BIST. Therefore, our third null hypothesis is: 
  
 : The classification accuracy of the various trade classification algorithms for trades on the BIST 
is the same for quote lag lengths of zero, one and five seconds that are commonly used in the 
microstructure literature. 
2.6.1.2   Results 
 We report the average accuracy rates for the full trading day and for the first and last 30 minutes of the 
morning and afternoon trading sessions in panels A and B of Table 2.3, respectively. The results are based 
on 7,889,985 transactions for the whole sample over the full seven months examined herein. For the 
undifferentiated sample, we find that the one-second version of each of the four trade classification 
algorithms that use quotes have the highest classification accuracies, and that this version of the LR 
algorithm has the best performance with an average accuracy rate of 96.38%.
17
 The use of zero-second 
lagged quotes results in the lowest classification accuracies for all quote-based algorithms. For one-
second lagged quotes, the average trade classification accuracy rate for the LR algorithm is followed by 
the quote, at-the-quote, tick and EMO algorithms with average accuracy rates of 95.00%, 93.05%, 
90.38%, and 86.93%, respectively. These results support the findings of Chakrabarty, Moulton and 
Shkilko (2012) that the use of quotes lagged one second lead to higher classification accuracies than the 
use of contemporaneous quotes.  
[Please place Table 2.3 about here] 
 As for the undifferentiated sample, we find that the one-second version of each of the four trade 
classification algorithms that use quotes have the highest trade classification accuracies for the 
differentiated samples. Furthermore, this version of the LR algorithm has the best performance with an 
average accuracy rate of 96.52% and 96.32% for the first and last 30 minutes of the morning trading 
session, respectively, and 95.89% and 96.99% for the first and last 30 minutes of the afternoon trading 
session, respectively.  As for the undifferentiated sample, this average trade accuracy rate for the LR 
algorithm is followed by the quote and at-the-quote algorithms. The tick (EMO) followed by the EMO 
(tick) algorithm come next for the morning (afternoon) session.
18
 Based on the chi-square and G- tests and 
one-second lagged BBO, the accuracy rates are significantly higher (lower) for the last 30 versus the first 
30 minutes for the at-the-quote and EMO (quote and LR) algorithms in the morning session and for all 
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 Since the tick algorithm does not use quotes, its classification accuracy is invariant to whether a zero, one or five 
second lagged quote is used. 
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four classification algorithms in the afternoon session. They are also significantly higher using the tick 
algorithm for both sessions. Thus, we reject our third null hypothesis at the 0.001% level that 
classification accuracy is independent of whether trades occur near the beginning or end of the morning or 
afternoon sessions for all trade classification algorithms and all lag lengths. 
2.6.2   Total Sample Differentiated by Trade Positioning within the BBO  
2.6.2.1 Hypothesis 
  It is well documented that trade classification algorithms perform significantly better for the trades at 
the BBO quotes. Since the LR algorithm compares the transaction price to the posted quotes, Chakrabarty 
et al. (2007) find that its accuracy is higher for the trades that occur at either BBO quote. Odders-White 
(2000) documents an 89.6% accuracy rate for the trades at or outside the quotes using the LR algorithm. 
However, the LR algorithm for her sample only correctly classifies 78.23% and 62.63% of the trades that 
are inside the spread but not at the spread midpoint and at the spread midpoint, respectively. Similarly, 
Rosenthal (2012) documents that the LR algorithm using one second lagged quotes has the best 
classification accuracy of 79% of the trades that take place at the ask quote for his sample of  Nasdaq and  
NYSE stocks for December 1 and 2, 2004. Thus, our fourth hypothesis in its alternate form is: 
  
 : The accuracy rate for classifying trades using the LR algorithm is higher when trades take 
place at the BBO quotes compared to when they occur at the mid-spread or inside the quotes 
but not at the mid-spread. 
2.6.2.2   Results 
 The accuracy rates of the trade classification algorithms based on the trade price positioning against 
the BBO quotes and their mid-spreads are reported in Table 2.4. Once again, the LR algorithm with one-
second lagged quotes exhibits the best performance with accuracy rates of 96.18%, 93.30% and 95.42% 
for the trades that occur at or outside the BBO spread, at the BBO mid-spread, and within the BBO spread 
but not at the mid-spread, respectively.
19
 Interestingly, the other three classification algorithms that use 
quotes have the highest accuracies for trades at the mid-spread when their lag length is five seconds. 
Among the three trade positions relative to the BBO, the tick algorithm performs best with an accuracy 
rate of 90.17% when the trades occur at or outside the BBO spread.  Our results for lagged versions of the 
LR algorithm are consistent with those of Odders-White (2000) in that the highest rates of 
misclassifications occur for the trades that take place at the quote mid-spread. Furthermore, based on the 
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 The results are similar when locked trades are removed from the sample. One difference is that the quote 
algorithm using a one-second lagged BBO has the highest accuracy rate of 95.40% versus 94.60% for its LR 
algorithm counterpart for trades within the BBO spread but not at the mid-spread. Not surprisingly, the accuracy 
rates increase substantially for all classification algorithms and BBO lag lengths for trades at the mid-spread. 
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chi-square and G-test statistics and their associated p-values, we reject our fourth null hypothesis at the 
0.001% level that classification accuracy is independent of the positioning of the trade relative to the 
BBO for all trade classification algorithms and all lag lengths. 
[Please place Table 2.4 about here] 
2.6.3  Total Sample Differentiated by Time between Trades  
2.6.3.1  Hypothesis 
 Easley and O’Hara (1992) show that the time between trades plays a role in price behavior in that 
trade provides a signal of the direction of any new information and the lack of trade indicates the absence 
of any news and provides an indicator of event uncertainty. Since the time between trades cannot be 
isolated from the information content and the price process, we analyze the effect of the time difference 
between trades when assessing the performances of the trade classification algorithms. In other words, we 
investigate if a relationship exists between the misclassification of trades and trade frequency.  This will 
provide an indirect test of whether trade classification accuracy has a relationship with the frequency of 
informed trading. Odders-White (2000) investigates this hypothesis by applying two different measures: 
time between trades and the total number of transactions during her sample period. Therefore, in order to 
provide further evidence on the effect of this trade characteristic for our market, our fifth hypothesis in its 
alternate form is:  
  
 : Trade classification accuracy is inversely related with the time between trades. 
2.6.3.2   Results 
To conduct this test, we divide our sample into three categories: trades occurring less than or equal to 
five seconds apart (76.2% of the total), trades occurring more than five and less than or equal to 30 
seconds apart (15.8% of the total), and trades occurring more than 30 seconds apart (8.0% of the total).  
The accuracy rates of the trade classification algorithms based on the time between trades are reported in 
Table 2.5. Based on the chi-square and G-test statistics, the rates of trade classification accuracy are 
significantly different for each classification algorithm for each lag quote length. Thus, our results do not 
support our fifth null hypothesis at the 0.001% level that classification accuracy is independent of the 
elapsed time between trades for all trade classification algorithms and all lag lengths. 
[Please place Table 2.5 about here] 
The one-second lagged version of the LR algorithm continues to have the best performance for three 
time-between-trades categories with a classification accuracy range of 96.19% to 97.50%. Holding the lag 
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to one-second, the accuracy rates in descending order are the quote, at-the-quote, and the EMO algorithms 
for all three categories. The tick algorithm consistently outperforms the EMO algorithm for all BBO lag 
lengths and time-between-trades categories. The rate of trade accuracy tends to deteriorate as the time 
between trades decreases for all but the EMO trade classification algorithm.  Except for the tick algorithm 
and the one- and five-second lagged quote versions of the EMO algorithm, all trade direction algorithms 
exhibit the lowest performances for successive trades occurring within five seconds or less. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Odders-White (2000) although she finds that 20.07% of the transactions 
occurring within five seconds or less of each other are misclassified using the LR algorithm. We find that 
the accuracy rate for the LR algorithm changes marginally when moving from five to one-second lagged 
quotes, except for a five-second or less period between trades where it increases from 93.77% to 96.29%. 
This result is also consistent with the finding of Oders-White (2000) for developed markets who notes 
that the increased misclassification for consecutive trades occurring within five seconds or less is not 
caused by the failure of the use of five-second lagged quotes. As further support, we find that the LR 
algorithm only successfully classifies 81.20% of the trades in this trade-time category using 
contemporaneous quotes. The misclassification rate increases from 6.23% to 18.80% when we move from 
five- to zero-second quotes, where the latter percentage represents the highest misclassification rate for 
the LR algorithm for all categories and for all lag lengths. These results are consistent with the conjecture 
that frequently traded stocks exhibit higher trade misclassification rates which may be attributed to the 
increased number of informed trades taking place when the time between consecutive trades is shorter.  
2.6.4  Total Sample Differentiated by Trade Size  
2.6.4.1   Hypothesis 
 There is reason to expect that trade classification accuracy may be lower for larger-sized trades. 
Various studies use either trade size categorization in dollars traded or shares traded to identify trades by 
retail investors (e.g., Brandt et al., 2010) or informed traders (e.g., Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1996; 
Schultz, 2000). Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) document greater price improvement for smaller trades, 
which may be caused by a greater proportion of small trades taking place inside the bid-ask spread. 
Odders-White (2000) reports that 16.85% of the transactions with 300 or fewer shares that she examined 
are misclassified by the LR algorithm, whereas 13.65% of the transactions consisting of more than 300 
shares are misclassified. Aitken and Frino (1996) document similar results for the Australian market using 
the tick algorithm. In contrast, Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) document higher 
misclassification rates for trades larger than their mean trade size of 300 shares and median of 100 shares.  




 : Smaller trades are more likely to be misclassified compared to larger trades, since they occur 
more frequently inside the bid ask spread.  
2.6.4.2   Results 
 There are three main metrics used in the microstructure literature to determine trade sizes: number of 
shares transacted, dollar value of shares transacted, or number of board lots transacted. Kryzanowski and 
Zhang (1996) use the dollar value of shares transacted in the Canadian Market and designate four 
categories: odd lot,
20
 small board lot (value of less than $10,000), middle board lot (value equal to or 
greater than $10,000 and less than $100,000), and large board lot (value equal to or greater than 
$100,000) in their analysis of the trading patterns of small and large trades around stock split ex-dates 
using intraday data for the Toronto Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1989. In exploring the competition 
between ECNs and NASDAQ market makers, Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) use the 
number of shares transacted on these trade venues when grouped into three categories: one to 1000 
shares; 1001 to 9999 shares; and ≥ 10000 shares. Using the board lots size (considered as the generally 
accepted unit of trading), Ahn and Cheung (1999) analyze the behavior of bid and ask spreads and depths 
for 471 stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
 To be consistent with Odders-White (2000), we divide our trades into six categories based on the 
number of shares traded. The resulting trade size groupings are: fewer than or equal to 500 shares, 
between 501 and 1,000 shares, between 1001 and 5000 shares, between 5001 and 15,000 shares, between 
15,001 and 45,000 shares, and more than 45,000 shares. Based on the accuracy rates for these trade size 
groupings reported in Table 2.6, we observe that almost half of the trades (41.6%) are in the smallest 
trade size category of 500 or fewer shares, whereas the largest trade size grouping with trades of more 
than 45,000 shares represent only 3.1% of all trades. The LR algorithm once gain outperforms the other 
four trade classification algorithms for each trade-size grouping using one-second lagged quotes with 
accuracy rates  of 96.77% and 96.79% for the smallest (fewer than or equal to 500 shares) and largest 
(more than 45,000 shares) trade size groupings, respectively. Based on the chi-square and G-test statistics 
and their associated p-values, we reject our sixth null hypothesis at the 0.001% level that classification 
accuracy is independent of trade size for all trade classification algorithms and all lag lengths. 
[Please place Table 2.6 about here] 
 Our findings are consistent with Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012) but not Odders-White 
(2000) and Aitken and Frino (1996). The misclassification rates for our smallest trade size category 
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 A board lot is defined as 100 shares for a stock with a price of $1 or higher (definition Canadian Securities 
Institute). An Odd Lot corresponds to the number of shares that are less than a board lot. 
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(between 501 and 1,000 shares) are (significantly) higher than that for the largest trade size category 
(greater than 45,000 shares) for the tick algorithm and the other four classification algorithms using zero 
and five-second lagged BBO. In contrast, they are smaller for the four classification algorithms that use a 
one-second lagged BBO, and significantly so for all but the LR algorithm. The misclassification rates for 
the second smallest trade size category (greater than 1000 shares but less than or equal to 5000 shares) are 
generally significantly larger than those for the second largest trade size category (greater than 15,000 
shares but less than or equal to 45,000 shares). The rates are significantly higher for the second largest 
versus second smallest trade size category for the at-the-quote and EMO algorithms using one-second 
lagged BBO. Based on our results, our evidence supports the hypothesis that the smallest trades are more 
frequently misclassified than the largest trades.  
2.6.5   Total Sample Differentiated by Long versus Short Trades 
 Short sales are allowed on the BIST using a conventional uptick rule after the opening price is 
determined by the system or against the previous session’s closing trade price in cases where the system 
does not determine an opening price.  
2.6.5.1   Hypothesis 
 Examining differences between short and long trades has attracted increasing research interest as more 
sophisticated data has become available. As discussed in section two, researchers report lower accuracy 
rates for trade classification algorithms for short versus long trades although they differ on whether short 
sales are expected to be buyer-initiated (Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko, 2012) or seller-initiated 
(Asquith, Oman and Safaya, 2010).  We also expect the classification accuracy of the LR algorithm for 
short sales to be best using one-second lagged quotes when benchmarked against the actual trade 
classification from the chronological approach. However, as we discussed in section five, the reliability of 
using the chronological approach for identifying the actual trade initiator is dependent upon the relative 
importance of the additional trade (immediacy) costs associated with the short and not the long side of a 
trade involving a short sale. We invoke the assumption in this section of the paper that these additional 
costs are not material so that our benchmark is that trades involving short sales are predominantly buyer-
initiated.
21
 We do this for presentation purposes and because the tick rule on the BIST may be a constraint 
for short sales. Therefore, our seventh hypothesis in its alternative form is: 
  
 : The LR algorithm using one second lagged quotes performs better than the other classification 
algorithms for both long and short trades.   
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 When we classify our samples of long and short trades using the chronological method, we find that 92.2% and 
only 51.2% of the short and long trades, respectively, are classified as being buyer-initiated. 
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2.6.5.2   Results 
 The results for trade classification accuracy differentiated by long versus short trades are reported in 
Table 2.7. For the four trade classification algorithms that use quotes (quote, at the quote, LR and EMO), 
the rate of “misclassification” is higher for the short trades than for the long trades using one second 
lagged quotes, consistent with the results reported by Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) and Chakrabarty, 
Moulton and Shkilko (2012).
22
 While the differences in classification accuracies for the same algorithm 
are statistical significant based on the chi-square and G-test statistics, the magnitudes are not that 
different. For instance, the “misclassification” rates for the LR algorithm for short and long trades are 
respectively 16.18% and 16.12% using contemporaneous quotes, 5.07% and 3.57% using one-second 
lagged quotes, and 8.05% and 3.57% using five-second lagged quotes. Although the corresponding 
“misclassification” rate magnitudes are higher in Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012), they report a 
similar ordering based on the quote lag length for the LR algorithm. Specifically, they report for short and 
long trades respective “misclassification” rates of 32% and 31% using contemporaneous quotes, 21.4% 
and 21.8% using  one-second lagged quotes, and 23.7% and 23.4% using five-second lagged quotes. For 
the four trade classification algorithms that use quotes, the rate of “misclassification” is lowest (highest) 
when one second (contemporaneous) quotes are used for both the short and long trades. Thus, our results 
support the seventh hypothesis that the LR algorithm using one-second lagged quotes outperforms the 
other trade direction algorithms for both long and short trades.  
[Please place Table 2.7 about here] 
2.6.6   Total Sample Differentiated by Seller-or-Buyer-Initiated Trades 
2.6.6.1   Hypothesis 
 While informed traders buy upon good information and sell upon bad information, uninformed 
(liquidity) traders are considered, on average, to buy or sell at similar levels. This distinction between 
informed and uninformed traders has been analyzed by many researchers for various purposes, such as the 
PIN of Easley et al. (1996) and the spread decomposition models of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans 
(1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988). Since the PIN estimate depends on the probability of information 
events and on the arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders, where the LR algorithm is 
generally used to  determine the number of buys and sells for each period of time (such as a day). 
                                                          
22
  This is the case even though the participation rate of short sales in our sample is lower than that reported in the 
U.S. For example, short sales account for 3.7% and 5.3% of the total number of trades and total number of shares 
traded, respectively, in our sample based on the last seven months of 2008. In contrast, Asquith et al. (2010, table 1, 
page 162) report respective corresponding average values of 29.7% and 27.9% for their sample for the three months 
examined in 2005. 
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Similarly, the trade indicator variables in these spread decomposition models generally rely on the LR 
algorithm to determine if a trade is buyer- or seller-initiated.  Thus, we now examine whether the 
accuracy rates of the five trade classification algorithms differ for buyer- and seller-initiated trades. 
Therefore, our eighth hypothesis is: 
  
 : There is no significant difference in the accuracies of the trade classification algorithms 
between buyer- and seller-initiated trades. 
2.6.6.2 Results 
 The trade classification accuracy results differentiated by buyer- or seller-initiated trades are reported 
in panel A of Table 2.8. Based on the chi-square and G-test values, the null hypothesis that trade 
classification accuracy is independent of whether the trade is buyer or seller-initiated is rejected at greater 
than the 0.01 level for all but the quote classification algorithm for a zero lag (p-value = 0.06). For the 
buyer-initiated trades which represent 52.8% of all trades, the LR algorithm using one-second lagged 
quotes has the best accuracy rate at 94.81%. In contrast, for the seller-initiated trades which represent 
47.2% of all the trades, the EMO algorithm with a one-second lag has the best accuracy rate at 99.07%, 
followed by the LR algorithm with a one-second lag at 98.12%. While the EMO algorithm is also best for 
the other two lag lengths for seller-initiated trades, its performance is far inferior to the tick and other 
three quote-based trade classification algorithms for the buyer-initiated trades.
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[Please place Table 2.8 about here] 
2.6.7   Total Sample Differentiated by BIST`s trader classifications 
2.6.7.1   Hypothesis 
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct a more complete test of the classification 
accuracy of trades differentiated by whether the trader has an agency or principal relationship with the 
brokerage firm executing the trade.
24
 To this end, we use the following three-way trader classification that 
is included in our proprietary dataset from the BIST: institutional and retail clients of the brokerage firms 
[M(Ins. & Retail)], portfolios of the brokerage firms [P(portfolio)], and the investment funds managed by 
the brokerage firms [F(fund)]. For testing purposes, we consider these three categories as representing 
pure agency, pure principal and most likely mixed agency and principal relations between client and 
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 Consistent with the findings of Funicane (2000) and untabulated results, the reverse tick rule displays the poorest 
classification accuracy for buyer- and seller-initiated trades. 
24
 Since they could not determine who initiated trades between market makers and between brokers, Ellis, Michaely 




executing broker, respectively. Thus, our ninth null hypothesis, which examines whether the accuracy of 
the trade classification algorithms is independent of the BIST’s trader classifications, is: 
  
 : The accuracy of the trade classification algorithms is independent of the BIST`s classification 
of traders. 
2.6.7.2   Results 
 The average trade classification accuracies in percent for each of the five trade classification 
algorithms based on the BIST`s classification of traders are reported in panel B of Table 2.8. Based on the 
chi-squares and G-test statistics, the null hypothesis that trade classification accuracy is independent of 
the BIST’s trader classification is rejected at greater than the 0.01 level. Consistent with previously 
reported results, the LR algorithm using one-second lagged quotes has the best classification accuracy at 
96.38%, 95.72% and 96.89% for the M, P and F trader classifications, respectively. Trades for the 
investment funds managed by the brokerage firms (mixed agency and principal relations) exhibit the 
highest accuracy rates with the exception of the LR algorithm using contemporaneous quotes. Trades for 
the portfolios of the brokerage firms (pure principal relations) exhibit the lowest accuracy rates. When 
compared to the undifferentiated results reported earlier in Table 2.3, we find lower accuracy rates for this 
grouping for all classification algorithms and lag lengths. Therefore, our results do not support our null 
hypothesis that the accuracies of the trade classification algorithms are independent of the BIST`s three-
way classification of traders. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 We examine the accuracy rates of five trade classification algorithms for a trade venue in a developing 
market for the seven months ending with December 2008 that is centered on the month of Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse. The order book data from the BIST is extensively cleaned to remove human errors 
prior to determining the BBO for each second for each trading day for each stock in the primary BIST 
index (the BIST-30).  
 We find that the one-second lagged version of the LR algorithm with over 95% classification accuracy 
not only outperforms the other four trade classification algorithms analyzed herein but is also higher than 
that previously reported for other markets including the U.S.  This is consistent with the guidance that the 
five-second rule needs to be replaced by its one-second counterpart for trade classifications for US 
markets (Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko, 2012). It is also consistent with the observation of Peterson 
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and Sirri (2003) that trade misclassifications for the LR algorithm based on the NBBO trade-
contemporaneous instead of the order-submission NBBO depend on how long an order takes to execute.  
 We find that the LR algorithm using one-second lagged quotes is generally the best for seven 
differentiated samples, and that the highest rates of misclassifications occur for trades at the quote mid-
spread and as the time between consecutive trades decreases (Odders-White, 2000). Misclassifications 
also tend to be lowest for agency trades and higher in the first versus the last 30 minutes of both daily 
trading sessions which may be due to more informed trading during these periods. Unlike Odders-White 
(2000) and Aitken and Frino (1996), we find that larger transactions generally are more frequently 
misclassified but only for the classification algorithms using one-second lagged BBO.  
 Unlike Asquith, Oman and Safaya (2010) and Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2012), we find 
accuracy rates of at least 90% using one-second lagged quotes for both long and short trades for the 
quote, at-the-quote and LR (but not EMO) algorithms. While the EMO algorithm is best for correctly 
classifying seller-initiated trades with over 95% accuracy rates and worst for correctly classifying buyer-
initiated trades, the LR algorithm using a one-second lagged BBO is second best for correctly classifying 























MARKET IMPACTS OF TRADES FOR STOCKS LISTED ON THE 
BORSA ISTANBUL 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Due to the effect (drag) of spread and price impacts of trade on investment performance; market 
participants implement various trading strategies in order to minimize their impact on net returns. With 
the increasing rate of participation of financial institutions in equity markets worldwide, large trades have 
substantially increased and become of increasing concern to market participants and regulators due to the 
perception that institutional traders are, on average, more informed. Due to their effect on the operational 
efficiency and transparency of markets, trading venues and regulators consider these impacts as some of 
the most important indicators of market quality. To illustrate using a 2012 example, the SIX Swiss 
Exchange extended its free Market Quality Metrics (MQM) service to ensure greater comparability and 
increased pre-trade transparency for its bond listings by providing investors with the ability to observe the 
historical availability of BBO (best bid and offer) quotes, the daily average spreads and the average 
depths on both sides of the order book.
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 As reviewed more extensively in the next section of the paper, most studies that examine the market 
impacts of large trades for various international markets report that these effects differ for buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades. A limitation of most of these studies is that their trade classifications depend on 
what proportion of the trades can be classified using the tick or Lee and Ready (1991) or Ellis, Michaely 
and O'Hara (2000) algorithms and the accuracy of the classifications for those trades that can be 
classified.
26
  Although a large portion of the trades remain unclassified in other studies, reported 
classification accuracies for the LR algorithm varies from 69.2% for long trades in Chakrabarty, Moulton 
and Shkilko (2012) to 93.0% in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000). As an illustration of the extent of trades 
that cannot be classified in many studies, Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) report a 93% accuracy rate for the 
Lee and Ready algorithm for a sub-sample of 15 stocks from the TORQ dataset after eliminating 
approximately 40% of the trades in TORQ that could not be unambiguously classified as being either 
buyer- or seller-initiated because they were market “crosses”, stopped market orders, and pairings of 
market with executable limit orders.  
                                                          
25As reported at: http://www.world-exchanges.org/focus/2012-11/m-4-8.php. Further details on the MQM are found 
at: http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/statistics/mqm/overview_en.html 
26 Other methods for classifying trades as buys and sells that are not necessarily buyer- or seller-initiated include 
Keim and Madhavan (1996) who use the trading history of a passive investment management firm containing all 
upstairs-negotiated trades between July 1985 and December 1992.  
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 Thus, a first motivation for this study is to examine the price effects of a trade on a developing 
(emerging) market (BIST or Borsa Istanbul) where order arrival times to the closest second, short sale 
trades are identified and the IDs of each order and trade are available for matching purposes. For our 
chosen market, this enables us to successfully identify more than 99.5% of the trades for the selected 
sample as being buyer-or seller-initiated using the chronological method as in Odders-White (2000).
27
 To 
illustrate the BIST’s growing importance, we note that on December 31, 2013, NASDAQ OMX 
concluded an agreement with the BIST to deliver market-leading technologies and advisory services, to 
take an equity stake in BIST, and to closely work together to further BIST’s “position and brand as the 
capital markets hub for the Eurasia region”.28 
 We examine trade price effects for various (not) differentiated samples of aggregated trades of 
relatively large and small sizes and trading frequencies that occur during the same trade second of the 
trading day for stocks included in the BIST-30 index. Since stocks in this index account for about 70% of 
the total trade volume on the BIST for our sample period of April 2008 through March 2009, they 
represent the investment opportunity set of greatest interest to (particularly foreign) investors. While the 
findings should not be generalized to the less heavily traded securities on the BIST, they do cover a 
period of considerable market turbulence associated with the Lehman collapse and the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). As such, they should be of interest to market overseers engaged in preventing possible 
stealth trading activity or market manipulation,
29
 and to practitioners when formulating and executing 
their investment decisions. 
      Consistent with the literature, we find that mean price effects are less than 30 basis points, and are 
(somewhat) counter-intuitive using the day’s closing (subsequent fifth trade second) price instead of the 
price for the first post trade second. Since an informed trader needs to cover the cost and risk of making 
the trade and thin trading is associated with larger inside bid-ask spreads, lower liquidity and higher 
volatility due to the addition of microstructure noise to the variance of the unobservable efficient returns 
that would prevail in a frictionless economy, we find, as expected, more positive and more negative total 
and permanent price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds for the relatively less frequently 
traded stocks. 
                                                          
27
 The chronological approach identifies the trade initiator as being the trader who placed her order closest to the 
trade being signed as buyer-or seller-initiated. 
28
 NASDAQ OMX and Borsa Istanbul sign landmark deal, NASDAQ OMX Press Release, December 31, 2013. 
Available at: http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=816529. The newly incorporated BIST became 
Turkey’s sole exchange entity by combining the former Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), the Istanbul Gold Exchange 
and the Derivatives Exchange of Turkey under the same umbrella from April 5, 2013. 
29
 Stealth trading is the practice of breaking up trades by informed investors into sequences of smaller trades and 
trading during periods of increased market activity in order to conceal their private information about the 
fundamental value of a stock. 
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 The second motivation for this paper is to provide a more precise assessment of the market impacts of 
trades accounting for whether one or both sides of the trade(s) involve a short trade given that our data set 
from the BIST identifies short sales. Examining differences between short and long trades has attracted 
increasing research interest as more sophisticated data has become available. Several authors (e.g., 
Asquith, Oman and Safaya, 2010; Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko, 2012) find short sellers are 
generally not the trade initiators and that the accuracy rates are lower for short versus long trades using 
the three trade classification algorithms that are commonly used to examine the differentiated price effects 
of large trades. The price effects of short selling on the BIST is of further interest since the BIST did not 
restrict short sales during the crisis of 2008 as was the case in some other markets (e.g., prohibition of 
short selling in financial companies in the U.S. and U.K. in late September 2008).   The theory of Miller 
(1977) and extensions by others states that, under heterogeneous expectations, short-sales constraints will 
inflate an asset’s price above its intrinsic value. Thus, an examination of the price effects associated with 
short sales provides evidence on whether short sellers contribute to price discovery and market efficiency 
in a developing market. Such findings are important from a policy perspective given the negative public 
image of short sellers among the public and policy-makers and the ongoing debate on whether short-sales 
restrictions should or should not be imposed.  
 We find that all mean permanent price effects are highly significant and positive for all short trade 
samples, and are substantially greater in magnitude for seller- versus buyer-initiated short trade seconds. 
We also find that these price effects are (highly) significantly more positive for the samples of short 
versus long trade seconds. This suggests that short trades are more informed than long trades (Battalio 
and Mendenhall, 2005; Hvidkjaer, 2006). 
  A third motivation for our study is to fill a gap in the price effects literature by being the first to the 
best of our knowledge to examine trade price impacts differentiated by whether large traders have a pure 
agency, pure principal and mixed relationship with the brokerage firms executing their trades based on the 
following trader classifications provided by the BIST: institutional and retail clients of the brokerage 
firms; portfolios of the brokerage firms; and investment funds managed by the brokerage firms. Previous 
studies examine trade behavior and performance of retail and/or institutional investors. Selected results 
include that retail investor trades move equity prices (Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber, Odean and Zhu, 2009); 
that the  trading dynamics of these two types of investors appear to be based on very different 
interpretations of information (Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu, 2003); and that lottery-type stocks are over-
weighted in the portfolios of retail but not institutional investors (Kumar, 2009). Whether or not and how 
the price effects differ on whether the trade is a principal or agent trade has important implications for the 
effect of agency issues on trade execution, and on the equity or fairness objective of security regulation.   
 31 
 
 We find that the smallest and largest negative mean total price effects using prior to trade prices are 
associated with seller-initiated trades for the portfolios of the brokerage firms and trades for the 
institutional and retail accounts of the brokerage firms, respectively. This suggests that the former traders 
or their brokers are better in either trade execution or the timing of their trades. Furthermore, we find that 
the smallest (largest) permanent price effects are associated with the small buyer- (small and large seller-) 
initiated trades for the institutional and retail accounts of the brokerage firms. 
 A fourth motivation for our study is to estimate end-of-session price effects. This may have important 
implications because stock exchanges and regulatory agencies around the world devote considerable 
human, technological and financial resources to curb market manipulation and to promote price 
discovery, market efficiency and market integrity. 
 We find some (weak) evidence that is consistent with the conjecture that manipulators have incentives 
to realize high prices at the close as opposed to earlier in a trading session since all three types of mean 
price effects are considerably higher positive (smaller negative) magnitudes in the last minute of the 
afternoon versus morning session for buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds. When we examine price 
effects for a three-day announcement day (AD) period centered on the Lehman announcement compared 
to the three-day periods pre- and post-AD, we find that the mean total price effects are highest AD,  and 
that the mean temporary and permanent price effects are highest for small-sized buyer-and seller-initiated 
trade seconds. 
 The fifth and final motivation for this paper is to identify the determinants of the three types of price 
effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds (not) differentiated by trade size using our richer data 
set. We observe that most of the expected relations between the three-types of price effects and various 
potential determinants are significant and have their expected signs. For example, we find that increased 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades in the last one minute of trading and the last five to one minute of trading 
are associated with an increase and decrease, respectively, of the total price effects of trade.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief and focused review of 
the literature on the impact of large trades. Section three presents the hypotheses and the methodology to 
test the hypotheses. Section four describes the sample and data. Section five reports and discusses the 
trade price effects for various delineations of the trades (such as long vs. short; trader type; and near the 
end of the trading session). Section six conducts panel regressions to identify the determinants of the price 




3.2. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE IMPACT OF LARGE 
TRADES 
 In this section, we refer to a number of papers that examine price effects in various markets. Non-US 
markets are identified in this section of the paper, and some summary details (e.g., sample and time 
period examined) for some of the studies that examine the price effects of large trades are presented in 
Table 3.1. 
[Please place Table 3.1 about here.] 
 Using a rational expectations model, Kyle (1985) shows that informed traders hide their trades among 
noise traders and maximize their returns by limiting trade size so that trade information is incorporated 
into prices gradually. Easley and O’Hara (1987) provide a theoretical explanation for the impact of large 
trades in which an adverse selection trading problem occurs because informed traders are willing to trade 
larger amounts at any given price. This is consistent with prior evidence by Copeland and Galai (1983) 
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that informed traders have an effect on bid and ask prices, and, for 
example, the findings by Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson (2013) for the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE).  
 Four hypotheses are advanced in the literature to explain the price effects of large trades. The 
empirical evidence often supports more than one of these hypotheses. The  substitution  hypotheses 
asserts that large trades only have small price impacts due to their minimal impact on the average demand 
and supply for stocks based on the assumption that all stocks are close substitutes for each other (Scholes, 
1972; Ball and Finn, 1989; Aitken, Frino and Sayers, 1994). Supportive evidence include Holthausen, 
Leftwich and Mayers (1987), and Ball and Finn (1989) for the Australian Stock Exchange (ASE). 
 The information-effects hypothesis asserts that permanent price effects are expected with large trades. 
The underlying argument is that seller- (buyer-) initiated large trades indicate the arrival of “bad” 
(“good”) news based on the party’s perception that a security is over- (under-) valued. Supportive 
evidence includes Fan, Hu and Jiang (2012) for the Shanghai Stock Exchange for seller-initiated large 
trades only. The permanent price effects are generally found to be greater for buyer- versus seller-initiated 
large trades (Gemmil, 1996, for the UK market; Aitken and Frino, 1996, for the ASE; Alzahrani, 
Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013, for the SSE). Together with the finding that buys (sells) exhibit price 
continuation (reversals), this suggests that only buyers pay a liquidity premium. One explanation for these 
asymmetric price effects is that buyer-initiated trades occur when firm-specific information arrives 
whereas seller-initiated trades are more liquidity than information based (e.g., Chan and Lakonishok, 
1993; Keim and Madhavan, 1996). 
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 The price pressure or segmented market hypothesis states that large trades cause temporary changes in 
short-run demand (supply) for buys (sells), which in turn causes temporary changes in stock prices. 
Studies supporting this hypothesis include Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987); Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993) for sells only; Keim and Madhavan (1996) for trades in the upstairs markets. Some 
studies find that the temporary effects are greater for buys than sells (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 
1990; Frino, Mollica and Romano, 2012).
30
  Other studies identify partial or full price reversals 
subsequent to a large trade (e.g., Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone 2009, for the ASE;
31
 Alzahrani, Gregoriou 
and Hudson, 2013, for the SSE) and price reversals for large sales and price continuations for large 
purchases (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1990). 
 The short-run liquidity-cost hypothesis, which is grounded in the models used by Kraus and Stoll 
(1972), Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981), asserts that the market effects of any liquidity (immediacy) 
costs associated with large trades are temporary. When the trades involve an intermediary, the trades 
compensate the intermediary for inventory costs and any additional size-related risks associated with the 
trade. Ball and Finn (1989) provide several theoretical arguments against this hypothesis. They argue that 
brokers do not have to trade at off-equilibrium prices because their cost of holding stock is already 
reflected in the equilibrium expected return and pre-large-trade transaction price, and brokerage 
commissions cover the intermediary’s cost of locating buyers and sellers. Studies supporting this 
hypothesis include Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987), and Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993) for buys only. 
 We now provide a brief discussion of six methodological issues that the literature addresses when 
examining the price effects of large trades. The first issue is what constitutes a large trade. Some studies 
define a large (or block) trade as involving more than 10,000 shares (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Ball and 
Finn, 1989, for the ASE). Other studies define a large trade as having a monetary value of at least 100,000 
in local currency (Ball and Finn, 1989, for the ASE) or as being in the largest 1 per cent of on-market 
transactions for each stock in each calendar year (Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007, for the ASE). 
 The second issue involves the choice of pre- and post-trade prices when calculating temporary, 
permanent and total price effects. Some studies use the immediately prior trade to the large trade when 
calculating the temporary and total price effects (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers 
1987, 1990), others use the day’s opening price (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993) or the previous day’s 
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 The proportion of the total price effect represented by the permanent effect changes from 25% in  Holthausen, 
Leftwich and Mayers (1987) to 85% in Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990). 
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 In contrast, Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2009) find positive (negative) continuations following positive (negative) 
initial impacts of large purchases (sales) using quote data for the ASE. 
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closing price (Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Frino, Mollica and Romano, 2012), and still others use the first 
(Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1990) or the fifth trade before the large trade (Frino, Jarnecic and 
Lepone, 2007, for the ASE; Hwang and Qian, 2011; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013, for the 
SSE). Similarly for the post-trade price, some studies use the same-day closing price (Kraus and Stoll, 
1972; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Aitken and Frino, 1996, for 
the ASE; Frino et al., 2005, for the ASE; Frino, Mollica and Romano, 2012) or the next-day’s closing 
price (Keim and Madhavan, 1996), and still others use the  first, third, fifth, or sixth trade after the large 
trade (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1990; Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007, for the ASE; Hwang 
and Qian, 2011; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013, for the SSE).  
 The third issue is the choice of method used to distinguish buys or buyer-initiated trades from sells or 
seller-initiated trades.  Trades are classified as buyer- or seller-initiated using a tick algorithm (e.g., Kraus 
and Stoll, 1972; Ball and Fin, 1989, as modified for the ASE; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Hwang and 
Qian, 2011; Fan, Hu and Jiang, 2012, for the Shanghai Stock Exchange), the Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara 
(2000) classification algorithm (e.g., Frino, Mollica and Romano, 2012, for the ASE), and the Lee and 
Ready (1991) classification algorithm (e.g., Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and 
Hudson, 2012 & 2013, for the SSE). No study could be found that uses the better performing 
chronological classification algorithm to assess trade direction as is done in our paper. 
 The fourth issue is whether the price effects for trades differentiated by trader type should be 
examined, as in, e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1995) who find that trade duration increases with order size 
and market liquidity, and trades are spread over longer periods for buys versus sells. No study could be 
found that examines the price effects of large trades transacted on an agency versus principal basis. The 
fifth issue is whether the examination of trade price effects is in the downstairs or upstairs market, where 
the latter is an off-the-exchange venue used to transact large trades. Exceptions to the examination of 
price effects in the downstairs market include Keim and Madhavan (1996). Consistent with most of the 
literature, we also examine price effects in the downstairs market on the BIST. 
 The sixth issue is whether to identify the determinants of the price effects of large trades. For the ASE, 
Ball and Finn (1989) document no relation between trade size and stock returns, while Frino, Jarnecic and 
Lepone (2007) find that proxies for block size, liquidity, volatility, market returns and broker execution 
abilities exhibit limited explanatory power.  For the SSE, Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson (2013) 
interpret their panel regression results as providing some evidence that permanent price effects increase 
with larger trades, higher volatilities and positive market returns, and that permanent price impacts 
decrease for stocks exhibiting more active trading, higher relative spreads and return momentum. 
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3.3. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 As discussed earlier, many studies report permanent but asymmetric price impacts from large sales and 
purchases.
32
 We test the same hypothesis for our emerging market during a period that covers the 
financial crisis (2008). As discussed in section two, past studies examine the temporary, permanent and 
total effects of trades of various sizes (usually large) that are (not) differentiated by buyer- or seller-
initiated trades. Therefore, our first null hypothesis is: 
  
   There are no temporary, permanent or total price effects of trades (not) differentiated by buyer- 
and seller-initiated trades. 
 To be consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987), we test 
the temporary, permanent and total price effects of a trade as ln(              , ln(               and 
ln(              , respectively, where        is the market price prior to the trade that does not include 
any information conveyed by the trade,        is the price of the trade whose effect is being assessed, and 
      is the equilibrium price after the temporary effect of the trade has dissipated. For       , we use the 
price of the immediately prior trade second in the spirit of Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) and 
Frino, Mollica and Romano (2012).  
 We first use that day’s market closing price for       as in Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) to 
test the conjecture by Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) that calculating the temporary and 
permanent effects using closing prices may cause systematic biases due to observed large positive returns 
in the last five minutes of trading (see Harris, 1986) or much quicker price discovery. If their conjecture is 
valid for the BIST, temporary (permanent) effects will be biased upward (downward) for seller-initiated 
transactions and vice versa for buyer-initiated transactions. We test the robustness of using that day’s 
market close by comparing the price effects associated with the first and fifth trade second after the trade 
second being examined. However, unlike most studies, we have the trade IDs so we do not have to use 
any trade classification algorithm (such as that of Lee and Ready, 1991) to separate trades as being buyer- 
or seller-initiated.  
 We also conjecture that the three types of price effects from trade differ when trades are delineated by 
various characteristics such as long/short trades, trade frequency, and trader type. Therefore, our second 
hypothesis in its null form is: 
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 These include Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Aitken and Frino 
(1996), Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2009) and Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson (2013). 
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   The price effects of a trade on the BIST do not differ for various types of trades (short versus 
long; less versus more frequently traded; near the end of a trading session) and trader types 
(specifically, institutional and retail accounts of brokerage firms, portfolios of brokerage firms, 
and the investment funds of the brokerage firms).   
 In traditional hypothesis testing, researchers test if the test statistic is, for example, significantly 
different from the null hypothesis value at say the 1% level. Since the confidence intervals become 
smaller with larger sample sizes, a researcher is increasingly more likely (almost certain) to reject the null 
hypothesis for an increasingly large (infinite) sample size for a given level of significance (Leamer, 1978, 
Ch. 4; Shanken, 1987; Connolly, 1989). However, the posterior level of belief in the prescribed value 
(under the null hypothesis) would be close to certainty since the estimated value would be very close to 
the actual value as the sample size approaches infinity. Various approaches are implicitly or explicitly 
used in the literature to address this paradox by setting a more appropriate (lower) critical level of 
significance for the test.
33
   They include the use of (i) a 0.001 level of significance (e.g., Aitken and 
Frino, 1996), (ii) a large-sample posterior odds ratio which can be approximated by            
             drawn from Zellner (1984) and used by, e.g., Griffiths and White (1993) and Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (2002) to find the t-statistic needed to generate a posterior odds ratio of 20:1, and where d.f. is 
the degrees of freedom and t is the traditional t-statistic, and (iii) sample size-adjusted critical t-values of  
         
     
   
drawn from Leamer (1978) and used by, e.g., Connolly (1989), Davidson and Faff, 
1999, and Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2007), where n is the number of observations and k is the number 
of parameters estimated under the null or alternative hypothesis. In this paper, we use the third approach 
as a further test of the significance of our estimates. As subsequently reported, our Bayesian critical t-
values using this approach straddle the critical t-value of 3.30 or 3.29 that corresponds to the use of a 
0.001 level of significance when n is 1,000 or approaches infinity, respectively. 
 
3.4. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 Our sample consists of all the firms that are included in the BIST-30 index of the Borsa Istanbul 
during our twelve-month examination period of April 2008 through March 2009. Due to quarterly 
updating of the index, our sample consists of 38 companies. Since the BIST-30 index consists of stocks 
with the greatest trading frequency, this index represents around 70% of the total trade volume on the 
BIST for our sample period.  We observe increasing trading activity and significantly decreasing index 
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 This is often referred to as Lindley's paradox. 
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levels over the studied time period due to the global crisis of 2008 that included the declaration of 
bankruptcy by Lehman brothers in September 2008.  
 Our data, which was provided by Borsa Istanbul, include all incoming orders and executed trades over 
this one-year period for our sample firms. Availability of a unique trade ID number and a timestamp up to 
the closest second enable us to identify almost all the trades as being either buyer- or seller-initiated using 
the chronological method as in Odders-White (2000). Since the chronological method cannot classify the 
64,911 orders that arrive and are executed during the same second, all subsequent results are based on our 
examination of the remaining 13,895,277 trades that can be classified using the chronological method. 
Thus, we are able to classify more than 99.5% of the trades correctly as being either buyer- or seller-
initiated according to the chronological method.  
 We examine the price effects of trades using various definitions of what constitutes a “large” trade.  
Some empirical studies measure the market impacts of large trades using individual trades even if they 
have the same time stamps in their data sets because they do not have access to trade or trader IDs. Our 
trade-“second” aggregation partially accounts for the concern of Bertsimas and Lo (1998) that best 
execution cannot be defined as a single number or often cannot be assessed based on a single trade if, for 
example, a trade from the same trader is transacted against multiple counterparties or the same trader 
enters separate orders in an attempt to conceal the trades.
 34
 Since our dataset includes trade but not trader 
IDs, our trade-“second” aggregation addresses the first concern since most single trades executed against 
multiple counterparties are executed in the same trade-“second” but does not address the second concern. 
 The aggregated trade-“second” method begins by aggregating all the trades that occur for each of the 
5,839,261 seconds in our sample that include one or more trades for the version where the first trade 
second after the trade second being examined is used as the post-trade price.
35
 We have 7345 firm days 
during our sample period. We delete the first and the last trade seconds for each firm each day, since it 
would not be possible to assess the price impact of these trade seconds. Therefore, the number of trade 
seconds decreases by 14,690 (7345 times 2) and becomes 5,824,571, which is used in Table 3.2. After 
excluding the 2.7% or 158,275 aggregated trade seconds that are not completely buyer- or -seller-
initiated, we are left with 3,245,494 and 2,420,802 aggregated trade “seconds” that are solely buyer- and 
seller-initiated, respectively. Since an aggregated trade-“second” could be of large size even when it does 
not contain any individual large trades, we also examine aggregated trade “seconds” that contain at least 
one non-aggregated large trade.  
                                                          
34
 This is documented by Keim and Madhavan (1995), Barclay and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001), and Frino, 
Johnstone and Hui (2010). 
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 Thus, as in Engle and Russell (1998) and Spierdijk (2004), we treat multiple transactions during the same second 
as a single transaction with aggregated trade volume and an averaged price. Similarly, Alzahrani, Gregoriou and 




 The numbers of trades subsequently reported in Tables 2 to 8 can vary for two reasons. First, the 
numbers of trades for the ALL cases can differ because of different post-trade prices used for      . For 
example, the 5,824,571 trade seconds reported for ALL in Table 3.2 using the first post-trade second 
becomes 5,795,171 trades in untabulated results when we use the fifth post-trade second price as 
     because we lose the last five trade seconds of each trading day for each firm or 154,933 trade 
seconds in total. Second, the number of trades is reduced when we delete the trade seconds where buyer- 
and seller-initiated trades occur within the same trade seconds in order to have solely buyer- and seller-
initiated trade seconds. For example, 158,275 trade seconds are so removed in Table 3.2. 
 
 
3.5. TRADE PRICE EFFECTS FOR VARIOUS TRADE-SECONDS SAMPLES 
3.5.1 Trade price effects for aggregated trade seconds differentiated by trade initiator 
and size 
 As discussed previously, prices measured at different times post-trade are used in the literature to 
calculate the price effects of a trade. We start with analyzing the three types of price effects based on the 
use of the closing daily price as the post-trade price (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Ball and Finn, 1989; 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987) to illustrate how this choice adversely affects inferences because 
the price effects of a trade are most likely fully incorporated into prices prior to the daily closing price. 
 Based on untabulated results, we find that all three types of mean trade price effects are generally 
statistically significant and no absolute value exceeds 30 basis points (bps). While all of the single sorted 
mean price effects are significant, mean price effects do not have the expected positive sign for one 
buyer-initiated trade and negative sign for one seller-initiated trade. All double-sorted mean total price 
effects [ln(              ] are significantly positive and negative for buyer- and seller-initiated trades as 
expected. While many of the double-sorted mean temporary price effects [ln(             ] are 
significant, they are not consistent in sign for buyer- or seller-initiated trades. All of the double-sorted 
mean permanent price effects [ln(             ] are significant. However, they display a counter-intuitive 
pattern in that they are negative for buyer-initiated trades and positive for seller-initiated trades for all 
small trade classifications. 
 Next, we examine how our initial results change using the first post-trade second price. Based on the 
results reported in Table 3.2, no absolute mean price effect exceeds 30 basis points (bps). All of the mean 
price effects for the double-sorted samples are highly significant and positive (negative) for buyer-
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initiated (seller-initiated) trade seconds. Trade seconds with aggregated share volumes of less than 15,000 
shares have the most positive and most negative mean total price effects [ln(              ] of 19.03 bps 
and -25.62 bps for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds, respectively, and  the most positive and most 
negative mean temporary price effects [ln(             ] of 18.06 bps and -24.16 bps for buyer- and 
seller-initiated trade seconds, respectively. In contrast and as expected, the most positive and most 
negative mean permanent price effects [ln(             ] of 10.14 bps and  -11.99 bps occur for trade 
seconds with  aggregated share values of at least 150,000 TRY that are  buyer- and seller-initiated, 
respectively. In comparison for the ASE, Frino et al. (2005) report mean total, temporary and permanent 
price effects of 61.86 bps (-38.19 bps), 05.10 bps (4.89 bps) and 56.76 bps (-43.08 bps), respectively, for 
buyer- (seller-) initiated trades.
36
 Since the mean permanent price effects capture the information content 
of the trades, these results suggest that informed traders in the BIST tend to trade in larger values which is 
consistent with the findings of Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson (2013) for the SSM.  
[Please place Table 3.2 about here] 
 We then examine the untabulated mean temporary, permanent and total price effects based on using 
the price for the fifth post-trade second for the various samples. Compared to the first post-trade second 
results, we now observe three negative mean temporary price effects for the double-sorted buyer-initiated 
trade seconds. Specifically, they are for buyer-initiated trade seconds with aggregated share volumes of at 
least 25,000 (-0.65 bps) and with aggregated trade values of at least 100,000 TYL (-0.66 bps) and 150,000 
TYL (-1.49 bps). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the price effects of a trade are fully 
incorporated into prices quite quickly and definitely prior to the daily close. 
 Table 3.2 also presents the p-values for the Kruskal and Wallis (K-W p-val.) test of whether the 
distributions of price effects are significantly different when the day’s closing price (not tabulated), or the 
first (Table 3.2) or the fifth post-trade second (not tabulated) are used when we do not adjust for the 
smaller number of trades when the fifth trade second is used as the post-trade price. We observe that the 
temporary [ln(             ] and permanent [ln(             ] price effects are highly significantly 
different between the three choices for post-trade second price.
37
 However, they are small in magnitude 
(no more than a few basis points) for all double-sorted buyer-initiated samples.  
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 Based on cross sectional regressions,  Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) document higher mean total price 
effects between  -2.48% and 1.68%, mean temporary price effects between -1.30% and 0.06% and mean permanent 
price effects between -1.18% and 0.78%.   
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 As expected, the K-W p-values for the total price effects are all one when we use an identical sample of trades; 
namely, the sample based on the fifth post-trade second. The inferences remain qualitatively unchanged when we 
use this same sample for all three types of post-trade second prices. 
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 For large and small trade sizes using the first post-trade second price, the mean differences tend to be 
more and less positive for the temporary price effects and less and more positive for the permanent price 
effects, respectively. The price effects are significantly different but small in magnitude (no more than 
one-half of a basis point) for the temporary and permanent price effects for all double-sorted seller-
initiated common samples with smaller trade sizes. The significant differences tend to be more negative 
and less negative for the temporary and permanent price effects, respectively, for the double-sorted seller-
initiated samples using the first post-trade second price. 
3.5.2 Further Delineations of the Trades 
 To conserve valuable journal space and given their similarity to the undifferentiated sample, we do not 
report the single-sorted results by trade size and some of the sample delineations that are referred to as 
untabulated results in this section of the paper. To illustrate, the untabulated mean price effects for the 
long trades are consistent with those reported earlier in Table 3.2 for the full sample. 
3.5.2.1 Trade price effects for less frequently traded stocks  
 To examine if the three types of price effects associated with trade depend upon relative trade 
frequency, we categorize the stocks into two groups based on whether their relative monthly number of 
trades is above or below the median of all the stocks in our sample for that month.  We observe that all 
the price effects for the double-sorted samples of trades of the relatively less frequently traded stocks 
reported in Table 3.3 are highly significant and positive for buyer-initiated trades and negative for seller-
initiated trades. With only two exceptions, the price effects are highly significantly different for the three 
types of price effects between the corresponding double-sorted samples differentiated by their relative 
trade frequency. As expected, both the total price effects [ln(              ] and the permanent price 
effects [ln(             ] are consistently more positive and more negative for buyer- and seller-initiated 
trades for the relatively less frequently traded stocks. Furthermore, as expected, the differences are 
substantially higher for the double-sorted samples of larger-sized trades. For example, the mean 
permanent price effects for the relatively less frequently traded sample of buyer-initiated trades with share 
values above and below 100,000 TRY are 8.23 and 1.75 bps higher than the corresponding untabulated 
samples of relatively more frequently traded counterparts.  For the temporary price effects 
[ln(             ] for the double-sorted samples, the means are consistently more negative for seller-
initiated trades but mixed for buyer-initiated trades. 
[Please place Table 3.3 about here.] 
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3.5.2.2 Trade price effects for short trades 
 In this section, we examine if the various types of trade price effects differ for short trades since some 
of our previous aggregated trade seconds included both long and short trades. Clearly indicated covered 
and naked short-sale orders are allowed for firms classified as Group A by the BIST, which covers the 
majority of the listed securities based on liquidity and capitalization.
38
 The BIST applies the up-tick rule 
so that short sales should be executed at a price higher than the previous traded price.  In this section, the 
double-sorted samples of buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds exclude trade seconds where both long 
and short trades appear together in the same trade second in order to obtain “clean” or unambiguous 
samples to aid in inference. Our major finding is that short sales are associated with positive permanent 
price effects and that knowing whether a short sale is buyer- or-seller-initiated is of value for researchers 
and practitioners in assessing the price effects of a short sale. 
  Table 3.4 presents the mean price effects for the short trades. Possible aided by the up-tick rule, all 
mean total price effects [ln(              ] are positive. They are highly significantly different between 
all long and short samples, and more positive and less positive for long versus short buyer-initiated trades 
for double-sorted samples of large and small trade sizes, respectively. In contrast, they are more negative 
for long versus short seller-initiated trade seconds for all double-sorted samples.  All mean temporary 
price effects [ln(             ] are highly significant and positive for buyer-initiated short trades and 
highly significant and negative for seller-initiated short trades. They are also highly significantly different 
between all long and short double-sorted buyer-initiated trade samples and six out of eight double-sorted 
seller-initiated trade samples.  All mean permanent price effects [ln(             ] are highly significant 
and positive for all samples of short trades, and are highly significantly more positive for the samples of 
short trade seconds than their corresponding samples of long trades.  
[Please place Table 3.4 about here.] 
3.5.2.3 Trade price effects for the BIST trader-type classifications  
 To assess whether the three types of price effects associated with trades differ for different trader-type 
classifications, we use the three main trader type classifications used by the BIST. They are based on 
trades taking place in the: (i) institutional and retail brokerage firm accounts (M), (ii) brokerage firm 
portfolios (P), and (iii) brokerage firm investment funds (F).  The mean price effects and tests of their 
individual significance are reported in Table 3.5 for M accounts and in Table 3.6 for P and F accounts, 
and tests of whether at least one distribution (median) differs from the others is also presented in Table 
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 The securities, transaction prices and volumes involved in short-sale transactions are announced at the end of the 
day on the BIST’s website.  
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3.5. We observe that the double-sorted buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds always have highly 
significant and positive (negative) mean total price effects [ln(              ]. At least one distribution 
differs significantly from the others for a comparison of the M, P and F accounts, with the exception of 
one seller-initiated trade-second sample where the Kruskal and Wallis statistic is not significant at the 
0.10 level.  If that sample is not considered, the ordering of the mean total price effects associated with 
seller-initiated, double-sorted trade-second samples takes on negative values of greater magnitude as we 
move from the P to F to M trader types for all the corresponding samples. In contrast, the orderings of the 
means across the three trader types for buyer-initiated trades are mixed for the various double-sorted 
samples. 
[Please place Tables 5 and 6 about here.]  
 Not only are all the mean temporary price effects [ln(             ] for the double-sorted trade-
second samples highly significant but they are positive for buyer-initiated trades and negative for seller-
initiated trades. Based on the Kruskal and Wallis tests, at least one distribution (median) differs 
significantly from the others for a comparison of the M, P and F trader types for each of the samples. The 
orderings of the means in ascending magnitudes are M, P and then F trader types for the relatively large 
trade sizes for the double-sorted samples of buyer- and seller-initiated trades, and are in the reverse order 
for the relatively small trade sizes for buyer-initiated trades.  They are P, F and then M trader types for the  
double-sorted sample of seller-initiated trades with relatively small trade sizes. Thus, the temporary price 
effect following a trade for the institutional and retail accounts of the brokerage firms is smallest for 
relatively large trades and largest for relatively small trades. 
 We observe quite different results for the mean permanent price effects [ln(             ] for the 
double-sorted trade-second samples.  While the means are highly significant for all buyer-initiated trade-
second samples for the three trader types, they are only highly significant for the seller-initiated trade-
second samples for trader type M. For the other two trader types, significance is only achieved with 
relatively large trade sizes in terms of value. Based on the Kruskal and Wallis tests, at least one 
distribution (median) differs significantly from the others for a comparison of the M, P and F trader types 
for most of the samples. For the double-sorted samples, the orderings of the means in ascending 
magnitudes are M, F and then P trader types for all seller-initiated trades and only for the relatively small 
trade sizes for buyer-initiated trades.  Thus, buyer-initiated trades for the institutional and retail brokerage 
firm accounts (M) have the smallest permanent price effects for relatively small trades and their seller-
initiated trades have the largest permanent price effects regardless of the relative trade size. This suggests 
an increased information content of the trade seconds for trader type M for larger trade sizes. This is 
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consistent with the notion of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) that informed 
trading is higher with larger trade sizes. 
3.5.2.4 Trade price effects for last minutes of the two trading sessions 
 In this section, we examine the three types of price effects associated with trade seconds during the 
last minute of trading for the BIST, which has daily morning and afternoon trading sessions. A common 
belief on the street is that manipulators have incentives to realize high prices at the close as opposed to 
earlier in a trading session, and that it is easier to maintain a liquidity imbalance just prior to the close 
than earlier in the trading session. The empirical evidence (e.g., Carhart et al., 2002) finds that the price 
distortions caused by closing price manipulation are short-lived as they are reversed in the following 
morning. Based on intraday returns over 15-minute intervals, Kucukkocaoglu (2008) concludes that 
close-end price manipulation through big buyers and big sellers is possible in the BIST.  
 Since we want to examine the permanent price effects without including next day trades, we exclude 
the last trade second for both sessions. The means for each of the three types of price effects for the first 
and second session of a trading day and tests of their individual significance are presented in Panels A and 
B of Table 3.7, respectively, and tests of whether their distributions (medians) differ are also presented in 
Panel A. The mean total [ln(              ] and temporary [ln(             ] price effects are highly 
significant and positive (negative) for buyer- (seller-) initiated trades for the double-sorted samples in 
both sessions. Based on the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, their distributions (medians) are highly 
significantly different for the buyer-initiated trade seconds and for the seller-initiated trade seconds of 
relatively smaller sizes.  For both of these price effects, the means are of considerably higher positive 
magnitudes in the last minute of the afternoon session for buyer-initiated trade seconds, and of a smaller 
negative magnitude for seller-initiated trade seconds of relatively small sizes.  While most of the mean 
permanent price effects [ln(             ] are not significant for the various double-sorted samples in the 
first session, all are positive and highly significant for the buyer- and seller-initiated samples of small 
sizes in the second session. Based on the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, their distributions (medians) are 
highly significantly different for the buyer- and seller-initiated trades of relatively smaller sizes.  For these 
permanent price effects, the means are of a considerable higher positive magnitude in the last minute of 
the afternoon session for buyer-initiated trade seconds, and of a smaller negative (or larger positive) 
magnitude for seller-initiated trade seconds of relatively small sizes.   
[Please place Table 3.7 about here.] 
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3.5.2.5 Trade price effects around Lehman Brothers’ announcement 
 After intense but unsuccessful efforts over the week-end to arrange for an acquisition of Lehman by 
Barclays or the Bank of America, Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection just before the opening of 
Asian markets at 1:45AM Eastern Standard Time on Monday, September 15, 2008  to become the biggest 
victim of the credit and sub-prime crises. The collapse of Lehman Brothers had a ripple effect on the 
Monday across international financial markets starting in Asia, then Europe (including the BIST) and 
ending up in North America.
39
 
 We analyze the three price effects for a three-day announcement day (AD) period centered on the 
Lehman announcement on September 15, 2008 to allow for anticipation, lags and ripple effects of the 
announcement. We benchmark these price effects against the trade-second price effects for the three days 
before (pre-AD) and after (post-AD) this three-day announcement period. Based on untabulated results, 
we find that all of the double-sorted mean total price effects [ln(              ] are highly significant for 
all three windows, and are positive and negative for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds. Based on 
the Kruskal and Wallis test, we find that the distributions (medians) of the total price effects are 
significantly different between the three windows for both buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds with 
relatively small trade sizes where the mean effects are smallest pre-AD and highest AD. They are also 
significantly different for all samples of seller-initiated trade seconds with relatively large trade sizes 
where the magnitudes of the mean effects are smallest post-AD and highest AD. Thus, the immediate 
price effects of trade spiked during the Lehman announcement. 
 When we examine the untabulated results for the temporary price effects, we find that most of the 
double-sorted mean temporary price effects [ln(             ] are significant for all three windows, and 
are positive and negative for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds when significant. Based on the 
Kruskal and Wallis test, we find that the distributions (medians) of the temporary price effects are 
significantly different between the three windows for all the double-sorted samples of buyer-initiated 
trade seconds, and for the samples of seller-initiated trade seconds with relatively small trade sizes. The 
least and most positive means for the samples of buyer-initiated trades are AD and pre-AD for relatively 
small trade sizes and their reverse for relatively large trade sizes. The least and more negative mean 
values for the seller-initiated trades of relatively small trade sizes are post-AD and AD. Thus, the mean 
temporary price effects are elevated for the Lehman announcement period for small-sized buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades. 
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 Emek Kaplangil, Lehman's bankruptcy filing shatters Turkish lira, shares on Monday, Hurriyet DailyNews.com. 
Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/9900493.asp 
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 Based on the untabulated results, we find that all double-sorted mean permanent price effects 
[ln(             ] are significant for all three windows, and are positive and negative for buyer- and seller-
initiated trade seconds. Based on the Kruskal and Wallis test, we find that the distributions (medians) of 
the permanent price effects are significantly different between the three windows for all the double-sorted 
samples with one exception (i.e., seller-initiated with values of at least 150,000 TRY). The least and most 
positive means for the samples of buyer-initiated trades are pre-AD and AD for relatively small trade 
sizes and pre-AD and post-AD for relatively large trade sizes. The least and more negative mean values 
for the samples of seller-initiated trade seconds are pre-AD and AD for trades of relatively small trade 
sizes, and mixed for relatively large trade sizes but are elevated for the AD window.  
3.6. DETERMINANTS OF THE PRICE EFFECTS 
3.6.1 Methodology 
    To identify the determinants of the price effects (k = temporary, permanent and total, respectively) for 
trade second i for firm j, we run the following regression for various samples:
40
 
         
                                                             
                                             (3.1) 
                                                     
Where                 is the natural log of the market cap of firm j for the trade second immediately 
prior to trade second i for firm j. Since market cap is perceived as being positively related to firm 
liquidity (e.g., Hasbrouck, 2009), we expect market cap to be negatively related to price impact as 
reflected in negative and positive coefficients for buyer- and seller-initiated trades (especially if they 
are larger-sized) for this variable. 
            is the relative half-spread (i.e., the ratio between the bid-ask spread and the quote-midpoint) 
that occurs immediately prior to trade second i for firm j , which is used as a proxy for the prevailing 
immediacy costs  (Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013). Unlike 
Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2007), researchers such as Aitken and Frino (1996) and Gemmill (1996) 
find that this variable has little explanatory power for the price effects of packages of transactions 
executed by a broker and large transactions executed off-market on the London Stock Exchange, 
respectively. Since the price effect should be higher with higher relative spreads (higher prevailing 
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 We also ran equation (1) including the relative trade aggressive proxy,             , which is the relative size of 
trade second i in number of shares divided by the corresponding depth at the bid or ask if it is a seller- or buyer-
initiated trade, respectively, that prevails for the trade second immediately prior to trade second i for firm j.This 
regressor generally was not significant. 
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immediacy costs), we expect the relationship between the relative inside spread and the price effect to 
be positive. This should be reflected in positive and negative coefficients for buyer- and seller-initiated 
trade seconds for this variable. 
                is the natural log of the dollar value of shares traded in second i for firm j in TRY 
(Turkish Lira) divided by 1,000,000 (used in Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987; Frino, Jarnecic 
and Lepone, 2007; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013, use the number of shares). Based on the 
premise that trade size and the probability that the trade initiator holds private information are 
positively correlated, information asymmetry models imply that larger-sized trades are associated with 
greater price impacts (Easley and O’Hara, 1987). However, while large trade sizes may consume 
market liquidity, smaller trade sizes may provide market liquidity. This implies that positive and 
negative coefficients should exist for buyer- and seller-initiated trades of large size for this variable. 
              is the lagged cummulative (compounded) daily return for firm j over the five trading 
days prior to trade second i for firm j (Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007; Alzahrani, Gregoriou and 
Hudson, 2013). Saar (2001) finds that past price performance plays an important role in the asymmetry 
of the permanent price impact between buyer- and seller-initiated block trades.  There is support in the 
literature for both herding (Alzahrani, Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013) and contrarian trade behaviour 
relative to a stock’s returns during the previous week or day (e.g., Kaniel, Saar and Titman, 2008, for 
individuals; Boehmer and Wu, 2008, for institutions and individuals). If contrarian trade behavior 
dominates, then we expect a positive (negative) relationship to exist between the cumulative stock 
return and the price impact for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds so that their coefficients should 
both be positive. If herding trade behavior dominates, then we expect the reverse relationships so that 
all coefficients should be negative. 
          is our risk proxy given by the standard deviation of trade-to-trade prices on the trading day prior 
to the trading day d of the trade second i for firm j (Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007; Alzahrani, 
Gregoriou and Hudson, 2013). Since investors require higher compensations for bearing higher risks 
(Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 2001) and variance is found to vary proportionate to the change of 
information flow (Ross, 1989), we expect a positive relation with this variable (i.e., positive and 
negative coefficients respectively for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds). 
          is the number of hours of trading time left until the end of trading after trade second i for firm j 
for that trading day d (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987). We exclude the lunch break, which is 
between 12:00 and 14:00 pm for the dates before October 13, 2008 and between 12:30 pm and 14:00 
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pm for the dates thereafter.  Several studies show that proxies for liquidity exhibit U-shaped intraday 
patterns (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992) and that quoted depths are associated with wider spreads and 
increased volume, particularly near the close of trading. Thus, the price impact of a trade may depend 
upon when it occurs during the trading day. Furthermore, a trade later in the trade day may cause a 
greater temporary market effect if an unofficial liquidity provider is the purchaser since this individual 
may be exposed to overnight risk (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987). Thus, prior to the period 
near the close of trading when spreads may increase, we expect a negative (positive) relationship to 
exist between Tleft and the price impact for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds so that their 
coefficients should both be negative. 
    is the market return for the ISE-100 Index (now BIST-100) for day d. This main index for the BIST 
consists of 100 stocks which are selected among the stocks of companies traded on the National 
Market and the stocks of real estate investment trusts and venture capital investment trusts traded on 
the Collective Products Market. BIST 100 Index automatically covers BIST 30 and BIST 50 stocks. 
Based on the findings of Aitken and Frino (1996a), Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2007) and Bonser-
Neal, Linnan and Neal (1999), we expect a positive (negative) relationship to exist between market 
return and the price impact for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds so that their coefficients should 
both be positive. In other words, a positive market return leads to larger (smaller) price effects for 
buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds. 
        is the Order Flow Imbalance which is the difference between the volume at the best ask and the 
volume at best bid for the trade second immediately prior to trade second i for firm j. If the trading 
imbalance reflects information-based trading, then we would expect a positive (negative) relationship 
to exist between OFI and the total price impact for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds so that 
their coefficients should both be positive. If the price impact is only a temporary response to 
uninformed OFI, then we would expect a quick reversal in the price effects so that a negative 
(positive) relationship would be expected between OFI and the temporary price effect for buyer- and 
seller-initiated trade seconds so that their coefficients should both be negative. Boehmer and Wu 
(2008) find positive coefficients for this relationship and no evidence of any reversal.  
                and                 are interactive variables that are the product of dummy variables 
and Tleft. D1 and D2 are equal to one if trade second i is in the last minute and the second through 
fifth last minutes of the afternoon trading session, respectively, and zero otherwise. If there is any 
trade price manipulation as the trading day nears the close, we expect the price effects to be positively 
 48 
 
related with the both of these interactive variables so that the coefficients will be positive and negative 
for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds, respectively. 
 Summary statistics for the regressors in equation (1) for the total sample of trade seconds 
undifferentiated by trade size and samples of clean trade seconds differentiated by buyer- and seller-
initiated trades are presented in Table 3.8. A clean trade second is one where all the trades contained 
therein are initiated by the same side of the market (e.g., all buyer-initiated). The values are quite similar 
for many of the regressors. Some notable differences are that the means and medians for trade values are 
higher for clean seller- versus buyer-initiated trade seconds, and that the means and medians OFI for trade 
values are higher for clean seller- versus buyer-initiated trade seconds. Interestingly, the mean proportions 
of seller-initiated trades in the last one and five minutes of the afternoon session (1.59% and 4.90%, 
respectively) exceed the corresponding proportions of 1.15% and 3.58%, respectively, for buyer-initiated 
trades. Based on untabulated correlation matrices for the full sample and the clean samples of buyer- and 
seller-initiated trade seconds, only one correlation exceeds absolute 0.2, and that is a correlation between 
                and         which is between 0.54 and 0.57 for these three samples. However, all of 
the VIF values including those for the two dummy variables are below 1.6 for these three samples, which 
strongly suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem.
41
 
 [Please place Table 3.8 about here.] 
 Since the number of potential trade-seconds is in the millions, we adopt a pooling regression approach 
for estimating equation (1) using only the trade seconds for which we have full data for all the variables 
included in equation (1).
42
 For drawing inferences about the estimated coefficients, we use firm and day 
clustered standard errors as per Petersen (2009). 
3.6.2 Regression Results for Buyer- and Seller-initiated Trade Seconds 
 The summary results from estimating equation (1) for the three price effects for clean samples of 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades are reported in Table 3.9. We also report the summary results for trade 
seconds with a value of at least 100,000 TRY for the buyer- and seller-initiated samples. This trade size is 
chosen because it corresponds with previous studies (e.g., Ball and Finn, 1989, for the ASE) and this 
trade size generally has the highest and lowest mean permanent price effects (i.e., highest information 
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 A rule of thumb is that a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further investigation.  Thus, the 
tolerance, defined as the inverse of the variance inflation factor (1 ⁄ VIF), of at least 0.625 (i.e., 1/1.6) is considerably 
higher than 0.1 for all the regressors. 
42
 We lose a very small percentage of trade seconds for the eight stocks that enter the ISE 30 during the quarterly 
updates after the beginning of our sample period primarily because five prior days are required to calculate the 
momentum variable in equation (1). 
 49 
 
content). The highly significant mean price effects are almost identical to those reported earlier in Table 
3.2 for the samples of buyer- and seller-initiated trades not differentiated by trade size. The much lower 
adjusted R
2
 values for the regressions for the permanent versus other price effects probably reflects the 
relative smallness of the mean permanent effects compared to their temporary and total price effect 
counterparts. Also, the adjusted R
2
 values for the seller-initiated trades are almost double those for the 
buyer-initiated trades. 
[Please place Table 3.9 about here.] 
 The market capitalization [               ] coefficients are significant and of the correct sign of 
negative and positive for the permanent price effects for respectively buyer- and seller-initiated trade 
seconds for all and large trades. The coefficients for the other two price effects are highly significant and 
positive for buyer-initiated trade seconds and significant for seller-initiated trade seconds for large but not 
all trades. 
 The relative spread [           ] coefficients are highly significant for the three types of price effects 
for all but not large buyer- initiated trade seconds and highly significant for all and large seller-initiated 
trade second with the exception of the temporary price effect for large trades. However, the coefficient 
signs are counter to expectations when significant since they are negative for buyer-initiated trades and 
positive for seller-initiated trades. Thus, our results differ from Aitken and Frino (1996) and Gemmill 
(1996) who find that relative spreads are not a significant determinant of trade price effects. 
 The trade size [               ] coefficients are highly significant for the three types of price effects 
for both buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds for all and large trades. Their coefficient signs are 
consistent with their positive and negative expectations for the permanent price effects for all and large 
trades but not for the temporary price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds where they are 
reversed for all and large trades. They are similarly reversed for the total price effects for buyer- and 
seller-initiated  trade seconds for all trades but consistent with expectations for large trades. 
 The momentum [             ] coefficients are highly significant with one exception and positive 
for the three types of price effects for both buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds. This is consistent 
with contrarian trade behavior by the consensus market participants for the stocks and time period 
examined herein.  
 The standard deviation [       ] coefficients are highly significant and positive (negative) for the 
three types of price effects for both buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds for all and large trades. Thus, 
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increased volatility leads to greater price effects for both buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds. This is 
consistent with our prior expectations and previous studies (e.g. Chan and Lakonishok, 1997; 
Chiyachantana et al., 2004; Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone, 2007). 
 The coefficients for the time left in the trading day prior to the closing five minutes [         ] are 
with one exception for all trades and two exceptions for large trades (highly) significant for the three 
types of price effects for both buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds. All of the significant coefficients 
have their expected negative signs.  
 The market return [   ] coefficients are positive and significant for the permanent price effects for all 
trades only and for the temporary and total prices effects for large trades only for buyer-initiated trade 
seconds. In contrast, they are positive and highly significant for the three types of price effects for the 
seller-initiated trade seconds with the exception of the weakly significant negative coefficient for the 
temporary price effect for large trades. Thus, according to expectations, positive market returns generally 
lead to larger but not necessary significant price effects for buyer-initiated trade seconds and smaller 
temporary, permanent and total price impacts for seller-initiated trade seconds. This is consistent with the 
findings of Aitken and Frino (1996a), Frino, Jarnecic and Lepone (2007) and Bonser-Neal, Linnan and 
Neal (1999) that the coefficients of this variable for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds should both 
be positive. In other words, a positive market return generally leads to larger (smaller) price effects for 
buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds. 
 The order flow imbalance [        ] coefficients are all highly significant and positive with the 
exception of large trades for the temporary price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trades. This is 
consistent with the expectations of a positive (negative) relationship between OFI and the three types of 
price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds. Thus, a positive OFI (i.e., larger positive 
difference between the volume at the best ask and the volume at best bid) leads to larger (smaller) price 
effects for buyer- (seller-) initiated trade seconds. 
 The coefficients for last minute and last fifth to last minute of a trading day [                and 
               ] are highly significant with the exception of permanent price effect for large buyer-
initiated trades. They have the expected signs for the last minute with the exception of the positive sign 
for the permanent price effect for all and large trades for seller-initiated trade seconds, and for the last 





3.7. CONCLUSION  
 The magnitude and duration of temporary and permanent price effects of trades of different sizes for 
an important emerging market, which has important implications for price discovery and market 
efficiency, was analyzed in this study. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain the price effects 
associated with large trades, including that these trades are from informed traders.  
 We examined the price effects associated with trade for the 38 companies during their tenure in the 
BIST-30 index during the twelve months from April 2008 through March 2009 which accounts for 
around 70% of the total trade volume on the BIST for our sample period and contains the GFC and the 
Lehman collapse. We find that mean price effects are less than 30 basis points, are competitive with those 
found for other markets, and are (somewhat) counter-intuitive using the price at the (subsequent fifth 
trade second) day’s close instead of the subsequent first trade second as the post-trade price. These 
findings imply that price discovery in fairly rapid on the BIST.  
 Except for the trades of less frequently traded stocks and short sales, we found that large trade seconds 
have the most positive and most negative mean permanent price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated 
trade seconds, respectively. This suggests that generally informed traders in the BIST have the tendency 
to focus on large trades. This is consistent with the prediction of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley 
and O'Hara (1987) that informed trading is more predominant for larger trades.  
 One of the striking results is that the permanent price effects are highly significant and positive for all 
samples of short trades, are substantially greater in magnitude for seller- versus buyer-initiated short-
trades, and are highly significantly more positive than their corresponding samples of long-trades. This 
suggests that short trades do not unduly depress prices, and is consistent with movements towards 
eliminating short-sale constraints in many markets such as the U.S. Furthermore, the significantly higher 
price effects of trades in the last minutes of a trading session that we uncover have important implications 
for market regulators in terms of refining their surveillance systems to eliminate or minimize any 
inappropriate stealth trading or end-of-session price manipulation if it exists in the BIST. 
 Our findings have important implications for the purchase and execution decisions of investors since 
we document that  the price effects of trade differ by how they are measured (especially for the post-trade 
price), trade type (long or short), trader aggressiveness (buyer- or seller-initiated), trade size (smaller or 
larger), share liquidity, when the trade is executed (e.g., near the close), the client-broker relationship 
(agency, principal or mixed), and market volatility (e.g., around the Lehman announcement). Such 
activities by investors will also benefit from a knowledge of what are the significant determinants of the 
price effects of trade, which we have identified for the BIST as including five-day return momentum, 
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standard deviation of returns, order-flow imbalance, and the one and five-to-one minute prior to the close 




































EFFECTS OF PRICE LIMITS ON THE BIST 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 For the past 20 years the market microstructure literature has examined the effects of price limits on 
volatility, price overreactions, delayed price discovery, trading interference and information asymmetry. 
Price limits are based on predetermined maximum and minimum price boundaries for an asset during a 
trading day or session based on the close for the previous trading day or session or volume-weighted 
average prices thereof. Price limits are applied by exchange regulators in order to prevent any (potentially 
detrimental) consequences from high fluctuations in asset prices over a short period of time, especially in 
emerging markets.   
 As a response to unusually volatile trading on May 6, 2010, where the Dow Jones Industrial average 
lost more than 600 points in about five minutes, U.S. exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) in June 2010 approved pilot basis procedures for single-stock circuit breaker trading 
pauses for five minutes if the price of an asset moves up or down sharply in a five-minute window.
43
 On 
May 31, 2012, the single circuit breaker rule was replaced by a “limit up-limit down” mechanism which 
brings price bands of 5%, 10%, and 20%, or the lesser of $0.15 or 75% depending on price and is 
intended to prevent trades of assets from occurring outside of these price bands. Various other markets 
(e.g., in Italy, Greece, France, Japan, Switzerland, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkey) also apply a version of 
price limits to shield their markets and traders from the negative effects of large price fluctuations. 
 The empirical evidence on the effects of price limits is mixed. Advocates argue that price limits 
moderate stock price volatility, correct short-term overreaction by providing a cooling off period by 
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 For further information, see http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm 
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providing time for investors to digest new information. They also argue that after the observance of a 
price-limit hit, there is likely to be a price reversal, lower price volatility and thinner trading volume. On 
the other hand, critics argue that price limits may only delay the price discovery process by inefficiently 
stopping the order flow and causing volatility spillover. 
 Most of the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the critics although most studies do not 
compare periods with and without price limits. This includes studies by George and Hwang (1995) for the 
Japanese stock market, Chen (1998) for U.S. futures markets, Phylatkis, Kavussanos, and Manalis (1999) 
for the Greek stock market, Kim and Limpaphayom (2000) for the Taiwan and Thailand stock markets, 
Chan, Kim, and Rhee (2005) for the Malaysian stock market, Chen, Rui, and Wang (2005) for the 
Chinese stock markets, Henke and Voronkova (2005) for the Polish stock market, and Bildik and Gülay 
(2006) for the Turkish stock market. Studies that similarly do not examine periods with and without price 
limits that support the predictions of the price-limit advocates include Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989a, 1989b) 
who examine the effects of price limits on Treasury bond futures in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). 
Kim, Liu and Yang (2013) find that price limits can facilitate price discovery, moderate transitory 
volatility, and mitigate abnormal trading activity when they compare a period with price limits (1997-
2001) with one without such limits (1992-1996) for the two Chinese markets. Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty 
(2010) find that for a cross section of 43 equity markets that the likelihood that price-limit rules exist is 
greater in markets with higher monitoring costs due to poorer business disclosure, more corruption and 
less efficiency in legal, regulatory and technological environments.
44
 
 This paper re-examines the impact of price limits of the Borsa Istanbul using intra-day trades and 
quotes. To this end, we examine the following hypothesis for price-limit hits that occurred for all the 
firms that are included in the BIST-50 index during the thirteen-month examination period of March 2008 
through March 2009. These include the volatility spillover and dampening hypotheses, the overreaction 
and delayed price-discovery hypotheses, magnet-effect hypothesis, trading interference hypothesis, and 
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 40 of the 58 countries that they list in their Table 1 have price limits as of December 2004. 
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the market quality hypothesis. We also test if our results based on equi-distant returns are robust when we 
use trade-by-trade returns adjusted for their associated serial correlations. 
 We find evidence to support the volatility no-effect, dampening and spillover hypotheses since the 
impact of a price-limit hit on volatility depends on whether it is a lower or upper limit hit and on the time 
of the day when the price-limit hit begins and when it ends. Post-hit volatilities tend to be lower for limit 
hits near the beginning of the first trading session, unchanged for limit hits that transcend a trading 
session and for upper price-limit hits near the end of either trading session, and higher for lower price-
limit hits near the end of either trading session.  
 We find support for the market overreaction hypothesis since we observe partial and significant 
return reversals in the post-hit windows for the four samples of upper price-limit hits and for two of the 
four samples of lower price-limit hits. We also find support for the no-effect hypothesis since the returns 
in the post-hit windows are not significant for the other two samples of lower price-limit hits. Thus, our 
findings are supportive of the overreaction and no-effect hypotheses but not the price-delay hypothesis. 
These results can be interpreted as price-limit hits do not inhibit price discovery.  
 Our results provide support for our third alternative hypothesis that the prices prior to a limit hit 
accelerate as they approach the price-limit hit.  Using the equi-distant returns, we always find that the 
slope coefficients of the time-series trajectories of the mean returns up to the price-limit hits are highly 
significant and positive (negative) for the price-limit hits triggered at the upper (lower) limit. Thus, there 
appears to be magnet behavior that may contribute to the price overreaction behavior during the period 
prior to the price-limit hits. 
 We observe that buyer-initiated trading activity is always higher after the lower price-limit hits and 
lower after the upper price-limit hits, although the change is not significant for some of the measures and 
samples of upper price-limit hits. We interpret these finding as supporting our overreaction trading 
hypothesis that buyer-initiated trade activity increases after lower price-limit hits and decreases after 
upper price-limit hits. 
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 We find that the lower price-limit hits significantly increase proportional quoted and effective 
spreads (except for hits occurring in the first 30 minutes of the first session) and significantly reduce share 
and TRY depth. These two spread measures for the upper price-limit hits are significantly higher for hits 
near the end of a trading session and insignificantly lower for hits during the first 30 minutes of the first 
trading session. Share and TRY depths are significantly lower for upper price-limit hits, unless they occur 
during the first 30 minutes of the first trading session where they are insignificantly higher.  We find that 
the median (not) mean composite measure of liquidity (i.e., proportional quoted spread divided by TRY 
depth) is generally significant (and higher) post-hit for both the lower and upper price-limit hits. Thus, 
price-limit hits generally significantly reduce or have no effect on spreads and depth measures of market 
quality. In turn, this can leave the composite measure of liquidity generally unchanged. We conclude that 
these market-quality findings are consistent with the greater informational asymmetry effect on market-
quality hypothesis. 
 We test the robustness of some of our results using equi-distant returns and ARIMA modeling, and 
trade-by-trade returns and ARIMA modeling. The ARIMA model helps to alleviate some of the bias due 
to the autocorrelations in returns. Our findings show that our previous corresponding findings are robust.  
 By examining hits at the upper and lower limits separately, we are able to address the question of 
whether upper limits are necessary (Lee and Chou, 2004). The effects of limit hits may be asymmetric 
since investors are likely to be averse to downside deviations but open to upside potential.  Hits at the 
downside limits may partially protect investors who have limited short-selling or option trading 
possibilities (Wong, Liu and Zeng, 2009). While we do find that the effects for upper and lower price-
limit hits differ, we find as noted above that the time hits occur is of at least equal importance. 
 The remainder for the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the price limit 
procedures on the BIST. Section 3 discusses the sample and data manipulation. Section 4 presents tests of 
various hypotheses dealing with price limits. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides some policy 




4.2. THE BIST AND ITS PRICE LIMIT PROCEDURES 
 Borsa Istanbul (BIST), formerly known as the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), is a fully 
computerized order-driven market that employs various trading mechanisms that match buy and sell 
orders using price and time priority. Trading takes place Monday through Friday in two separate sessions 
from 09:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 14:00 p.m. to 17:30 p.m. According to the price limit rule in the 
BIST, each stock price can fluctuate to a maximum of 10% in each session from the “base price”, which 
is the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of the previous session. Due to rounding to the nearest 
tick for both the upper and lower limits, the maximum or minimum price may fall slightly outside the 
bounds of the 10% threshold. These limits are set and directed by the system automatically and they can 
be seen easily in the intraday data. In the case of a limit hit, trading is not interrupted and it continues 
until the end of the session within the same minimum and maximum price limit brackets. However, in the 
case of an excessive number of buy (sell) orders at the up-limit (down-limit) price with no corresponding 
sell (buy) orders, trading is either interrupted or continues at the limit price. This situation is referred to as 
a “limit lock” by Bildik and Gulay (2006). The interruption continues until there is a seller (buyer) willing 
to trade at a price not greater than the up–limit (not lower than the down-limit) price for that session. 
Trading may continue in the following session when the price limits are reset. 
 As in Kim and Yang (2008), our data set includes single limit hits, consecutive limit hits and closing 
limit hits. For our purposes, each limit hit is preceded and followed by 30-minute windows with no limit 
hit transacted price.  
 
4.3. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Our sample of firms consists of all the firms that are included in the BIST-50 index during the 
thirteen-month examination period of March 2008 through March 2009. Due to quarterly updating of the 
index, our sample consists of 59 companies. Our cleaned data include all transactions and incoming 
orders and the limit-order book reconstructed by us for all the companies in our sample. During our 
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sample period, 10 and 14 companies are either added or delisted from the up- and down-limit samples, 
respectively, due to index revisions.  The 18,989,498 trades in the BIST-50 companies during our sample 
period are reduced to 8,070,537 trade-second observations after the trade-second aggregations. There are 
44,037 and 52,816 trade-seconds occurring within the 30 minutes prior and after the down-limit 
observations, respectively. In a similar vein, there are 42,957 and 58,769 trade-seconds within the 30-
minute pre- and post-periods for the up-limit hit observations, respectively. We also used a daily dataset 
which includes the closing, minimum, maximum, and volume-weighted average price data for each stock 
and each session in order to double-check the minimum and maximum values during the trading day to 
determine if there was a limit hit on a particular day for a particular stock.  
 To aid in the identification of price-limit hits (time period during which prices hit and/or remain at 
either their upward or lower limits), we first compute the upper and lower price limits using  the 
following equations in Bildik and Gulay (2006) that  are modified to reflect any rounding to the nearest 
tick: 
Upper limit or bound on trade price:                     (4.1) 
Lower limit or bound on trade price:                    (4.2) 
where    is the maximum price permitted in session s,    is the  minimum price permitted in session s, 
        is the volume-weighted average price in session s-1 and the 0.10 is the deviation in price that is 
permitted in session s from the volume-weighted average price in the previous session s-1. Thus, the limit 
hit is in force when trading is either interrupted or continues at one of the limit prices. 
 Since our research design involves various comparisons of the values of various metrics for the 30 
minutes after a price-limit hit to their values in the 30 minutes prior to the price-limit hit (Kim and Yang 
2008), we identify a limit hit as being unique for testing purposes if 60-minutes of trading at non-limit-
prices is centered on that limit hit (i.e., 30 minutes before and after). In this study, a price-limit hit also 
refers to a series of price-limit hits that are consecutive or whose initial and final hits are not preceded and 
followed, respectively, by 30 minutes of trading at non-limit-prices. It also refers to a closing limit hit that 
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occurs when no other non-limit transaction prices occur after a limit hit price is reached during the same 
trading session.  
 Table 4.1 reports the total number of downward and upward limit locks for our sample of firms and 
subsamples thereof that have at least 7 trades in the 30 minutes before and after each price-limit hit. The 
choice of at least 7 trades allows us to satisfy the minimum number of observations of five for an ARIMA 
(p, d, q) based on Jarrett and Kyper (2011) and six for the SAS proc ARIMA procedure. Of the 328 hits at 
the lower price limit,
45
 133 and 16 occur in the first 30 minutes of the first and second trading session of 
the trade day. Of the 267 hits at the upper price limit, 77 and 9 occur in the first 30 minutes of the first and 
second trading session of the trade day. No more than 39 hits occur in the last 30 minutes of a session for 
hits at either the upper or lower price limits. Interestingly, 79 and 127 of the price hits at the lower and 
upper price limits, respectively, are in place at the close of a trading session. To ensure reasonable sample 
sizes, we examine the following separately for upper and lower price-limit hits: all price-limit hits; price-
limit hits triggered during the first 30 minutes of the first session; price-limit hits triggered during the last 
30 minutes of the first and second sessions; and  price-limit hits still in place at the end of the same 
session. 
 [Please place Table 4.1 here.] 
 Table 4.2 reports the number of trade seconds for various buckets for the sample of limit hits on the 
BIST. A paucity of trade seconds in either the pre- or post-windows for the price-limit hits of 30 minutes 
should not be a concern since over 94% of those windows have at least 30 seconds with trades. 
Furthermore, the percentages of those windows with at least 60 seconds with trades range from 69.8% to 
85.4% (respectively, pre-window for lower price-limit hits and post- window for upper price-limit hits). 
[Please place Table 4.2 here.] 
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 This reflects the elimination of one limit lock with less than five trade seconds in the pre-limit-hit period. This is 
consistent with previous studies. For example, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) exclude stocks with less than five 
trading days in a month from the computation of this measure for that month. 
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4.4. TESTS OF THE VOLATILITY SPILLOVER AND DAMPENING HYPOTHESES 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 
 The volatility spillover hypothesis argues that price volatility after a limit hit or lock is expected to 
be higher than that before (e.g., Kim and Rhee, 1997) if price limits or locks cause greater uncertainty and 
delay the price discovery process by adversely affecting trading (Fama 1989; Lehmann, 1989). However, 
if this type of market intervention provides traders with a reflection period during which they can obtain 
information to reduce informational asymmetry,
46
 reassess the market price, and avoid or correct 
overreaction, then it follows from the volatility dampening hypothesis that the price volatility may be 
lower after a limit hit or lock (Kim and Yang 2008).  Another possible outcome is that these two opposing 
effects neutralize each other so that there is no change in price volatility after a limit hit or lock. Thus, the 
first null and alternative hypotheses to be tested are: 
  
   The volatility of a stock after a price-limit hit is unchanged from what it was before the price-limit 
hit (volatility no-effect hypothesis). 
   
   The volatility of a stock after a price-limit hit is lower from what it was before the price-limit hit 
(volatility dampening hypothesis). 
   
   The volatility of a stock after a price-limit hit is higher from what it was before the price-limit hit 
(volatility spillover hypothesis).  
4.4.2 Methodology 
 The first methodological consideration is the choice of benchmark as there are three types of 
benchmarks used in the literature to test the volatility spillover hypothesis.  The first type of benchmark 
uses a control group composed of stocks that did not reach their limit prices but had stock price 
movements approaching the price limits (e.g., between 90% to almost 100% of the price limit, and 
between 80 to 90% of the price limit). Using this type of benchmark, Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik 
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and Gulay (2006) report support for the volatility spillover hypothesis for the Tokyo and Istanbul Stock 
Exchanges, respectively, using the squared close-to-close (not demeaned) returns for the 21-days centered 
on the limit locks that occurred during a trading day (session for the latter study). The second type of 
benchmark uses the period prior to the introduction of price limits or a change in the price limits. Bildik 
and Gulay (2006) report lower (GARCH-estimated) volatilities based on daily closing prices for a 30-
stock sample following a structural change on July 14, 1994 on the Istanbul Stock Exchange that doubled 
the daily cumulative price limit due to a transition from a one-to-two session trading day. They attribute 
this change in volatility to the two-hour break between the two daily sessions and not to the change in 
price limits. Kim, Liu and Yang (2013) compare a period with price limits to one without price limits in 
China, and report that price limits can moderate volatility calculated as the natural log of the ratio of daily 
high and low prices (Grossman 1988). The third type of benchmark uses the period prior to a price lock. 
Henke and Voronkova(2005) provide empirical evidence that price limits result in excess next-day 
volatility for the call auction segment of the Warsaw Stock Exchange over the period from January 1996 
to November 2000. Kim and Yang (2008) report lower intraday volatilities after limit hits on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange for periods of 15 (and of 30 minutes) before and after a limit hit. In this paper, we use the 
third type of benchmark where we measure volatility or variation in the 30 minutes before and after a 
limit hit or lock on the BIST.   
 The next methodological consideration is whether the data should remain unequally spaced in time 
or should be aggregated up to fixed (discrete) intervals. While most studies choose a discrete sampling 
scheme when examining the effect of limit hits to control for microstructure noise, the severity of any bias 
introduced with this choice is unclear. First, the value of the metric being examined seldom coincides 
with the end of each equi-distant interval due to trade randomness. Thus, the calculation of evenly spaced 
high-frequency returns necessarily relies on some form of interpolation among prices recorded around the 
endpoints of the given sampling intervals that results in a nonsynchronous trading or quotation effect that 
may induce negative autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the interpolated return series. These biases 
may be exacerbated in a multivariate context since varying degrees of interpolation are employed in the 
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calculation of the returns for different securities. Second, the impact on the metric being examined (e.g., 
price and volume behavior) of intra-interval events with informational content are imperfectly captured 
by the choice of equi-distant intervals. As a result, the equi-distant intervals may discard valuable 
information. Thus, the choice of measurement interval involves a tradeoff between statistical 
measurement error that decreases and untreated microstructure-induced bias (e.g., significant 
autocorrelation caused by bid-ask bounce as described by Roll, 1984) that increases as the sampling 
frequency increases (e.g., from trade-by-trade intervals to twenty-minute equi-distant intervals). 
 To make our choice of interval frequency for our base results, we estimate ARIMA (1,0,0) models 
using trade-by-trade returns for the price-limit hits that the Dickey-Fuller test does not find evidence of a 
unit root in both the paired pre- and post-windows which is not the case for only seven lower price-limit 
hits and only two upper price-limit hits. Based on untabulated results, we find price reversals or bid-ask 
bounce is likely to be a problem when using trade-by-trade returns. For example, the mean and median 
rho estimates for the full sample without a unit root that range between -0.34 and -0.40 for the pre-and 
post-windows for the lower price-limit hits are highly significant (all p-values <0.0001). We obtain 
similar magnitudes and significances for the other three samples of lower price-limit hits and for all four 
samples of upper price-limit hits.  Thus, our base results use intra-day equi-distant intervals.  
Nevertheless, we do provide some results in various sections of this paper using unequally spaced 
intervals to emphasize the impact of this high level of negative autocorrelation in our trade-by-trade 
returns on inferences.  
 When we use equally spaced returns, we use ten 3-minute returns for the pre- and post-limit hit 
windows. Our choice of ten 3-minute intervals allows us to satisfy the minimum number of observations 
of five for an ARIMA (p, d, q) based on Jarrett and Kyper (2011) and six for the SAS proc ARIMA 
procedure. We use the following model-free but definition dependent metrics to measure volatility or 
variation in each 30-minute window: 
                           
   
   ; (4.3) 
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 For the above measures,      and     
  are the      not demeaned and demeaned 3-minute returns, 
respectively, for limit hit i in window j (pre- or post-limit hit) for a window of length    (= 30 minutes 
herein). The measure given by (6) is the (l, l)-order realized bipower variation for the special case where 
r=s=1 (Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004). The second term under the square root sign in (5) 
includes an autocorrelation (ρ) adjustment. This adjustment was used by French, Schwert and Stambaugh 
(1987) to deal with the autocorrelation in returns due to non-synchronous trading and subsequently used 
by Goyal and Santa Clara (2003), Wei and Zhang (2005), amongst others. Goyal and Santa Clara (2003, 
ftn. 6, p. 769) state that, although the volatility estimate is negative when ρ < -0.5 because the second 




 We also use the Grossman (1988) measure of volatility for each window given by: 
                      ; (4.7) 
where      and       are the highest and lowest price, respectively, for limit hit i in window j of length  .  
4.4.3 Results 
 We report summary statistics for the estimates for each of the five volatility measures for hits at the 
lower-price limit for the full sample and three differentiated subsamples in Table 4.3. We observe that all 
of the means and medians for all five volatility measures are significantly lower after the lower-price limit 
hits for the full sample (panel A)
48
 and for lower-price limit hits that were triggered during the first 30 
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 We get no negative estimates using the demeaned three-minute returns but do using the non-demeaned three-
minute returns. 
48
 Not unexpectedly, the differences either become insignificant or change sign for the full sample but not the 
sample of lower price-limit hits triggered during the first 30 minutes of the first session when we use trade-by-trade 
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minutes of the first session (panel B). In contrast, we observe that the means and medians for all five 
volatility measures are higher and significant (with one exception) after the lower-price limit hit that are 
triggered during the last 30 minutes of the first or second session (panel C), and none of the means and 
medians for all five volatility measures are significantly different after the lower-price limit hits for those 
that remain in place at the end of the trading session (panel D). Thus, the average effect of a lower-price 
limit hit depends upon when during the day the limit hit is first triggered and also on whether it is still in 
place at the end of a trading session. 
[Please place Table 4.3 here] 
 We report summary statistics for the estimates for each of the five volatility measures for the upper-
price limit hits for the full sample and the same three differentiated subsamples in Table 4.4. As was the 
case for the lower-price limit hits, we observe that all of the means and medians for all five volatility 
measures are significantly lower after the upper-price limit hits for the full sample (panel A) and for 
upper-price limit hits that occur during the first 30 minutes of the first session (panel B),
49
 and for most of 
the means and medians for all five volatility measures for upper-price limit hits that persist through the 
close of a trading session (panel D).
50
 Unlike the lower-price limit hits, none of the means and medians 
for all five volatility measures are significantly different after the upper-price limit hits that are triggered 
during the last 30 minutes of the first or second session (panel C). Thus, the average effect of an upper-
limit hit depends upon when during the day the limit hit is first triggered and also on whether it is still in 
place at the end of a trading session. 
 [Please place Table 4.4 here.] 
 Thus, we draw a number of initial inferences from these results. First, our results provide support for 
both our null and two alternative first hypotheses (i.e., volatility no-effect, volatility dampening and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
returns in the calculation of the two volatility measures that captures the effect of bid-ask bounce; namely,      and 
    .  
49
 Not unexpectedly, the differences either become insignificant or change sign for the full sample and become 
insignificant for the sample of lower price-limit hits triggered during the first 30 minutes of the first session when 
we use trade-by-trade returns in the calculation of the two volatility measures that captures the effect of bid-ask 
bounce; namely,      and     .  
50
 The two exceptions are the significantly lower mean      and median     after the upper limit hits.  
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volatility spillover, respectively) since the post-window impact of a price-limit hit depends on the time of 
the day when the price-limit hit begins and when it ends. While volatilities associated with limit-price 
limit hits near the beginning of the first trading session tend to be lower post-limit hit, those near the end 
of either trading session tend to be higher post-hit for lower-price limit hits and unchanged for upper-price 
limit hits, and those that are still in place at the end of a session tend to be unchanged after the price limit 
hit. Second, the differences in some of the inferences across volatility measures may be partially 
misleading when considered in isolation if the price-limit hits facilitate price discovery. We examine this 
issue in the next section of the paper. 
 
4.5. TESTS OF THE OVERREACTION AND DELAYED PRICE-DISCOVERY 
HYPOTHESES 
4.5.1 Hypotheses 
 Price-limit opponents argue that short-term overreactions are not prevented by price limits without 
delaying the price discovery process due to their adverse effect on trade and the provision of market 
liquidity (Lehmann 1989). As a result, prices will continue in the same direction after a price-limit hit 
until equilibrium is re-established (Kim and Rhee, 1997). In contrast, price-limit advocates argue that 
price limits aid in the price-discovery process by providing investors with a cooling-off period during 
which they can reassess prices, and thus, correct short-term market overreactions. If the overreaction 
hypothesis holds, a price reversal is expected after a price-limit hit. If the price-limit hit persists through 
the close of a trading session, the delayed price discovery hypothesis predicts that prices will be higher 
when trading resumes in the next session with its new price limits. We test the following null and 
alternative hypotheses to determine if short-term overreactions or delayed price-discovery is associated 
with price-limit hits: 
  
   There are no significant mean return continuations or reversals in the post- versus pre-window 
for price-limit hits (no-effect price hypothesis). 
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   There are significant mean return continuations in the post- versus pre-window for price-limit 
hits (price-delay hypothesis). 
   
   There are no significant mean return reversals in the post- versus pre-window for price-limit 
hits (market overreaction price hypothesis). 
 The empirical evidence is mixed in its support of the overreaction hypothesis. This includes the 
studies by Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989a, 1989b) for Treasury bond future prices; Huang (1998) and Huang, 
Fu and Ke (2001) for the Taiwan stock market; and Diacogiannis et al. (2005) for the Athens Stock 
Exchange.  In contrast, Phylaktis, Kavussanos, and Manalis (1999) for the Athens Stock Exchange and 
Chen (1998) for U.S. futures markets find no and little evidence for the overreaction hypothesis, 
respectively. 
 Similarly, the empirical evidence is mixed in its support of the delay price-discovery hypothesis. 
Supportive evidence includes Kuhn, Kurserk, and Locke (1991) for the S&P stock and stock index 
futures, Chen (1993) for the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Bildik and Gulay (2006) for the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, Kuserk and Locke (1996) for the Chicago Merchantile Exchange, Kim and Rhee (1997) for the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Arak and Cook (1997) for U.S. Treasury bond futures, Chen (1998) for U.S. 
futures contracts, and Henke and Voronkova (2005) for the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Contradictory 
evidence includes Huang, Fu and Ke (2001) for the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Kim, Liu and Yang (2013) 
for the Chinese Stock Markets and Ma, Rao and Sears (1989a, 1989b) for the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and U.S. treasury bonds.  
4.5.2 Methodology and Results 
 To test hypotheses (  ), we examine if the mean and median returns for the 30-minutes after the 
price-limit hits are significant and carry a different sign from their counterparts for the 30-minutes before 
the price-limit hits for the four samples of price-limit hits. Specifically, we find the mean return for the 
ten 3-minute intervals in the pre- and the post- windows for each price-limit hit. We then test the cross-
sectional mean and median of these mean returns for the pre- and post-windows and for the paired 
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differences in the returns between the post- and pre-windows. The implicit assumption is that either no 
material news is disseminated from the 30 minutes prior through the 30 minutes after the price-limit hits 
or that the cross-section effect on prices of such disclosures in event time averages out over a series of 
such price-limit hits. The latter is a common assumption invoked in most event studies. 
 Panels A and B of Table 4.5 report various summary statistics for estimates of the mean returns in 
the pre- and post-30 minute windows for the four samples for those price-limit hits triggered by hitting 
lower and upper price limits, respectively. As expected, all of the means and medians are significantly 
negative and significantly positive prior to the price-limit hits for those triggered by hitting a lower and an 
upper price limit, respectively. For the price-limit hits triggered by hitting the lower price limit, the mean 
and median returns are significant (and positive) in the post-window for the full sample and for those 
triggered during the first 30 minutes of the first session. The mean and median returns are insignificantly 
different from zero (with three out of four negative signs) for those triggered during the last 30 minutes of 
the first and second sessions and for those triggered during the trading session that were still in place at 
the close of that session. In contrast, for the price-limit hits triggered by hitting the upper price limit, the 
mean and median returns are significant and negative post-price-limit hit for all four samples. For the four 
samples, the mean and median returns in the pre-limit hit window are significantly larger in absolute 
magnitude that their counterparts in the post-limit hit window.  
 [Please place Table 4.5 here.] 
 To summarize, we find support for   
 (the market overreaction price hypothesis) since we observe 
partial and significant return reversals in the post-hit windows except for two samples of lower price-limit 
hits. The results for these two samples support  
  (no-effect price hypothesis) since the post-hit window 
returns are insignificant. These two samples are for the lower price-limit hits that occur in the last 30 
minutes of a trading session or are still in place at the end of a trading session. Thus, our findings are 




4.6. TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PRICE LIMITS ACT AS MAGNETS 
4.6.1 Hypothesis 
 The magnet-effect hypothesis argues that the price accelerates towards a price limit as the price gets 
closer to the limit. Rationale provided by proponents of the magnet effect of price limits are based on 
investors becoming less willing to wait to trade either due to the fear of the loss of liquidity and trading 
imbalances (Lehmann 1989) or due to their fear of missing out on a trend (Arak and Cook 1997) or the 
transactional risk associated with asymmetric information (Kodres and O’Brien, 1994). Phylaktis, 
Kavussanos and Manalis (1999) conjecture that investor overreaction to new information drives the share 
price to reach the limit. The hypothesis also is theoretically motivated as Subrahmanyam (1994) shows 
that a price limit can increase ex ante price variability and the probability of the price hitting the limit in 
an intertemporal one-market model when the price is close to the limit. The cooling-off effect of price 
limits, which was discussed earlier, is a counter argument to the magnet effect. We test the following null 
hypotheses for the magnet-effect: 
  
   The prices prior to a limit hit do not accelerate as they approach the price-limit hit (no magnet 
effect hypothesis). 
    
  The prices prior to a limit hit accelerate as they approach the price-limit hit (magnet effect 
hypothesis). 
 The evidence for magnet-effect is also mixed. Some studies document statistically and economically 
significant (weak) tendency for stock prices to accelerate toward the upper (lower) bound as the price 
approaches the bound (Cho, Russell, Tiao and Tsay, 2003) and others find supporting evidence in an 
experimental setting (Ackert, Church and Jayaraman, 2001) or alternative empirical setting (Hsieh, Kim 
and Yang, 2009, for the Taiwan Stock Exchange; Tooma, 2011, with price-limit imposition on the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange). Other studies examine runs and reversals and other measures such as trading 
behavior around trading limits and find little evidence to support a magnet effect (e.g., Kuserk, Moriarty, 
Kuhn and Gordon, 1989, for T-Bond, soybean and corn contracts; Arak and Cook, 1997, for Treasury 
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bond futures; Abad and Pascual, 2007, for rule-based halts on the Spanish Stock Exchange; Huang, Fu 
and Ke, 2001, for closing limit halts on the Taiwan Stock Exchange).   
4.6.2 Methodology and Results 
 We begin by assessing the existence of a magnet effect graphically. To do this, we first calculate the 
cumulative returns for each price-limit hit starting with the most distant 3-minute interval prior to the 
price-limit hit (i.e., [-10]) and then continue to add another 3-minute interval ending with the closest 3-
minute interval prior to the price-limit hit (i.e., [-10: -1]). We then calculate the cross-sectional mean and 
median for each of these cumulative returns. We use a similar procedure for the ten 3-minute intervals 
after the price-limit hits except that we first calculate the cumulative returns for each price-limit hit 
starting with the most recent 3-minute interval after the price-limit hit (i.e., [+1]) and then continue to add 
another 3-minute interval ending with the most distant 3-minute interval after the price-limit hit (i.e., [+1: 
+10]). 
 Figure 4.1 provides the plots based on the cumulative cross-sectional mean returns for the price-limit 
hits that were triggered by the upper and lower price limits for the four samples. It is visually obvious that 
the change in the cumulative cross-sectional mean returns accelerates as it approaches the price-limit hit. 
To further examine this statistically, we run simple regressions of the changes in the cumulative cross-
sectional mean returns against time for the windows prior to the price-limit hits for the up and down hits 
for the four samples. Based on untabulated results, we always find that the slope coefficients are highly 
significant and positive (negative) for the price-limit hits triggered at the upper (lower) limit. To illustrate, 
the estimated coefficients for the all case (Figure 1, Panel A) are 0.1012 (t-value = 4.86) and -0.1074 (t-
value = -5.24) for the upper- and lower-limit hits, respectively.  
 Thus, these results provide at least preliminary support for our third alternative (magnet effect) 
hypothesis that the prices prior to a limit hit accelerate as they approach the price-limit hit.  However, it 
would appear that this magnet effect behavior may not be rationale given the overreaction price behavior 
identified in the previous section of the paper. 
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[Please place Figure 4.1 here.] 
  
4.7. TESTS OF THE TRADING-INTERFERENCE HYPOTHESIS 
4.7.1 Hypothesis 
 According to Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993, p. 1909), amongst others, price limits (and 
coordinated trading halts) are “obviously cost-interfering with market liquidity.” Greenwald and Stein 
(1991) associate unwarranted trading uncertainty with asymmetric information. The trading-interference 
hypothesis asserts that price limits induce pre-limit order imbalances that limit trading in this window 
which spills-over into an increase in trading volume after the price-limit hit (Lehmann 1989). If price-
limit hits impede the movement towards a higher (lower) equilibrium price for upward (downward) price 
limits, it is not obvious why patient buyers (sellers) would wait for prices to reach equilibrium. 
Furthermore, if the marginal investor perceives that the price-limit hit was due to market reaction, then we 
would expect that buyer-initiated trade activity would increase after a lower price-limit hit and decrease 
for an upper price-limit hit. Thus, to address the trading interference hypothesis, we test the following null 
and alternate hypotheses: 
  
   Trading activity remains unchanged after a price-limit hit (no trading-inference hypothesis). 
   
   Trading activity increases after a price-limit hit (trading-inference hypothesis). 
   
   Buyer-initiated trade activity increases after a lower price-limit hit and decreases after an 
upper price-limit hit (overreaction trading hypothesis). 
 The empirical evidence for the trading-interference hypothesis is mixed. Studies using daily data find 
that trading activity after a price-limit hit increases (e.g. Kim and Rhee, 1997; Bildik and Gulay, 2006), 
increases only for upper price-limit hits (e.g.,  Li, Zheng and Chen, 2014), or decreases (Chen, Rui and 
Wang, 2005).
51
 Studies using intra-day data find similar contradictory results that trading activity after a 
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 The periods examined vary from [-3, 5] in Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) to [-4, 5] in Kim and Rhee (1997) and 
Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) to [-11, 11] in Bildik and Gulay (2006). 
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price-limit hit increases only for upper limit hits (e.g., Wong, Liu and Zeng, 2009), or remains unchanged 
(e.g., Kim, Liu and Yang, 2013). 
4.7.2 Methodology and Results 
 To test this hypothesis we examine the change in trading activity from the pre- to post-window for 
price-limit hits.  For this purpose, we use the total number of transactions and total shares in number and 
value traded, undifferentiated and buyer-initiated. Since the times and IDs of each order and trade are 
available for our propriety dataset from the BIST, we use the more accurate chronological approach to 
identify the true initiator of a trade (Aktas and Kryzanowski, 2014). The authors use the available 
timestamp to the closest second for each order in order to identify the most recent  one as the trade-
initiator according to the chronological method first used by Odders-White (2000).  
 Since few mean and median changes are significant at conventional levels,
52
 the results remain 
untabulated for the three trading activity measures undifferentiated by trade direction for the four samples 
to conserve valuable journal space. Taken at face value, this could lead to the incorrect conclusion that 
these results support our null hypothesis that trading activity remains unchanged after a price-limit hit. 
However, as we next learn examining trading activity undifferentiated by trade initiator masks an 
interesting new observation. 
 The four panels of Table 4.6 report various summary statistics for buyer-initiated trading activity for 
the three measures in the pre- and post-30 minute windows and their differences for the four samples of 
lower price-limit hits. We observe that all of the mean and median trading activity values are significantly 
higher after these lower price-limit hits. This most likely helps to explain the significant mean and median 
returns (all positive) found earlier for the post-hit windows for the full sample and the sample of lower 
price-limit hits during the first 30 minutes of the first session. 
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 There is only two cases where both the mean and median paired differences are significant. This is for the increase 
in the number of transactions after a price-limit hit for price-limit hits triggered by hitting either lower or upper price 
limits that were in place at a session’s close. 
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 The four panels of Table 4.7 report similar information for the four samples of upper price-limit hits. 
We observe that the mean and median trading activity measures for buyer-initiated trades are always 
lower after the upper price-limit hits. Furthermore, both the means and medians of the three trading 
activity measures are always significant for the total sample of upper price-limit hits and for the sample of 
upper price-limit hits triggered during the last 30 minutes of the first and second sessions. For the other 
two samples, none of the means are significant and all but the median for the number of trades for the 
upper price-limit hits that remain at session close. This most likely helps to explain the significantly 
negative mean and median returns found earlier after the upper price-limit hits for all four samples. Thus, 
we interpret these finding as supporting the second of our fourth alternative hypothesis (   
 ); namely, 
that buyer-initiated trade activity increases after lower price-limit hits and decreases after upper price-
limit hits (overreaction hypothesis). 
[Please place Tables 4.6 and 4.7 here.] 
 In summary, we observe that buyer-initiated trading activity is always higher after the lower price-
limit hits and lower after the upper price-limit hits. These finding are supportive of our overreaction 
trading hypothesis that buyer-initiated trade activity increases after lower price-limit hits and decreases 
after upper price-limit hits. Our results do not support the trading interference hypothesis. 
 
4.8. MARKET QUALITY HYPOTHESIS 
4.8.1 Hypothesis 
 If price limit hits provide time for information dissemination and revelation and provide investors 
with time to better assess such information, then market quality should improve after price-limit hits (e.g., 
Chan, Kim and Rhee, 2005; Chen, Kim and Rui, 2005). Furthermore, if price limits mitigate information 
asymmetry, then providers of liquidity will narrow bid-ask spreads and/or widen spread depths because 
they will face fewer adverse selection risks from informed traders after limit hits. However, market 
quality should deteriorate after price-limit hits if price-limit hits interfere with information-based trading 
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(i.e., trading-inference hypothesis). Thus, to address the effect, if any, of price-limit hits on market 
quality, we test the following null and alternate hypotheses: 
  
   Market quality remains unchanged after a price-limit hit (no informational asymmetry effect on 
market-quality effect hypothesis). 
   
   Market quality decreases after a price-limit hit (greater informational asymmetry effect on 
market-quality hypothesis). 
   
   Market quality increases after a price-limit hit (lower informational asymmetry effect on 
market-quality hypothesis). 
 The empirical evidence for the effect of price-limit hits on market quality in general is that price-
limit hits either lessen market quality or have no effect. Kim, Yague and Yang (2008) find that 
proportional quoted and effective spreads are wider and depths are lower, especially after lower price-
limit hits. Kim and Yang (2008) find that proportional quoted spreads are unchanged after single limit 
hits, and are higher for lower price-limit closing hits and upper price-limit consecutive hits. Wong, Liu 
and Zeng (2009) find wider depth-weighted quoted spreads only as stock prices approach floor limits.  
4.8.2 Methodology and Results 




                        where                (4.8) 
                           (4.9) 
                                   (4.10) 
                                                (4.11) 
                             (4.12) 
                                                          
53
 We also calculate and discuss when appropriate but do not tabulate the following additional measures:      
       ,                ,                                            , and               
                                       , where the last two measures are for imbalance of share and 
dollar depth, respectively. 
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Where          is the proportional quoted spread; i and t refer to price-limit hit i and time t, respectively; 
     and     are the inside bid and ask quotes;     is the mid-spread;          is the proportional 
effective spread;            is the number of shares bid for at the inside bid; and            is the 
number of share offered at the inside ask.                is designed to measure the average slope of 
the liquidity function in percent per dollar traded. 
 We examine changes in these market quality measures by comparing their paired differences found 
by subtracting the value 30 minutes before a price-limit hit from its value for the 30 minutes after the 
price-limit hit. The results for the four samples of lower price-limit hits are summarized in Table 4.8. For 
the full sample of lower-price limit hits, we observe that both the proportional quoted and effective 
spreads are higher post-hit, and the share and dollar depths are lower post-hit. We observe that the 
composite liquidity measure is significantly higher post-hit based on the median but not the mean. For the 
sample of lower-price limit hits that occurred during the first 30 minutes of the first session, we observe 
no significant differences in the proportional quoted and effective spreads and composite liquidity 
measure between the post- and pre-hit 30 minutes. However, the share and dollar depths are significantly 
lower post-hit. 
[Please place Table 4.8 here.] 
 For the sample of lower price-limit hits that occurred during the last 30 minutes of either session, we 
observe significantly higher proportional quoted and effective spreads and significantly lower share and 
dollar depths post-hit. As for the full sample, the composite liquidity measure is significantly higher post-
hit based on the median but not the mean. For the sample of lower-price limit hits that are not resolved 
within either session, we observe significantly higher proportional quoted and effective spreads and 
significantly lower share and dollar depths post-hit.
54
 
 The results for the four samples of upper price-limit hits are summarized in Table 4.9. For the full 
sample of upper-price limit hits, we observe that proportional quoted and effective spreads are lower and 
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 and the share and dollar depths are lower post-hit. We observe that the 
composite liquidity measure is significantly higher post-hit. For the sample of upper-price limit hits that 
occurred during the first 30 minutes of the first session, we observe no significant mean and median 
paired differences in the proportional quoted spread and the mean proportional effective spread. The 
median paired difference (post minus pre value) is significantly negative for the proportional quoted 
spread and the composite liquidity measure. Although all the depths are higher post-hit, the only 
significant difference is for the dollar depth based on the median. 
[Please place Table 4.9 here.] 
 For the sample of upper price-limit hits that occurred during the last 30 minutes of either session, we 
observe significantly higher proportional quoted and effective spreads and significantly lower share and 
dollar depths post-hit. For the sample of upper price-limit hits that are not resolved within either session, 
we observe significantly higher proportional effective but not quoted spreads and significantly lower 
share and dollar depths post-hit. As for the full sample, the composite liquidity measure for these two 
samples is significantly higher post-hit based on the median but not the mean. 
 To summarize, we find that the lower price-limit hits significantly increase proportional quoted and 
effective spreads (except for those in the first 30 minutes of the first session) and significantly reduce 
share and TRY depth. These two spread measures for the upper price-limit hits are significantly higher for 
hits near the end of a trading session and insignificantly lower for hits during the first 30 minutes of the 
first trading session. Share and TRY depths are significantly lower for upper price-limit hits, unless they 
occur during the first 30 minutes of the first trading session where they are insignificantly higher.  The 
median (but not mean) composite measure of liquidity (i.e., proportional quoted spread divided by TRY 
depth) is generally significant (and higher) post-hit for both the lower and upper price-limit hits. Thus, 
price limit hits generally significantly reduce or have no effect on spreads and depth measures of market 
quality. In turn, this leaves the composite measure of liquidity generally unchanged. We conclude that 
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 The mean proportional quoted spread is not significantly lower post-hit. 
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these market-quality findings are consistent with the greater informational asymmetry effect on market-
quality hypothesis (   
 ). 
 
4.9. FURTHER TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS 
4.9.1 Trade-by-Trade Returns and ARIMA Models 
 In this section, we conduct a number of tests of robustness using trade-by-trade returns and AIRMA 
models. Various papers suggest that the bias due to the autocorrelations caused by using trade-by trade 
returns can be alleviated somewhat by using ARIMA(1,0,0) or ARIMA(0,0,1) models which are 
commonly referred to as AR(1) and MA(1) models, respectively. Since there is no consensus on which 
modeling approach is better, our robustness tests use both models.
56
 Furthermore, they provides us with 
the opportunity to examine how our previous results are affected by increasing sampling randomness and 
decreasing sampling discreteness given the finding of Aït -Sahaila and Mykland (2003) that the effect of 
sampling randomness is greater than the effect of sampling discreteness in many situations. 
 The AR(1) and MA(1) models estimated herein are given by: 
 AR(1):                    (4.13) 
 MA(1):                    (4.14)
  
where   is the correlation between successive return observations in the AR(1); and     and     are 
assumed to be IID normal. It is well known that the theoretical mean and variance from the AR(1) model 
are given by           and  
           
   , respectively. Similarly, the theoretical mean and 
variance from the MA(1) model are given by    and  
           
  , respectively. The first-order   for 
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 Corsi, Zumbach, Muller and Dacorogna (2001) demonstrate that using a MA(1) representation permits a highly 
efficient treatment of inhomogeneous time series (i.e., not equally spaced in time).  Bollen and Inder (2002) use an 
AR(K) representation in calculating their VARHAC estimator, which appears to apply the same variance adjustment 
as we use when the lag length operator K is equal to 1. Den Haan and Levin (1996) provide the step-by-step 
description of the procedure for estimating the VARHAC estimator of Den Haan and Levin (1994). 
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the MA(1) is given by        
   .57  We estimate these equations for the pre- and post-windows for 
each price-limit hit but only for the price-limit hits where the Dickey-Fuller test indicates that the series 
for both the pre-and post-windows for the same price-limit hit are stationary (i.e.,     ). 
 The summary results for the four samples using both time-series models with trade-by-trade returns 
for the lower and upper price-limit hits are summarized in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. We note that 
the first-order autocorrelations for the pre- and post-windows in both tables are highly significant but are 
negative for the AR(1) model and positive for the MA(1) model. For the pre-windows, the mean and 
median mean returns (Mean) for both ARIMA models are always highly significant and negative for 
lower price-limit hits (Table 4.10) and positive for upper price-limit hits (Table 4.11). These results are 
consistent with what was reported earlier in both panels of Table 4.5. For the post-windows, the mean and 
median mean returns (Mean) for both ARIMA models are always of the same sign and statistical 
inference based on conventional levels of significance.  Furthermore, the mean and median mean returns 
(Mean) for both ARIMA models in Table 4.10 are generally consistent with what was reported earlier in 
panel A of Table 4.5. They are significantly positive for all lower price-limit hits and for those during the 
first 30 minutes of the first session, insignificantly different for those during the last 30-minutes of both 
sessions, and still negative but now significant for those in place at sessions’ closes. They are 
significantly negative for the four samples of upper price-limit hits in Table 4.11 as they were previously 
in panel B of Table 4.5. Thus, our initial mean results based on 3-minute intervals are robust. This 
reinforces our previous inference that our test results support our two second alternative hypotheses that 
either market overreactions or price delays are associated with price-limit hits depending on the timing 
and duration of the price-limit hits. 
[Please place Tables 4.10 and 4.11 here.]  
 We now do similar comparisons of the mean and median return variances for the paired differences 
(i.e., Adj. σ) reported in each table for each AIRMA model, and with their counterparts reported earlier in 
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Tables 3 and 4 for the variances that account for serial autocorrelation (i.e.,       and     ). With only a 
few exceptions, the mean and median return variances (Adj. σ) for both ARIMA models are always of the 
same sign and statistical inference based on conventional levels of significance.  The exceptions are 
positive means and medians for lower price-limit hits during the last 30 minutes of both sessions that are 
nearly significant and are significant for the AR(1) and MA(1) models, respectively. When we compare 
the Table 4.10 and 11 estimates against those reported earlier for      and      for the paired post- and 
pre-window differences, we observe the following consistencies for the lower price-limit hits: 
significantly lower variances post-window for the full sample of price-limit hits, significantly lower 
variances post-window for price-limit hits during the first 30 minutes of the first session, higher (either 
significant or nearly so) variances post-window for price-limit hits during the last 30 minutes of both 
sessions, and not significantly different variances post-window for price-limit hits that transcend the end 
of sessions.  Similarly, we observe the following consistencies for the upper price-limit hits: significantly 
lower variances post-window for the full sample of price-limit hits, significantly lower variances post-
window for price-limit hits during the first 30 minutes of the first session, and not significantly different 
variances post-window for price-limit hits during the last 30 minutes of both sessions. The only 
inconsistencies are that the changes in the variances post-window differ in sign and significance for price-
limit hits that transcend the end of sessions.
58
 Thus, these new results support our previous variance 
results based on 3-minute intervals. Thus, our previous variance results based on 3-minute intervals are 
robust. This reinforces our previous inference that our test results support our second null and our two 
second alternative hypotheses since the post-window impact on return variances of a price-limit hit 
depends on the time of the day when the price-limit hit begins (e.g. beginning or end of a trade session) 
and when it ends (e.g., in the same or subsequent session).  
4.9.2 3-minute Returns and ARIMA Models 
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 The mean and median variances post-window are higher based on the AR(1) and MA(1) models but only the 
medians are significant. In contrast, the mean and median variances post-window are lower and higher based on the 
     and      metrics but only the mean for       is significant. 
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 In this section, we conduct tests of robustness using the ten 3-minute returns for each of the pre- and 
post-windows for each price-limit hit using the two ARIMA models.
59
 However, due to the low power 
and distorted size of unit-root tests (e.g., Mahadeva and Robinson, 2004)
60
 when combined with the 
moderate increase in the critical t-values as the sample size decreases (e.g., Rinat and Kumar, 2013), we 
expect that the null hypothesis that the 3-minute return series have a unit root will be rejected less often 
using the Dickey-Fuller test for the various time-series each consisting of only ten observations. This is 
what we find as we are unable to reject the null of a unit root for about 67% of the pre- and post-windows 
for the full samples of lower and upper price-limit hits. Nevertheless, using the remaining samples does 
provide additional evidence on the robustness of our previously reported results. However, to conserve 
valuable journal space these results remain available but untabulated. 
 For the pre-windows, the mean and median mean returns for both ARIMA models are always highly 
significant and negative for lower price-limit hits and positive for upper price-limit hits. These results are 
consistent with what was reported earlier in both panels of Table 4.5. For the post-windows, the mean and 
median mean returns for both ARIMA models carry the same sign as reported earlier in both panels of 
Table 4.5 but now they are no longer significant for both ARIMA models for the lower price-limit hits 
during the first 30 minutes of the first session and the last 30 minutes of both sessions. The mean post- 
minus pre-window differences in average returns continue to be always positive and significant for the 
four samples of lower price-limit hits and negative and significant for the four samples of upper price-
limit hits. Thus, our previous mean results based on 3-minute intervals are robust. This reinforces our 
previous inference that our test results support our two second alternative hypotheses that either market 
overreactions or price delays are associated with price-limit hits depending on the timing and duration of 
the price-limit hits. 
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 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Ebens (2001) estimate an MA(1) model for each of the 5-minute return series 
using a five-year sample in order to purge the high-frequency returns of the negative serial correlation induced by 
the uneven spacing of the observed prices . 
60
 These terms are respectively an incorrect probability of rejecting a true null and a high probability of accepting a 
false null.  
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 We now compare the mean and median variances of returns for the paired differences (i.e., Adj. σ) 
for each ARIMA model (untabulated), and with their counterparts reported earlier in Tables 3 and 4 that 
account for serial autocorrelation (i.e.,       and     ).  A positive (negative) difference indicates that the 
post-window variance is larger (smaller) than its pre-window counterpart. We begin with a discussion of 
the results for the lower price-limit hits. While both the mean and median differences for      and      
for the full sample are significantly negative, the median for the MA(1) is no longer significant. Both the 
mean and median differences for      and      for the lower price-limit hits during the first 30 minutes 
of the first session continue to be significantly negative,  those during the last 30 minutes of both sessions 
continue to be positive and generally significant, and those that transcend the close of a session continue 
to be insignificant. We continue with a discussion of the results for the upper price-limit hits.   
While both the mean and median differences for      and      for the full sample are significantly 
negative, the median difference from the AR(1) model becomes insignificant for the MA(1) model. While 
both the mean and median differences for      and      for the upper price-limit hits during the first 30 
minutes of the first session are significantly negative, both difference average are insignificant for the 
AR(1) model. While both the mean and median differences for      and      for the upper price-limit 
hits during the last 30 minutes of both sessions are not significant, they remain insignificant for the 
MA(1) model but become significantly negative for the AR(1) model. The variance differences for the 
upper price-limit hits that transcend a session close continue to be generally insignificant. Thus, our 
previous variance results based on 3-minute and trade-by-trade intervals are robust. This reinforces our 
previous inference that our test results support our second null and our two second alternative hypotheses 
since the post-window impact on return variances of a price-limit hit depends on the time of the day when 







 This study provides evidence that the effects of price-limits are not homogeneous as they differ 
between upper and lower hits but also when they occur during a trading session or trading day and 
whether they continue in a subsequent trading session at least for the BIST. Our results are based on the 
price-limit hits for members of the BIST-50 index during the thirteen-month examination period of March 
2008 through March 2009. Thus, whether they can be generalized to non-members of this index remains 
to be tested. Our results are robust to a number of further tests such as using trade-by-trade returns instead 
of equi-distant returns, and accounting for the effect of autocorrelation in both series. 
 Our major findings can be summarized as follows: 
 They are supportive of the volatility no-effect, volatility dampening and volatility spillover 
hypotheses depending on the time of the day when the price-limit hit begins and/or ends, and 
whether it is a lower or upper price-limit hit. 
 They are supportive of the overreaction and no-effect price hypotheses but not the price-delay 
hypothesis. 
 They are supportive of the magnet effect hypothesis that the prices prior to a limit hit accelerate 
as they approach the price-limit hit. 
 They are not supportive of the trading interference hypothesis but are supportive of the 
overreaction trading hypothesis that buyer-initiated trade activity increases after lower price-limit 
hits and decreases after upper price-limit hits. 
 They are supportive of a greater informational asymmetry effect on market-quality hypothesis. 
 Our findings have implications for the BIST and for emerging markets that plan to impose similar 
mechanisms or to fine-tune their current mechanisms. Regulators may want to experiment with more 
flexible (somewhat discretionary) price limits especially for price-limit hits that appear that they will 
continue into the next trading session. Given the evidence supporting the overreaction and magnet-effect 
hypothesis, regulators may want to closely monitor pre- and-post-limit periods to ensure that these are not 
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periods that are being exploited by market manipulators or insiders. We believe that all regulatory actions 
that facilitate market quality, integrity and fairness are especially important for an emerging market such 

























5.  CONCLUSION 
 Researchers are interested in trade direction algorithms because they help to better analyze the 
market for immediacy. Therefore, the main motivation of the first essay was to empirically investigate the 
accuracy rates of five trade classification algorithms for a trade venue (the BIST) in a developing market 
for the seven months ending with December 2008 that is centered on the month of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  
 In this essay, we documented that the one-second lagged version of the Lee and Ready (LR, 1991) 
algorithm with a greater than 95% classification accuracy rate outperformed the other four trade 
classification algorithms examined therein. Our accuracy result for the LR algorithm was also higher than 
that previously reported for other markets including the U.S. Our results also supported the finding that 
the five-second rule needs to be replaced by its one-second counterpart, as found by others for US 
markets (e.g., Chakrabarty et al., 2012). This result may imply that fully computerized order driven 
markets such as the BIST provide for a better sequencing of the actual entrance of trades and orders.  
 In addition to the superior performance of the LR algorithm using one-second lagged quotes, we 
found that the highest rates of misclassifications occurred for trades at the quote mid-spread and as the 
time between consecutive trades decreased (Odders-White, 2000). We documented the lowest 
misclassification rates for agency trades and that misclassification rates were higher in the first versus the 
last 30 minutes of both daily trading sessions of the BIST. This may be the result of informed trading 
during these periods although these periods are closely monitored by exchanges such as the BIST to 
minimize possible manipulative actions. 
 Unlike Odders-White (2000) and Aitken and Frino (1996), we found that larger transactions 
generally are more frequently misclassified but only for the classification algorithms using one-second 
lagged BBO (Best Bid and Offer). A special trade or cross, especially for large transactions, where buyers 
and sellers agree prior to the trade on the terms of the trades may be a factor in these situations. Unlike 
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Asquith et al. (2010) and Chakrabarty et al. (2012), we found accuracy rates of at least 90% using one-
second lagged quotes for both long and short trades for the quote, at-the-quote and LR (but not EMO) 
algorithms. While the EMO algorithm was best for correctly classifying seller-initiated trades with an 
over 95% accuracy rates and worst for correctly classifying buyer-initiated trades, the LR algorithm using 
a one-second lagged BBO was second best for correctly classifying seller-initiated trades and best for 
correctly classifying buyer-initiated trades. 
 The firms examined in the first essay were the thirty most frequently traded firms in the BIST, and 
the time period examined included the impact of the global financial crisis.  In future work, we plan to 
add relatively smaller firms to our sample and to examine other time periods with less volatility to 
determine if the high accuracy rate of the LR algorithm remains during such periods. 
 In Essay 2 we examined the magnitudes and durations of the temporary and permanent price effects 
of trades with various characteristics, such as being large or small. To this end, we examined the price 
effects associated with trades for the 38 companies during their tenure in the BIST-30 index during the 
twelve months from April 2008 through March 2009. Our findings support the conclusion that price 
discovery is fairly rapid on the BIST. To illustrate, we found that the mean price effects are less than 30 
basis points, are competitive with those found for other markets, and are (somewhat) counter-intuitive 
using the price at the (subsequent fifth trade second) day's close instead of the subsequent first trade 
second as the post-trade price. We also found that large trade seconds generally have the most positive 
and most negative mean permanent price effects for buyer- and seller-initiated trade seconds, respectively. 
This is consistent with the prediction of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) that 
informed trading is larger for larger trades. 
 Another major finding of the second essay is that the permanent price effects are highly significant 
and positive for all samples of short trades. They are substantially greater in magnitude for seller- versus 
buyer-initiated short trades, and are significantly (highly) more positive than their corresponding samples 
of long trades. This suggests that short trades do not unduly depress prices, and is consistent with the 
elimination of short trades or movements towards doing such in many markets such as in the U.S.  
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 Another major finding of the second essay is that the price effects of trades in the last minutes of a 
trading session are significantly higher. This result may have important implications for market regulators 
in terms of refining their surveillance systems to eliminate or minimize any inappropriate stealth trading 
or end-of-session price manipulation. 
 In Essay 3, we examined price-limit hits for members of the BIST-50 index during the March 2008 
through March 2009 period. We found that the effects of price-limit hits are not homogeneous as they 
differ between upper- and lower-limit hits, according to when they occur during a trading session or 
trading day, and whether they continue in a subsequent trading session. In this third essay, we document 
supporting evidence for the volatility no-effect, volatility dampening and volatility spillover hypotheses 
depending on the time of the day when the price-limit hit begins or ends. This implies that exchanges 
such as the BIST may consider paying extra attention to the timing of a price-limit hit and may consider 
adjusting their enforcement of such hits based on the timing of the price-limit hits.  
  Another major finding of this third essay is that we provided support for the magnet effect 
hypothesis that stipulates that the prices prior to a price-limit hit accelerate as they approach the price-
limit hit price. While the reported evidence did not support the trading interference hypothesis, it did 
provide some support for the overreaction hypothesis since buyer-initiated trade activity increased after 
lower price-limit hits and decreased after upper price-limit hits. 
 On a broader perspective, the findings reported in the third essay may be very useful for regulators of 
emerging markets in terms of price-limit hit enforcement. Basically, more flexible rules in terms of price-
limit enforcements may be more effective in terms of promoting improved price discovery and liquidity. 
Moreover, more scrutiny may be required during the periods prior to and after price-limit hit periods in 
order to alleviate any stealth trading activity. Such regulatory actions could improve market quality and 
enable exchanges (particularly emerging-markets such as the BIST) to provide a fairer trading 
environment. 
 In future work, we plan to examine the impact of price-limit hits for relatively smaller firms and 
other time periods. We also plan to examine how the order book and its slope changes around price-limit 
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hits using our ability to construct the limit order book consisting of the ten best different bids and ten best 
different offers and their corresponding volumes for each second of the trading day based on price and 
then time priority by using the order flow and trade data. Given the richness of our dataset, we also plan 
to use a new specification of an existing vector autoregressive (VAR) model used by Al-Suhaibani and 
Kryzanowski (2000) to assess the information content of a newly submitted order around price-limit hits 
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Figure 2.1. Plot of the level and monthly share volume of the BIST-30 Index 
 
This figure plots the month-end level of the BIST-30 Index and its monthly share volume over the 
period from month-end January 2005 through month-end October 2012. The “♦”and “▲” 




Table 2.1. Trade classification algorithms  
This table presents the definitions of the commonly used trade classification algorithms in the microstructure literature. LR refers to the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm and EMO refers to the Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) algorithm. 
Algorithms Definition 
Tick  
Trade is classified as a buy (sell) if the price of the trade to be classified is above (below) the closest different price of a 
previous trade.  
Quote  
Classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if the trade price of the trade to be classified is above (below) the mid-point of the bid 
and ask spread. Trades executed at the mid-spread are not classified.  
At-the-quote  Classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if the trade takes place at the ask (bid) quote. 
LR 
Classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if its price is above (below) the mid-spread (quote algorithm), and uses the tick algorithm 
if the trade price is at the mid-spread. LR recommend using the mid-spread five-seconds earlier (“5-second” rule) as it 
reduces trade misclassifications for many of the 150 NYSE firms that they examine.   
EMO 










Table 2.2. Summary of the results from studies of trade classification accuracy 
This table summarizes the findings of some of the studies that assess the accuracy rates of the trade classification algorithms used for US and 
International markets. ST refers to short trades & LT to long trades when such a breakdown exists. “SI” refers to seller-initiated trades. 
 
Study Sample Time Period 
Trade classification algorithm 
Tick Quote LR EMO 
Studies for US Markets 
Asquith, Oman & Safaya (2010) NASDAQ & NYSE, 100 
firms from each 
March, June & Dec. 
2005 
  12% - 15%  ST as SI no uptick 
rule & 41% - 44% ST as  SI 
with uptick rule  
 
Ellis, Michaely & O’Hara or EMO (2000) NASDAQ, 313 firms Sept. 1996 - Sept. 1997 76.4% 77.6% 81.1% 81.9% 
Chakrabarty et al. (2007) NASDAQ, 750 firms April-June 2005 75.4%  74.4% 75.8% 
Rosenthal(2012) NASDAQ 1391 firms; 
NYSE 1420 firms 
Dec. 1 & 2, 2004 64.7%  68.4% 65.6% 
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) TORQ, 144 firms Nov. 1990 – Jan. 1991   93.0%  
Odders-White (2000) TORQ, 144 firms Nov. 1990 - Jan. 1991 75.0% 79.0% 85.0%  
Funicane (2000) TORQ, 144 firms Nov. 1990 – Jan. 1991 83.0%  84.0%  
Savickas & Wilson (2003) CBOE July 1995 - Dec. 1995 59.0% 83.0% 80.0% 77.0% 
Blais & Protter (2011) S&P, top 50 firms    61.0%  
Chakrabarty, Moulton &Shkilko (2012) TAQ, 100 firms June & Dec. 2005   68.2% ST;  69.2% LT   
Studies for International Markets 
Aitken and Frino (1996) ASX, all firms June 1992 - June 1994 74.4%    
Theissen (2001) Frankfurt, 15 firms 25 Sep. – 25 Oct. 1996   72.8%  
Lu & Wei (2009) Taiwan Stock Exchange, 687 
firms 





Table 2.3. Trade classification accuracy for all trades and during the “first” and last 30 
minutes of each daily trading session 
First three rows of each panel in this table report average trade classification accuracies (buyer- and seller-
initiated trades) in percent for each of five trade classification algorithms using lagged zero, one and five 
second quotes for all trades (Overall) and for trades in the first 30 (F. 30 m.) minutes and the last 30 
minutes (L. 30 m.) of the morning (panel A) and afternoon (panel B) sessions of the trading day for the  
firms in the BIST-30 Index for the seven months from June 1 to December 31, 2008. The tick algorithm is 
not based on quotes so its performance is invariant to whether quotes are lagged. Each    and G-test 
statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point for 
presentation purposes. The chi-square and G-test statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for 
tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassifications is independent of whether the trade occurred 
in the first or last 30 minutes of each trading session. There are 7,889,985 trades in total, 991,489 and 
839,984 trades in the F.30m. for the morning and afternoon sessions, respectively, and 509,089 and 
1,294,405 trades in the L.30m. for the morning and afternoon sessions, respectively. 
Categories 
Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1 S 5 S 
Panel A:  Morning trading session 
F. 30 m. 89.05 75.14 95.15 93.07 73.94 93.36 90.60 82.62 96.52 94.08 83.77 90.57 88.71 
L. 30 m. 91.23 78.28 94.88 93.93 77.88 94.05 92.53 85.90 96.32 94.94 86.33 91.78 90.86 
Overall 90.38 76.32 95.00 93.48 75.22 93.05 90.80 83.87 96.38 94.44 80.88 86.93 85.69 
   (÷ 100) 23.3 18.4 0.6 4.4 28.1 8.4 18.1 27.0 0.6 4.8 132.6 194.4 163.3 
G (÷100) 22.8 18.6 0.6 4.4 28.5 8.7 19.1 27.3 0.6 4.9 139.8 210.1 175.9 
p-values <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘F. 30 m.’ versus ‘Overall’ 
   (÷ 100) 17.7 6.8 0.4 2.4 7.7 1.3 0.4 10.3 0.6 2.1 48.2 105.5 67.1 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘L. 30 m.’ versus ‘Overall’ 
   (÷ 100) 4.0 10.1 0.1 1.6 18.3 7.5 17.2 14.6 0.0 2.3 93.0 100.7 106.3 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .050 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Panel B: Afternoon trading session 
F. 30 m. 89.37 75.43 94.49 92.22 73.80 91.98 88.55 82.35 95.89 93.17 78.11 84.76 83.10 
L. 30 m. 91.92 79.69 95.67 94.53 78.45 93.29 91.35 86.63 96.99 95.41 80.66 85.41 84.50 
Overall 90.38 76.32 95.00 93.48 75.22 93.05 90.80 83.87 96.38 94.44 80.88 86.93 85.69 
   (÷ 100) 44.1 78.5 16.7 45.4 77.6 15.3 53.5 84.4 19.5 49.1 37.3 47.6 48.5 
G (÷100) 45.2 80.5 17.0 45.2 79.1 14.8 50.8 86.8 19.9 48.7 36.2 46.6 47.2 
p-values <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘F. 30 m.’ versus ‘Overall’ 
   (÷ 100) 8.7 3.3 4.1 19.5 8.1 13.2 45.3 12.9 5.1 23.0 37.2 31.2 40.8 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘L. 30 m.’ versus ‘Overall’ 
   (÷ 100) 31.0 70.7 10.9 20.5 63.3 1.0 4.0 63.9 12.2 20.3 0.4 22.5 12.7 




Table 2.4. Trade classification accuracy differentiated by their positioning within the BBO 
First three rows of this table report average trade classification accuracy in percent for each of the five algorithms based on the positioning of each trade versus 
the best bid and offer (BBO). The categories are at or outside of the BBO (≥quotes), at the mid-spread, and within the BBO but not at the mid-spread (< quote & 
≠ Mid-spread).  The number of transactions at 8,106,213 is higher than 7,889,985 because the transactions that take place at the locked quotes appear both in the 
at the quote trades and in the mid-spread trades. Each    and G-test statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point 
for presentation purposes. The chi-square and G-test statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of 
misclassifications is independent of whether the trade occurred at or outside the quotes, at the mid-spread, and inside the spread but not at the mid-spread.  N/A is 
not applicable. The sample sizes are 7,449,032 for ≥quotes, 639,426 for mid-spread and 17,755 for < quote & ≠ Mid-spread. 
Category 
Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 
≥quotes   90.17 80.72 94.73 93.19 79.67 92.81 90.53 83.06 96.18 94.19 80.38 86.52 85.26 
Mid-spread  88.33 N/A 79.25 84.17 N/A 89.40 90.17 93.19 93.30 92.10 77.12 84.82 85.60 
< quote & ≠ 
Mid-spread  84.46 52.24 95.40 94.63 N/A 45.77 44.11 52.24 95.42 94.70 89.51 91.01 91.06 
   (÷ 100) 28.1 N/A 2327.9 691.4 N/A 653.2 440.2 575.2 126.2 45.9 49.3 17.8 5.3 
G (÷ 100) 26.4 N/A 1603.7 551.1 N/A 356.4 239.1 636.2 107.8 42.3 49.6 17.7 5.9 
p-values <.001 N/A <.001 <.001 N/A <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘≥quotes’ versus ‘Mid-spread’ 
   (÷ 100) 22.1 N/A 2325.5 689.8 N/A 99.7 0.9 446.4 126.1 45.8 39.4 14.5 0.5 
p-value <.001 N/A <.001 <.001 N/A <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘≥quotes’ versus ‘< quote & ≠ Mid-spread’                  
   (÷ 100) 6.5 92.0 0.2 0.6 N/A 579.5 440.6 119.1 0.3 0.1 9.4 3.1 4.7 






Table 2.5. Trade classification accuracy differentiated by the time between trades 
First three rows of this table report average trade classification accuracy in percent for each of the five algorithms based on the time between trades. The 
categories are the 6,012,500 trades with less than or equal to five seconds between trades (<=5 s.), the 1,244,220 trades with more than 5 and less than 30 seconds 
between trades (>5 & <=30 s.), and the 633,265 trades with more than 30 seconds between trades (>30 s.). The last column reports the total number of 
transactions in each category. Each    and G-test statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point for presentation 
purposes.  The chi-square and G-test statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassifications is 
independent of the time between consecutive trades. There are 7,889,985 trades in total. 
Category 
Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1 S 5 S 
<=5 s. 91.29 71.87 94.75 92.77 71.42 92.72 89.80 81.20 96.29 93.77 80.17 87.47 85.88 
>5 & <=30 s. 86.44 89.79 95.26 95.22 87.71 92.87 92.75 91.66 96.19 96.09 81.87 84.24 84.02 
>30 s. 89.40 92.11 96.83 96.87 90.86 95.39 95.38 93.88 97.50 97.49 86.21 87.87 87.89 
   (÷ 100) 286.9 2781.3 54.2 231.1 2354.5 62.7 285.0 1344.7 25.5 227.4 144.2 99.8 55.1 
G (÷ 100) 266.0 3222.6 60.5 262.0 2674.0 70.1 321.7 1551.2 28.2 260.2 153.6 95.5 55.2 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘<=5 s’ versus ‘>5 & <=30 s.’  
   (÷ 100) 281.7 1762.8 5.4 97.5 1429.2 0.3 102.8 799.6 0.3 100.9 19.1 94.6 28.9 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘<=5 s’ versus ‘>30 s.’      
   (÷ 100) 25.3 1213.6 51.6 151.2 1105.7 62.7 204.5 635.9 24.4 143.0 134.6 0.8 19.4 




Table 2.6. Trade classification accuracy differentiated by trade size  
First six rows of this table report average trade classification accuracy (buyer- and seller-initiated trades) in percent for each of the five classification algorithms 
using lagged zero, one and five second quotes for the 3,280,534 trades with fewer than or equal to 500 shares (<=500 sh.), for the 1,033,029 trades with more 
than 500 and fewer than or equal to 1000 shares (>500 & <=1000), for the 1,726,491 trades with more than 1000 and fewer than or equal to 5000 shares (>1000 
& <=5000), for the 891,260 trades with more than 5000 and fewer than or equal to 15,000 shares  (>5000 & <=15000), for the 711,123 trades with more than 
15,000 and fewer than or equal to 45,000 shares (>15000 & <=45000) , and for the 247,548 trades with more than 45,000 shares (>45000 ). The last column 
reports the total number of trades in each category. The tick algorithm is not based on quotes so its performance is invariant to whether quotes are lagged. Each 
   and G-test statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point for presentation purposes. The chi-square and G-test 
statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassifications is independent of trade size category. 
 
Category 
Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1 S 5 S 
<=500 sh. 91.86 80.75 95.72 94.93 79.52 93.52 91.81 86.87 96.77 95.69 82.92 87.22 86.45 
>500 & <=1000 90.36 75.26 94.74 93.63 73.83 92.37 90.77 83.04 96.08 94.58 80.51 86.69 85.72 
>1000 & <=5000 89.24 73.24 94.27 92.78 72.26 92.43 90.39 81.35 96.06 94.02 79.14 86.48 85.24 
>5000 & <=15000 88.36 71.49 94.08 91.71 70.78 92.71 89.70 80.20 96.06 92.98 78.27 86.51 84.64 
>15000 & <=45000 88.97 73.23 94.57 91.19 72.23 93.04 88.82 82.03 96.01 92.09 79.53 86.98 84.51 
>45000 90.00 69.93 96.12 91.51 69.13 95.06 90.11 83.69 96.79 92.13 80.82 88.82 85.64 
   (÷ 100) 166.6 661.7 81.9 251.0 594.8 46.0 90.9 411.6 28.5 239.6 170.4 15.2 34.5 
G (÷ 100) 173.5 693.5 85.7 258.8 623.7 49.3 93.3 431.4 29.9 243.0 177.5 16.2 35.8 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘<=500 sh.’ versus ‘>45000’ 
   (÷ 100) 10.5 168.4 0.9 53.7 148.7 9.0 8.7 20.2 0.0 67.0 7.1 5.4 1.3 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .580 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘>500 & <=1000’ versus ‘>15000 & <=45000’ 
   (÷ 100) 8.9 9.1 0.2 36.7 5.5 2.7 17.8 3.0 0.0 43.1 2.5 0.3 4.9 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .030 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘>1000 & <=5000’ versus ‘>5000 & <=15000’ 
   (÷ 100) 4.7 9.1 0.4 9.5 6.3 0.7 3.1 5.0 0.0 10.8 2.7 0.0 4.7 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .850 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Table 2.7. Trade classification accuracy differentiated by long versus short trades  
First two rows of this table report average trade classification “accuracy” in percent for each of the five classification algorithms based on long or short trades.  
The last column reports the total number of trades in each category. The tick algorithm is not based on quotes so its performance is invariant to whether quotes 
are lagged. Each    and G-test statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point for presentation purposes. The chi-
square and G-test statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassifications is independent of short or 





Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1 S 5 S 
Short trades 92.15 76.06 92.04 90.01 76.10 91.83 89.19 83.82 94.93 91.95 75.19 86.25 83.98 
Long trades 90.31 76.33 95.11 93.62 75.18 93.09 90.86 83.88 96.43 94.53 81.10 86.96 85.76 
   (÷ 100) 11.1 0.1 56.1 60.4 1.3 6.9 9.4 0.0 18.2 35.9 63.8 1.3 7.2 
G (÷ 100) 11.7 0.1 48.2 52.8 1.3 6.6 9.0 0.0 16.3 31.9 59.8 1.2 7.0 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .410 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Table 2.8. Trade classification accuracy differentiated by buyer- or seller-initiated trades and by BIST`s trader classifications 
First two rows of panel A of this table report average trade classification accuracies in percent for each of the five algorithms based on whether the trade is buyer-
or-seller initiated. First three rows of panel B of this table report average trade classification accuracies in percent for each of the five classification algorithms 
based on the BIST`s trader classifications of institutional and retail clients of the brokerage firms [M(Ins. & Retail)], portfolios of the brokerage firms 
[P(portfolio)], and the investment funds managed by the brokerage firms [F(fund)].  The last column reports the number of transactions for each category in each 
panel. In both panels, each    and G-test statistic has been divided by 100 and rounded to the nearest one digit after the decimal point for presentation purposes. 
The chi-square and G-test statistics (and the associated p-values for both) are for tests of the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassifications is independent of 
whether the trade is buyer-or-seller-initiated in panel A and the BIST’s trade classifications in panel B. There are 7,889,985 trades in total. There are 4,162,006 
and 3,727,979 buyer- and seller-initiated trades in panel A. There are 7,464,484 M(Ins. & Retail) trades, 244,813 P(Portfolio) trades and 180,688 F(Fund) trades 
















Trade Classification Algorithm 
Tick Quote At-the-Quote LR EMO 
All 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1-S 5-S 0-S 1 S 5 S 
Panel    Trade classification accuracy differentiated by buyer-or-seller-initiated trades 
Buyer-initiated 89.93 76.35 93.52 91.93 75.08 91.72 89.72 84.06 94.81 92.86 67.59 76.06 74.98 
Seller-initiated 90.87 76.29 96.65 95.21 75.37 94.53 92.01 83.66 98.12 96.20 95.72 99.07 97.64 
   (÷ 100) 19.7 0.0 405.4 347.0 0.9 240.6 123.3 2.3 616.7 415.8 10061.7 9166.0 8237.3 
G (÷ 100) 19.7 0.0 416.7 353.7 0.9 243.9 124.1 2.3 651.0 426.5 11382.5 11429.2 9641.9 
p-value <.001 <.060 <.001 <.001 <.01 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Panel B : Trade classification accuracy differentiated by BIST`s trader classifications 
M(Ins. & Retail) 90.46 76.44 95.08 93.57 75.26 93.05 90.82 83.95 96.38 94.48 80.99 86.88 85.65 
P(Portfolio) 87.31 72.16 92.01 89.89 73.41 92.52 89.26 82.35 95.72 92.46 77.20 86.81 84.93 
F(Fund) 91.21 76.96 95.66 94.56 75.98 93.77 92.11 82.82 96.89 95.48 81.33 89.28 88.30 
   (÷ 100) 28.4 24.5 48.6 56.3 4.9 2.5 10.7 6.0 4.3 22.2 22.3 9.0 11.3 
G (÷ 100) 26.3 23.7 41.9 49.5 4.9 2.6 10.5 5.9 4.3 20.7 21.4 9.5 11.8 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘M(Ins. & Retail)’ versus ‘P(Portfolio)’  
   (÷ 100) 26.8 24.1 46.7 52.6 4.4 1.0 6.9 4.5 3.0 18.4 22.1 0.0 1.0 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .280 <.001 
Paired     test of ‘M(Ins. & Retail)’ versus ‘F(Fund)’  
   (÷ 100) 1.2 0.3 1.3 2.9 0.5 1.5 3.5 1.7 1.3 3.4 0.1 8.9 10.1 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Table 3.1. Proxies used in prior studies for pre- and post-trade prices 
This table reports the pre- and post-trade prices used in a selection of prior studies to examine the price impacts of large trades on various markets. ASE is the 




 of a second, respectively.
a
indicates that all 
trades occurring within 5 seconds of each other with the same price are aggregated. 
Study Sample 
Data source & time stamp to 
nearest Pre-trade Post-trade 
Kraus & Stoll (1972), p. 571 NYSE 402 firm subsample, July 1, 
1968 to Sept. 30, 1969 
Vickers, not provided Immediately prior Day’s closing trade 
Holthausen, Leftwich & 
Mayers (1987), p. 243 
NYSE firms, 1982  Francis Emory Fitch, Inc., minute Immediately prior Day’s closing trade 
Holthausen, Leftwich & 
Mayers (1990), pp. 85 & 88 
NYSE firms, Dec. 1, 1982 to Jan. 
31, 1984 






 but only 
report 3
rd
 trade after  
Chan & Lakonishok (1993), 
p. 177 
NYSE & AMEX firms, July 1986 
to end of 1988 
37 large institutional money mgmt. 
firms trades, no time stamp 
Opening price Day’s closing trade 
Keim & Madhavan (1996), p. 
14 
NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ NMS, 
5625 upstairs 1985-1992 
Dimensioanl Fund Advisors, not 
time stamped (in day) 
Previous day’s close Day’s closing trade 
Frino et al. (2005), p. 253 All ASE, 1 Jan., 1992 to 31 Dec., 
2001 
ASE, centisecond Opening trade Day’s closing trade 




 trade before  5
th
 trade after  
Hwang & Qian (2011), p. 17
a 
All NYSE & AMEX, Jan. 1983 to 
Dec. 2006 
ISSM (second)/TAQ 
(millisecond/second if daily/ 














 but only report 
3
rd
 trade after  
Frino, Mollica & Romano 
(2012), p.18 
S&P 500 traded on NYSE, 1 Jan. 
1997 to quarter 1 of 2001 
Thompson Reuters, not provided Previous day’s close, 
immediately prior 
Day’s closing trade, & 
trade price 5 minutes 
after 
Alzahrani, Gregoriou & 
Hudson (2013), p. 328 
All SSM, Jan. 2005 to Oct. 2008 Mubasher, minute 5
th








Table 3.2. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST using the first post-trade second 
price 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the 
12-month period from April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, permanent and total effects of a trade on 
price are given by ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is the price in 
the trade second whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the trade second 
of interest, and       is the price in first trade second after the trade of interest. All refers to the total sample of 
aggregated trade “seconds”. Buyer and Seller refer to buyer- and seller-initiated trades, respectively. Shares and 
value refer to the number and dollar value of shares traded in thousands, respectively. The price effects that are 
significantly different from zero are indicated by superscripts a, b and c for the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, based on traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d for significance based on the Bayesian 
adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.). P-values for the Kruskal and Wallis (K-W p-val.) test examine if the mean 
price effects are significantly different from zero when the day’s closing price (untabulated), or the first (this table) 







































































Value<100 5589375 0.0003 <.0001 -0.0005
c 
<.0001 -0.0002 0.7149 ±3.942 





Value<150 5698627 0.0002 <.0001 -0.0005
c 

















































































































Min  -0.2416  -0.1199  -0.2562   
Max  0.1806  0.1014  0.1903   
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Table 3.3. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST for less frequently traded stocks 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for trades of less frequently traded 
stocks on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the 12-month period from April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, 
permanent and total effects of a trade on price are given by ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , 
respectively, where        is the price in the trade second whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in 
the trade-second before the trade second of interest, and       is the price in the first trade second after the trade of 
interest. The All sample and single-sorted subsamples are drawn from the complete sample of aggregated trade 
seconds. Buyer and Seller refer to buyer- and seller-initiated trades, respectively. Shares and value refer to the 
number and dollar value of shares traded in thousands, respectively. The price effects that are significantly different 
from zero are indicated by superscripts a, b and c for the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on traditional 
critical t-values and by the superscript d for significance based on the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-
val.).  P-values for the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW p-val.) test examine if the mean price effects are 


















All  1512431 0.0003 0.7705 -0.0009
b 
0.1866 -0.0006 0.4530 ±3.772 






























































































































Min  -0.2513  -0.1992  -0.3026   
Max  0.1967  0.1978  0.2177   
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Table 3.4. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST for short trades 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for short trades on the Borsa Istanbul 
(BIST) for the 12-month period from April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, permanent and total effects of 
a trade on price are given by ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is 
the price in the trade second whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the 
trade second of interest, and       is the price in the first trade second after the trade of interest. The All sample and 
single-sorted subsamples are drawn from the complete sample of aggregated trade seconds. Buyer and Seller refer to 
buyer- and seller-initiated trades, respectively. Shares and value refer to the number and dollar value of shares traded 
in thousands, respectively. The price effects that are significantly different from zero are indicated by superscripts a, 
b and c for the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d 
for significance based on the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.). P-values for the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW p-val.) test examine if the mean price effects are significantly different from zero between the 






















































































































































Min  -0.0303  0.0028  0.0022   
Max  0.1925  0.0365  0.1953   
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Table 3.5. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST for the trader classification M 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for trades of trader classification M 
(institutional and retail clients of the brokerage firms) for the Bolsa Istanbul (BIST) for the 12-month period from 
April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, permanent and total effects of a trade on price are given by 
ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is the price in the trade second 
whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the trade second of interest, and 
      is the price in the first trade second after the trade of interest. The All sample and single-sorted subsamples are 
drawn from the complete sample of aggregated trade seconds. Buyer and Seller refer to buyer- and seller-initiated 
trades, respectively. Shares and value refer to the number and dollar value of shares traded in thousands, 
respectively. The price effects that are significantly different from zero are indicated by superscripts a, b and c for 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d for 
significance based on the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.).  P-values for the Kruskal and Wallis (KW 
p-val.) test examine if the mean price effects are significantly different from zero for trader classifications M (this 





















































































































































Min  -0.2469  -0.0940  -0.2603   
Max  0.1815  0.1041  0.1905   
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Table 3.6. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST for the trader classifications P and F 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for trades of trader classification P (portfolios of the brokerage firms) and F 
(investment funds managed by the brokerage firms) for the Bolsa Istanbul (BIST) for the 12-month period from April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, 
permanent and total effects of a trade on price are given by ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is the price in the 
trade second whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the trade second of interest, and       is the price in the first trade 
second after the trade of interest. The All sample and single-sorted subsamples are drawn from the complete sample of aggregated trade seconds. Buyer and 
Seller refer to buyer- and seller-initiated trades, respectively. Shares and value refer to the number and dollar value of shares traded in thousands, respectively. 
The price effects that are significantly different from zero are indicated by superscripts a, b and c for the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d for significance based on the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.).   
Sample 



























































































































































































































































Min  -0.2216 -0.0280 -0.2216   -0.2366 -0.0425 -0.2378  
Max  0.1516 0.1049 0.1996   0.1451 0.0913 0.1860  
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Table 3.7. Trade price effects for various trade classifications on the BIST for trade seconds in the last minute 
of the first and the second sessions 
This table reports the mean price effects in % for various trade classifications for trade seconds in the last minute of 
the first and second sessions in Panels A and B, respectively, for the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the 12-month period 
from April 2008 through March 2009. The temporary, permanent and total effects of a trade on price are given by 
ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is the price in the trade second 
whose trade effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the trade second of interest, and 
      is the price in the first trade second after the trade of interest. The All sample and single-sorted subsamples are 
drawn from the complete sample of aggregated trade seconds. Buyer and Seller refer to buyer- and seller-initiated 
trades, respectively. Shares and value refer to the number and dollar value of shares traded in thousands, 
respectively. The price effects that are significantly different from zero are indicated by superscripts a, b and c for 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d for 
significance based on the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.).  P-values for the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW p-val.) test examine if the mean price effects are significantly different from zero between the 



















All  13600 -0.0017 <.0001 0.0060 <.0001 0.0043 0.0029 
ALL Buy 8081 0.1750
c,d 
<.0001 0.0077 <.0001 0.1828
c,d 
<.0001 
ALL Sell 4890 -0.2889
c,d 
0.0029 0.0024 0.0024 -0.2865
c,d 
<.0001 
Shares>=15 Buyer 1198 0.0947
c,d 





<.0001 0.0073 <.0001 0.1963
c,d 
<.0001 







Shares<25 Buyer 7252 0.1851
c,d 
<.0001 0.0057 <.0001 0.1908
c,d 
<.0001 
Value>=100 Buyer 526 0.0895
c,d 
<.0001 0.0074 0.0023 0.0969
c,d 
<.0001 
Value<100 Buyer 7555 0.1810
c,d 
<.0001 0.0077 <.0001 0.1887
c,d 
<.0001 
Value>=150 Buyer 290 0.0820
c,d 
<.0001 0.0265 0.1363 0.1084
c,d 
<.0001 
Value<150 Buyer 7791 0.1785
c,d 
<.0001 0.0070 <.0001 0.1855
c,d 
<.0001 
Shares>=15 Seller 819 -0.2114
c,d 
0.1082 -0.0115 0.4901 -0.2229
c,d 
0.5053 
Shares<15 Seller 4071 -0.3045
c,d 
0.0001 0.0052 0.0023 -0.2993
c,d 
<.0001 
Shares>=25 Seller 554 -0.2085
c,d 
0.3621 -0.0339 0.2397 -0.2424
c,d 
0.4986 
Shares<25 Seller 4336 -0.2992
c,d 
0.0003 0.0070 0.0063 -0.2922
c,d 
<.0001 
Value>=100 Seller 335 -0.1798
c,d 
0.5582 -0.0206 0.7439 -0.2004
c,d 
0.9154 
Value<100 Seller 4555 -0.2969
c,d 
0.0021 0.0041 0.0016 -0.2928
c,d 
<.0001 







Value<150 Seller 4715 -0.2934
c,d 
0.0014 0.0051 0.0043 -0.2884
c,d 
<.0001 
Min  -0.3045  -0.0699  -0.2993  





























































































































































Min  -0.2886 -0.0360 -0.2636 
Max  0.2587 0.0857 0.3060 
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Table 3.8. Summary statistics for the regressors used in the pooled regressions 
This table reports summary statistics for the regressors used in the pooled regressions for the trade seconds not differentiated by trade initiator (mixed) and 
differentiated by buyer- and seller-initiated trades. A clean trade second is one where all the trades in that trade second are exclusively buyer- or seller-initiated 
(i.e., not mixed as they do not contain both).                  is the natural log of the market cap of firm j for the trade second immediately prior to trade 
second  i for firm j divided by 1,000,000.             is the relative half-spread (i.e., bid-ask spread divided by quote-midpoint) that occurs immediately prior to 
trade second i for firm j.                 is the natural log of the dollar value of shares traded in second i for firm j in TRY (Turkish Lira) divided by 1,000,000. 
              is the lagged cumulative (compounded) daily return for firm j over the five trading days prior to trade second i for firm j.          is the 
standard deviation of trade-to-trade prices on the trading day prior to the trading day d of the trade second i for firm j.           is the number of hours of trading 
time (excluding the lunch break) left until the end of trading after trade second i for firm j for that trading day d.     is the market return for the ISE-100 Index 
(now BIST-100) for day d.          is the Order Flow Imbalance which is the difference between the volume at the best ask and the volume at best bid for the 
trade second immediately prior to trade second i for firm j. The OFI values have been divided by 1000 for presentation purposes.    and    are dummy variables 
that are equal to one if trade second i is in the last minute and the last two through five minutes of the afternoon trading session, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable 
Mixed full sample (N = 5,793,148)  Clean buyer-initiated sample (N = 3,226,935) Clean seller-initiated sample (N = 2,408,524) 
Mean Median Std Dev Min. Max. Mean Median Std Dev Min. Max. Mean Median Std Dev Min. Max. 
       6084.51 4135.72 5996.67 26.00 31290.00 5910.24 3791.08 5970.90 26.00 31290.00 6224.96 4296.55 6034.19 26.00 31080.00 
            7.9708 8.3274 1.4353 3.2581 10.3511 7.9206 8.2404 1.4489 3.2581 10.3511 8.0116 8.3656 1.4182 3.2581 10.3443 
       0.0118 0.0063 0.0883 0.0015 2.0000 0.0120 0.0064 0.0862 0.0037 2.0000 0.0118 0.0063 0.0929 0.0015 2.0000 
         0.0371 0.0020 0.2105 >0.0000 179.3510 0.0313 0.0013 0.1570 >0.0000 26.7302 0.0394 0.0027 0.2566 >0.0000 179.3510 
              -6.7039 -6.2146 3.2917 -15.1626 5.1893 -7.0548 -6.6238 3.3116 -15.1248 3.2858 -6.3863 -5.9276 3.2040 -15.1626 5.1893 
           -0.0168 -0.0127 0.0889 -0.3602 0.3583 -0.0210 -0.0174 0.0889 -0.3602 0.3583 -0.0109 -0.0066 0.0882 -0.3602 0.3583 
   0.0041 0.0035 0.0022 0 0.0342 0.0042 0.0035 0.0023 0 0.0342 0.0040 0.0034 0.0021 0 0.0342 
      2.7332 2.7031 1.7656 0.0003 5.7489 2.7702 2.7439 1.7484 0.0003 5.7489 2.6795 2.6378 1.7742 0.0003 5.7472 
     -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0314 -0.0861 0.1289 -0.0013 -0.0008 0.0315 -0.0861 0.1289 0.0004 0.0002 0.0309 -0.0861 0.1289 
    -25.69 -0.12 665.31 -20470.62 6701.23 -120.06 -19.56 677.90 -20470.62 6609.53 99.76 30.05 618.63 -20067.26 6382.53 
        0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0164 0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 1.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0164 
       0.0013 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0831 0.0012 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 1.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0831 
   0.0145 0.0000 0.1195 0.0000 1.0000 0.0115 0.0000 0.1065 0.0000 1.0000 0.0159 0.0000 0.1250 0.0000 1.0000 
   0.0285 0.0000 0.1665 0.0000 1.0000 0.0243 0.0000 0.1541 0.0000 1.0000 0.0332 0.0000 0.1790 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 3.9.  Summary pooled regression results for the three types of price effects for the clean buyer- and seller-initiated samples 
This table reports the summary results from the pooled regressions for the temporary, permanent and total price effects for the clean samples of buyer- and seller-initiated 
trade seconds. A clean trade second is one where all the trades in that trade second are exclusively buyer- or seller-initiated (i.e., not mixed in that they do not contain 
both).  These price effects are given by ln(             , ln(              and ln(              , respectively, where        is the price in the trade second whose trade 
effect is being assessed,        is the price in the trade-second before the trade second of interest, and       is the price in the first trade second after the trade of interest. 
                is the natural log of the market cap of firm j for the trade second immediately prior to trade second  i for firm j divided by 1,000,000.             is the 
relative half-spread (i.e., bid-ask spread divided by quote-midpoint) that occurs immediately prior to trade second i for firm j.                 is the natural log of the 
dollar value of shares traded in second i for firm j in TRY (Turkish Lira) divided by 1,000,000.               is the lagged cumulative (compounded) daily return for 
firm j over the five trading days prior to trade second i for firm j.          is the standard deviation of trade-to-trade prices on the trading day prior to the trading day d of 
the trade second i for firm j.           is the number of hours of trading time (excluding the lunch break) left until the end of trading after trade second i for firm j for that 
trading day d.     is the market return for the ISE-100 Index (now BIST-100) for day d.          is the Order Flow Imbalance which is the difference between the 
volume at the best ask and the volume at best bid for the trade second immediately prior to trade second i for firm j.    and    are dummy variables that are equal to one 
if trade second i is in the last minute and the last two through five minutes of the afternoon trading session, respectively, and zero otherwise. As indicated in the table, a 
number of coefficients have been multiplied by 1000 or one million for presentation purposes. The coefficient estimates that are significantly different from zero are 
indicated by superscripts a, b and c for the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on traditional critical t-values and by the superscript d for significance based on 
the Bayesian adjusted critical t-values (Bay. t-val.).   
Item 
Buyer-initiated Seller-initiated 
Temp. V ≥100K Perm. V≥100K Total V≥100K Temp. V≥100K Perm. V≥100K Total V≥100K 


























            x 103 0.0673c,d 0.2505c,d -0.0287c,d -0.3844c,d 0.0386c -0.1335c,d -0.0161 -0.1252c,d 0.0415c,d 0.3335c,d 0.0255 0.2083c,d 
       -0.0013c,d 0.0001 -0.0001c,d 0.0003 -0.0014c,d 0.0004 0.0016c,d 0.0000 0.0002c 0.0005c 0.0018c,d 0.0005c,d 
                x 103 -0.1924c,d -0.4020c,d 0.0249c,d 0.5774c,d -0.1671c,d 0.1753c,d 0.2678c,d 0.5217c,d -0.0446c,d -0.7005c,d 0.2232c,d -0.1788c,d 
           x 103 1.2488c,d 0.6622c,d 0.0782c,d 0.7176c,d 1.3269c,d 1.3798c,d 1.1086c,d 0.6107c,d 0.2292c,d 0.2388 1.3378c,d 0.8495c,d 
   0.3711c,d 0.0556c,d 0.0115c,d 0.1671c,d 0.3826c,d 0.2227c,d -0.5965c,d -0.0982c,d -0.0137c,d -0.2169c,d -0.6102c,d -0.3152c,d 
      x 103 -0.0217c,d -0.0163c 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0211c -0.0018b -0.0232c,d -0.0009 -0.0169c,d -0.0291c,d -0.0400c,d -0.0301c,d 





















    x 106 0.0004c,d -0.0002c,d 0.0001c,d 0.0004c,d 0.0005c,d 0.0002c,d 0.0005c,d -0.0004c,d 0.0002c,d 0.0005c,d 0.0007c,d 0.0002c,d 
         0.1036c,d 0.1048c,d 0.0101c,d 0.0075 0.1138c,d 0.1123c,d -0.0486c,d -0.1176c,d 0.030c,d 0.0526c,d -0.0186c,d -0.0650c,d 
         0.0134c,d 0.0137c,d -0.0011c,d 0.0011 0.0123c,d 0.0125c,d -0.0040c,d -0.0087c,d 0.0018c,d 0.0037c -0.0022c,d -0.0050c,d 
N 3226935 110242 3226935 110242 3226935 110242 2408524 102115 2408524 102115 2408524 102115 
Adj.  R
2
 0.0832 0.0325 0.0006 0.0389 0.0866 0.0228 0.1503 0.0386 0.0019 0.0490 0.1583 0.0223 





Table 4.1. Summary statistics for the price-limit hits on the BIST 
 
This table reports the number of price-limit hits triggered at the upper and lower price limits in 
total and for various categories for the stocks in the BIST-50 during the thirteen months from 
March 2008 to March 2009, inclusive. The categories are price-limit hits triggered during the first 
and last 30 minutes of each session, and price-limit hits that remained in effect at the close of 















Lower 328 133 29 16 30 79 
Upper 267 77 30 9 39 127 
 
Table 4.2. Number of trade seconds for the sample of price-limit hits on the BIST 
 
This table reports the distribution of the number of trade seconds in the 30-minute periods before 
and after the sample of price-limit hits at the upper and lower price limits on the BIST. The left or 
right bracket (parenthesis) indicates that its adjacent value is included (not included). To 
illustrate, [5, 12) indicates that the number of trade seconds begins with 5 but does not include 12. 
 
Number of trade seconds 
Lower Price-limit Hits Upper Price-limit Hits 
Pre-hit Post-hit Pre-hit Post-hit 
[7, 12)  3 1 1 0 
[12, 30) 26 25 14 7 
 [30, 60) 70 45 40 32 
[60, 120) 93 90 70 63 
[120, 240) 87 100 83 70 
[240,480] 39 55 49 76 
(480, ∞] 10 12 10 19 




Table 4.3. Volatility changes around limit hits that are triggered by the down limit 
 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for five volatility measures in the pre- and post-thirty minute windows centered on limit hits triggered 
by hitting a down limit. The volatility values and tests thereof reported in the third column for each volatility measure are based on the paired difference in the 
post- minus pre-windows for each limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the hits 
in the last 30 minutes of the first and second sessions, and the locks that are still in place at the end of a session’s trading. T- and Wilcoxon tests of the means and 
medians, respectively, and their associated p-values are presented in the table. 
 
                                    
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting the lower price limit (N = 328) 
Mean 1.2189 1.0333 -0.1855 0.9391 0.8180 -0.1211 3.6568 3.1001 -0.5567 0.0842 0.0590 -0.0251 4.9711 4.1887 -0.7824 
Median 0.9277 0.8389 -0.0240 0.7707 0.6751 -0.0400 2.7831 2.5167 -0.0730 0.0314 0.0264 -0.0010 3.9000 3.5719 0.0001 
Std. Dev. 0.8666 0.6656 0.9202 0.6252 0.5313 0.6770 2.5999 1.9969 2.7607 0.1216 0.0993 0.1116 3.5223 2.6337 4.1306 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 -4.0643 0.0000 0.0000 -2.5890 0.0000 0.0000 -12.1930 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6544 0.4750 0.4106 -14.7630 
Max 4.3052 5.0717 2.3239 3.3907 4.2864 1.6132 12.9150 15.2150 6.9719 0.7001 0.7196 0.3541 15.9060 22.8630 12.4060 
Skewness 1.21 1.91 -0.98 1.11 2.09 -0.52 1.21 1.91 -0.98 2.50 3.99 -1.78 0.74 1.99 -0.25 
Kurtosis 0.88 5.95 2.03 1.05 7.59 1.13 0.88 5.95 2.03 6.91 18.95 7.96 -0.53 8.26 0.41 
t-test  25.47 28.12 -3.65 27.20 27.88 -3.24 25.47 28.12 -3.65 12.54 10.76 -4.08 25.56 28.80 -3.43 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001 0.0013 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 
Wilcoxon 26814 26163 -3750 26814 26163 -4415 26814 26163 -3749 25680 26163 -4147 26978 26978 -4447 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0289 <.0001 <.0001 0.0100 <.0001 <.0001 0.0289 <.0001 <.0001 0.0156 <.0001 <.0001 0.0068 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the lower price limit during the first 30 minutes of the first session (N = 133) 
Mean 1.5319 0.9881 -0.5438 1.1362 0.7876 -0.3486 4.5959 2.9644 -1.6315 0.1152 0.0480 -0.0671 6.2897 4.1687 -2.1209 
Median 1.2872 0.8149 -0.1600 1.1029 0.6435 -0.1860 3.8615 2.4447 -0.4790 0.0574 0.0239 -0.0160 5.9423 3.6534 -1.5380 
Std. Dev. 1.0068 0.5544 1.1113 0.6948 0.4399 0.7842 3.0206 1.6633 3.3340 0.1330 0.0731 0.1381 4.1189 2.6615 4.6758 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 -4.0643 0.0000 0.0000 -2.5890 0.0000 0.0000 -12.1930 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6544 0.4751 0.4106 -14.7630 
Max 4.3052 3.1013 1.5936 3.1234 2.3555 1.4337 12.9150 9.3040 4.7809 0.6580 0.5846 0.3541 15.9060 22.8630 12.4060 
Skewness 0.53 1.20 -0.71 0.41 1.17 -0.43 0.53 1.20 -0.71 1.74 4.28 -1.53 0.17 2.91 -0.06 
Kurtosis -0.66 1.43 0.31 -0.63 1.46 0.18 -0.66 1.43 0.31 3.38 24.39 4.59 -1.39 17.36 -0.13 
t-test  17.55 20.55 -5.64 18.86 20.65 -5.13 17.55 20.55 -5.64 9.99 7.58 -5.60 17.61 18.06 -5.23 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 4389 4389 -1975 4389 4389 -1913 4389 4389 -1975 4323 4389 -2103 4456 4456 -1952 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 4.3. Cont’d 
 
 
                                    
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the lower price limit during the last 30 minutes of the first and second session (N =59) 
Mean 0.8745 1.1086 0.2340 0.7008 0.8533 0.1525 3.3258 0.7022 3.3258 0.0462 0.0630 0.0168 3.3901 4.4684 1.0782 
Median 0.7037 0.9650 0.2821 0.5971 0.7788 0.1675 2.8951 0.8462 2.8951 0.0210 0.0321 0.0085 2.7588 4.2111 1.0363 
Std. Dev. 0.5304 0.6550 0.6598 0.4084 0.4834 0.5161 1.9650 1.9794 1.9650 0.0813 0.0929 0.0947 2.5077 2.2351 3.0782 
Min 0.2736 0.0000 -2.2153 0.2261 0.0000 -1.8054 0.0000 -6.6460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4108 0.5089 1.3245 -10.6130 
Max 2.7214 3.3096 2.3239 1.8237 2.5760 1.6132 9.9288 6.9719 9.9288 0.4548 0.5049 0.3184 13.5540 10.9190 7.2831 
Skewness 1.72 1.21 -0.44 1.49 1.35 -0.78 1.21 -0.44 1.21 3.63 3.06 -0.96 2.17 0.86 -0.86 
Kurtosis 2.92 1.97 3.96 1.80 2.93 3.44 1.97 3.96 1.97 14.24 10.39 9.59 6.28 0.50 2.93 
t-test  12.66 13.00 2.72 13.18 13.56 2.27 13.00 2.72 13.00 4.36 5.22 1.37 10.38 15.36 2.69 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0085 <.0001 <.0001 0.0269 <.0001 0.0085 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1762 <.0001 <.0001 0.0093 
Wilcoxon 885 827 434 885 827 384 827 434 827 827 827 406 885 885 415 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001 0.0030 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the lower price limit during the trading day that were in place at market close (N = 79) 
Mean 0.9923 0.9931 0.0007 0.8012 0.7837 -0.0175 2.9771 2.9794 0.0023 0.0573 0.0462 -0.0110 4.2072 4.2810 0.0738 
Median 0.8166 0.8558 0.0412 0.6857 0.6699 -0.0110 2.4497 2.5673 0.1236 0.0264 0.0295 0.0020 3.4786 3.8319 0.1896 
Std. Dev. 0.6519 0.4945 0.6794 0.5159 0.3970 0.5593 1.9559 1.4837 2.0384 0.0793 0.0508 0.0689 3.1609 2.1062 3.2457 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 -2.2153 0.0000 0.0000 -1.8054 0.0000 0.0000 -6.6460 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2545 0.5509 0.8439 -8.5282 
Max 3.0249 2.4245 1.6548 2.4484 2.0679 1.3113 9.0749 7.2735 4.9645 0.4565 0.3094 0.1437 13.6570 11.0000 7.8400 
Skewness 1.36 0.89 -0.58 1.26 0.89 -0.47 1.36 0.89 -0.58 2.74 2.59 -1.58 0.97 0.81 -0.11 
Kurtosis 1.49 0.34 1.49 1.54 0.51 1.35 1.49 0.34 1.49 8.92 9.00 3.70 0.12 0.79 0.07 
t-test  13.53 17.85 0.01 13.80 17.55 -0.28 13.53 17.85 0.01 6.42 8.09 -1.43 11.83 18.07 0.20 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.9919 <.0001 <.0001 0.7817 <.0001 <.0001 0.9919 <.0001 <.0001 0.1579 <.0001 <.0001 0.8403 
Wilcoxon 1541 1541 100 1541 1541 -19 1541 1541 100 1463 1541 -25 1580 1580 107 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.6281 <.0001 <.0001 0.9267 <.0001 <.0001 0.6281 <.0001 <.0001 0.9037 <.0001 <.0001 0.6042 
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Table 4.4. Volatility changes around limit hits that are triggered at an upper limit 
 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for five volatility measures in the pre- and post-thirty minute windows centered on limit limits 
triggered by hitting an upper limit. Each volatility value is based on ten 3-minute returns. The volatility values and tests thereof reported in the third column for 
each volatility measure are based on the paired difference in the post- minus pre-windows for each limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full 
sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the hits in the last 30 minutes of the first and second sessions, and the locks that are still in place at the 
end of the session’s trading. T- and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated p-values are presented in the table. 
 
 
                                    
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting the upper price limit (N = 267) 
Mean 1.1232 0.9166 -0.2065 0.8700 0.7360 -0.1340 3.3696 2.7500 -0.6196 0.0762 0.0450 -0.0311 5.0221 3.7484 -1.2737 
Median 0.8837 0.7542 -0.0880 0.7167 0.6212 -0.0710 2.6512 2.2627 -0.2640 0.0279 0.0192 -0.0040 4.0822 3.3006 -0.4320 
Std. Dev. 0.8032 0.5745 0.8375 0.5561 0.4653 0.6041 2.4097 1.7237 2.5127 0.1193 0.0838 0.1232 3.5815 2.4821 4.2918 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 -3.5436 0.0000 0.0000 -2.1666 0.0000 0.0000 -10.6310 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6130 0.0000 0.0000 -13.5540 
Max 4.1825 4.8243 3.0833 2.9430 4.1378 3.0217 12.5470 14.4730 9.2499 0.6775 0.8783 0.8086 16.9680 28.5380 24.5210 
Skewness 1.59 2.52 -1.22 1.20 2.75 -0.22 1.59 2.52 -1.22 2.93 5.82 -0.81 1.00 4.59 0.11 
Kurtosis 2.63 10.44 4.03 1.31 12.88 3.59 2.63 10.44 4.03 9.44 46.06 14.40 0.48 38.68 4.86 
t-test  22.85 26.07 -4.03 25.56 25.84 -3.62 22.85 26.07 -4.03 10.44 8.78 -4.13 22.91 24.68 -4.85 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 17490 17490 -3929 17490 17490 -4052 17490 17490 -3928 17227 17227 -5750 17490 17756 -5149 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0017 <.0001 <.0001 0.0012 <.0001 <.0001 0.0017 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the upper price limit during the first 30 minutes of the first session (N = 77) 
Mean 1.6734 1.1015 -0.5718 1.2451 0.8870 -0.3580 5.0202 3.3046 -1.7155 0.1530 0.0698 -0.0831 7.5360 4.2237 -3.3123 
Median 1.4036 0.8875 -0.3730 1.1710 0.6478 -0.3320 4.2109 2.6626 -1.1180 0.0918 0.0240 -0.0400 7.1263 3.3738 -2.6390 
Std. Dev. 1.0291 0.8008 1.2429 0.6502 0.6575 0.8415 3.0875 2.4025 3.7287 0.1699 0.1322 0.2010 4.1699 3.7964 5.9409 
Min 0.2955 0.2929 -3.5436 0.1393 0.2382 -2.1666 0.8866 0.8787 -10.6310 0.0043 0.0000 -0.6130 0.9852 0.9302 -13.5540 
Max 4.1825 4.8243 3.0833 2.9430 4.1378 3.0217 12.5470 14.4730 9.2499 0.6698 0.8783 0.8086 16.9680 28.5380 24.5210 
Skewness 0.81 2.29 -0.50 0.51 2.45 0.43 0.81 2.29 -0.50 1.52 4.34 0.20 0.38 4.07 1.06 
Kurtosis -0.27 6.47 0.68 -0.46 7.78 2.50 -0.27 6.47 0.68 1.46 21.96 5.38 -0.79 22.40 4.99 
t-test  14.27 12.07 -4.04 16.80 11.84 -3.73 14.27 12.07 -4.04 7.90 4.64 -3.63 15.86 9.76 -4.89 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 1502 1502 -707 1502 1502 -742 1502 1502 -707 1502 1463 -866 1502 1502 -947 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 4.4. Cont’d 
 
 
                                    
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the upper price limit during the last 30 minutes of the first and second session (N =69) 
Mean 0.8333 0.8120 -0.0213 0.6686 0.6536 -0.0149 2.5001 2.4362 -0.0639 2.5001 2.4362 -0.0639 3.8745 3.5197 -0.3547 
Median 0.7210 0.7539 0.0570 0.6075 0.6176 0.0190 2.1630 2.2617 0.1720 2.1630 2.2617 0.1720 3.3152 2.9853 -0.1240 
Std. Dev. 0.4812 0.3753 0.4274 0.3687 0.2873 0.3640 1.4437 1.1259 1.2824 1.4437 1.1259 1.2824 2.6014 1.5372 2.4438 
Min 0.2108 0.0000 -1.1448 0.1266 0.0000 1.3285 0.6324 0.0000 -3.4345 0.6324 0.0000 -3.4345 0.3944 1.1173 -8.8292 
Max 2.2271 2.1165 1.1339 1.7439 1.4110 0.7918 6.6815 6.3497 3.4017 6.6815 6.3497 3.4017 12.9670 7.3025 5.4884 
Skewness 1.00 0.91 -0.27 0.89 0.58 -0.76 1.00 0.91 -0.27 1.00 0.91 -0.27 0.93 0.67 -0.67 
Kurtosis 0.39 1.39 0.39 0.52 0.10 1.89 0.39 1.39 0.39 0.39 1.39 0.39 0.84 -0.28 1.50 
t-test  14.38 17.97 -0.41 15.06 18.90 -0.34 14.38 17.97 -0.41 14.38 17.97 -0.41 12.37 19.02 -1.21 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.6803 <.0001 <.0001 0.7338 <.0001 <.0001 0.6803 <.0001 <.0001 0.6803 <.0001 <.0001 0.2321 
Wilcoxon 1208 1173 -15 1208 1173 17 1208 1208 -15 1208 1208 -15 1208 1208 -152 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.9317 <.0001 <.0001 0.9223 <.0001 <.0001 0.9317 <.0001 <.0001 0.9317 <.0001 <.0001 0.3568 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting the upper price limit during the trading session that were in place at the session’s close (N = 127) 
Mean 0.9878 0.9412 -0.0465 0.7784 0.7690 -0.0093 2.9635 2.8238 -0.1397 0.0594 0.0405 -0.0189 4.0992 4.3811 0.2818 
Median 0.7779 0.8715 0.0890 0.6349 0.6871 0.0650 2.3337 2.6146 0.2680 0.0226 0.0230 0.0010 2.9342 3.8915 0.8883 
Std. Dev. 0.7463 0.4775 0.7562 0.5395 0.3904 0.5237 2.2390 1.4327 2.2686 0.1086 0.0486 0.1009 3.2295 2.8673 4.1303 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 -3.2644 0.0000 0.0000 -1.8696 0.0000 0.0000 -9.7933 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6130 0.0000 0.0000 -12.9330 
Max 4.1825 2.8184 1.3678 2.9430 2.5124 0.9639 12.5470 8.4553 4.1036 0.6698 0.3003 0.1393 16.9680 28.5380 24.5210 
Skewness 1.96 1.34 -1.67 1.61 1.51 -1.15 1.96 1.34 -1.67 4.03 2.70 -3.95 1.55 5.07 0.82 
Kurtosis 4.89 2.86 4.83 3.16 3.73 2.11 4.89 2.86 4.83 18.44 8.77 19.72 2.59 39.81 9.82 
t-test  14.92 22.21 -0.69 16.26 22.20 -0.20 14.92 22.21 -0.69 6.17 9.39 -2.11 14.30 17.22 0.77 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.4890 <.0001 <.0001 0.8402 <.0001 <.0001 0.4890 <.0001 <.0001 0.0365 <.0001 <.0001 0.4433 
Wilcoxon 3875 3938 296 3875 3938 387 3875 3938 296 3813 3938 -185 4001 4001 730 





Table 4.5. Changes in mean returns around price-limit hits that are triggered by hitting lower and upper price limits 
 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates of the mean returns in the pre- and post-30 minute windows centered on price-limit hits for four 
samples (full sample, hits in first 30 minutes of first session, hits in last 30 minutes of first and second sessions, and locks that are still in place at the end of a 
trading session). The values and tests thereof reported in the third column for each sample are based on the paired difference in the post- minus pre-window mean 
returns for each price-limit hit. Panels A and B present summary results for the price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower and upper price limits, respectively.  N 
is the sample size. T- and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated p-values are presented in the table. 
 All During first 30 min. of first session During last 30 min. of first & 
second session 
During the trading session and still 
in place at session’s close 
 Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. 
Panel A: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting an lower price limit 
Mean -0.3843 0.0769 0.4612 -0.4804 0.0791 0.5595 -0.2375 0.0086 0.2461 -0.3237 -0.0384 0.2852 
Median -0.2740 0.0873 0.3872 -0.4450 0.0985 0.5504 -0.2080 0.0000 0.3052 -0.2350 -0.0560 0.2817 
Std. Dev. 0.3633 0.2560 0.4624 0.4650 0.2347 0.5394 0.1806 0.2815 0.3015 0.3371 0.2502 0.4467 
Min -1.5906 -0.7410 -1.3003 -1.5906 -0.7410 -1.3003 -0.8388 -0.6959 -0.4533 -1.2588 -0.7410 -1.3003 
Max 0.6632 1.3883 1.8050 0.6632 0.6394 1.7049 0.0000 0.7410 1.0086 0.6632 0.5043 1.3916 
Skewness -0.58 0.17 0.19 -0.08 -0.81 -0.23 -0.99 -0.02 -0.17 -0.53 -0.11 -0.18 
Kurtosis -0.35 3.18 0.02 -1.18 1.49 -0.25 1.16 0.29 0.00 0.50 0.56 1.34 
t-test  -19.16 5.44 18.06 -11.91 3.89 11.96 -10.10 0.24 6.27 -8.53 -1.37 5.68 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.8143 <.0001 <.0001 0.1758 <.0001 
Wilcoxon -24131 9152 23216 -3825 1651 3830 -827 24 650 -1407 -266 1049 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8538 <.0001 <.0001 0.1448 <.0001 
N 328 133 59 79 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting an upper price limit 
Mean 0.4082 -0.0998 -0.5080 0.6019 -0.1318 -0.7338 0.3307 -0.0629 -0.3937 0.3160 -0.0714 -0.3874 
Median 0.2985 -0.1200 -0.4070 0.5884 -0.1310 -0.8000 0.2817 -0.0820 -0.3180 0.2208 -0.0840 -0.3050 
Std. Dev. 0.3625 0.2259 0.4406 0.4635 0.2703 0.5151 0.2687 0.2257 0.3526 0.3256 0.2561 0.4114 
Min -0.1612 -0.7796 -1.9151 -0.1612 -0.7796 -1.9151 -0.0579 -0.4467 -1.6404 -0.1593 -0.7796 -1.9151 
Max 1.6285 1.1523 0.6116 1.6285 1.1523 0.6116 1.2967 0.7061 0.3946 1.6285 0.7145 0.3946 
Skewness 0.94 0.91 -0.51 0.25 1.37 0.14 0.93 0.81 -0.96 1.53 0.23 -1.05 
Kurtosis 0.51 4.27 -0.19 -0.69 7.05 -0.51 1.06 1.44 1.78 2.96 0.89 1.36 
t-test  18.40 -7.22 -18.84 11.40 -4.28 -12.50 10.23 -2.32 -9.27 10.94 -3.14 -10.61 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0236 <.0001 <.0001 0.0021 <.0001 
Wilcoxon 16565 -9189 -16706 1433 -991 -1447 1157 -419 -1123 3498 -1306 -3558 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0065 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 <.0001 




Table 4.6. Buyer-initiated trading activity around price-limit hits triggered by down price limits 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for three trading activity measures for buyer-initiated trades in the pre- 
and post-thirty minute windows centered on limit hits triggered by hitting a down price limit. The trading activity values and tests 
thereof reported in the third column for each measure are based on the paired difference in the post- minus pre-windows for each 
price limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the 
hits in the last 30 minutes of the first and second sessions, and the hits that are still in place at the end of a session’s trading. T- 
and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated p-values are presented in the table. 
 TotalBuyerTransactions TotalBuyerSharesTraded (000) TotalBuyerDollarVolume (000 TYL) 
 Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit (N = 328) 
Mean 137.5 214.2 76.7 543.3 1031.9 488.6 1251.9 2030.7 778.8 
Median 84.5 124.0 34.0 139.4 246.6 54.1 225.3 485.1 120.0 
Std. Dev. 198.3 281.6 180.7 1605.2 2928.6 1821.8 3854.4 6449.7 4038.2 
Min 1.0 4.0 -373.0 0.0 0.7 -1834.0 0.1 4.2 -11533.8 
Max 2276.0 2282.0 1461.0 20648.9 31941.2 24843.0 37899.4 76736.2 57935.3 
Skewness 6.10 4.12 3.42 8.47 7.08 8.89 6.70 7.57 9.82 
Kurtosis 54.45 22.59 19.83 88.93 60.32 103.93 50.62 69.57 129.59 
t-test  12.56 13.77 7.68 6.13 6.38 4.86 5.88 5.70 3.49 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 
Wilcoxon 26978 26978 16214.5 26978 26978 16522 26978 26978 15764 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit during first 30 minutes of first session (N = 133) 
Mean 156.4 244.3 88.0 548.4 1264.8 716.4 1447.7 2659.6 1211.9 
Median 116.0 149.0 32.0 177.4 249.7 40.4 380.3 515.1 60.5 
Std. Dev. 149.5 318.7 240.1 956.4 3380.0 2615.0 3544.1 7974.5 5907.1 
Min 1.0 6.0 -373.0 0.0 0.7 -401.8 0.1 4.2 -10966.3 
Max 821.0 2282.0 1461.0 7098.2 31941.2 24843.0 31917.2 76736.2 57935.3 
Skewness 1.97 3.49 3.28 3.84 6.64 6.96 6.13 7.08 7.53 
Kurtosis 4.67 15.75 14.28 19.52 54.02 57.80 45.66 59.56 67.85 
t-test  12.06 8.84 4.22 6.61 4.32 3.16 4.71 3.85 2.37 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0020 <.0001 0.0002 0.0194 
Wilcoxon 4455.5 4455.5 2246.5 4455.5 4455.5 2116.5 4455.5 4455.5 1840.5 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit during last 30 minutes of first and second session (N =59) 
Mean 169.3 263.0 93.7 888.0 1418.7 530.6 1905.9 2958.8 1052.9 
Median 70.0 152.0 53.0 148.1 318.6 126.6 202.9 635.2 258.5 
Std. Dev. 365.7 380.0 136.5 3053.5 4210.2 1438.8 6087.0 8208.3 2599.5 
Min 7.0 12.0 -213.0 0.8 2.8 -952.0 1.2 5.0 -1216.5 
Max 2276.0 2124.0 511.0 20648.9 26565.5 7411.1 37899.4 46006.5 14993.7 
Skewness 4.8 4.0 1.0 5.6 4.9 3.8 5.1 4.7 3.9 
Kurtosis 24.6 17.4 2.0 33.4 25.7 14.5 26.7 22.2 16.7 
t-test  3.6 5.3 5.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.1 
  p-value 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001 0.0294 0.0122 0.0063 0.0194 0.0075 0.0029 
Wilcoxon 885 885 885 885 885 727 885 885 724 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit that were in place at session’s close (N = 79) 
Mean 110.7 219.1 108.4 275.1 533.0 257.8 527.1 1215.0 688.0 
Median 67.0 144.0 47.0 92.3 178.3 50.8 198.3 321.8 119.0 
Std. Dev. 122.4 274.0 227.2 443.1 929.3 738.2 965.7 2608.1 2058.6 
Min 1.0 9.0 -373.0 0.0 0.7 -396.3 0.1 4.2 -579.7 
Max 670.0 1627.0 1324.0 2572.0 5477.9 4750.8 6088.9 15164.7 12966.4 
Skewness 2.56 3.19 2.92 2.75 3.49 4.77 3.72 3.91 4.71 
Kurtosis 7.86 11.80 12.10 9.56 14.43 25.52 16.48 16.39 24.17 
t-test  8.03 7.11 4.24 5.52 5.10 3.10 4.85 4.14 2.97 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0027 <.0001 <.0001 0.0040 
Wilcoxon 1580 1580 1111 1580 1580 954 1580 1580 968 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table 4.7. Buyer-initiated trading activity around price-limit hits triggered by up price limits 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for three trading activity measures for buyer-initiated trades in the pre- 
and post-thirty minute windows centered on limit hits triggered by hitting a upper price limit. The trading activity values and tests 
thereof reported in the third column for each measure are based on the paired difference in the post- minus pre-windows for each 
price-limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the 
hits in the last 30 minutes of the first and second sessions, and the hits that are still in place at the end of a session’s trading. T- 
and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated p-values are presented in the table. 
 TotalBuyerTransactions TotalBuyerSharesTraded (000) TotalBuyerDollarVolume (000 TYL) 
 Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. Pre-Hit Post-Hit Paired Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit (N = 267) 
Mean 326.8 265.0 -61.8 1865.4 1482.5 -382.9 3939.0 3313.5 -625.5 
Median 229.0 160.0 -60.0 697.6 356.1 -150.2 1594.1 902.3 -294.2 
Std. Dev. 318.4 318.2 227.3 3705.4 4147.1 2134.5 9421.4 10825.4 4863.0 
Min 10.0 7.0 -642.0 4.2 0.1 -9619.7 10.5 0.4 -28879.3 
Max 2269.0 2172.0 1248.0 33994.2 42422.9 15841.1 108784.6 113325.6 42039.2 
Skewness 2.68 3.22 1.32 5.29 6.82 2.26 7.65 8.36 2.53 
Kurtosis 10.67 13.89 7.78 37.19 55.51 20.96 72.84 77.71 33.83 
t-test  16.77 13.61 -4.44 8.23 5.84 -2.93 6.83 5.00 -2.10 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0037 <.0001 <.0001 0.0365 
Wilcoxon 17889 17889 17889 17889 17889 -9326 17889 17889 -8041 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit during first 30 minutes of first session (N = 77) 
Mean 404.1 359.4 -44.7 2612.6 2477.1 -135.5 5675.2 5531.9 -143.3 
Median 308.0 184.0 -70.0 1087.7 608.8 -91.9 1375.2 1105.3 -96.2 
Std. Dev. 401.8 454.0 315.9 4761.9 5471.2 3028.5 14082.8 15286.9 7537.3 
Min 10.0 11.0 -622.0 7.3 0.1 -7740.2 10.5 0.4 -28879.3 
Max 2196.0 2172.0 1248.0 33994.2 33966.2 15841.1 108784.6 113325.6 42039.2 
Skewness 2.12 2.22 1.98 4.49 4.20 2.76 5.70 5.64 1.42 
Kurtosis 5.72 5.09 5.93 25.52 20.02 12.71 38.82 35.79 15.70 
t-test  8.83 6.95 -1.24 4.81 3.97 -0.39 3.54 3.18 -0.17 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.2182 <.0001 0.0002 0.6958 0.0007 0.0022 0.8679 
Wilcoxon 1502 1502 -615 1502 1502 -561 1502 1502 -355 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0014 <.0001 <.0001 0.0038 <.0001 <.0001 0.0716 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit during last 30 minutes of first and second session (N =69) 
Mean 294.6 255.9 -38.7 1179.5 873.7 -305.7 3150.1 2304.0 -846.2 
Median 245.0 195.0 -51.0 539.8 333.5 -150.2 1714.4 1034.1 -418.3 
Std. Dev. 212.5 200.4 144.1 1808.8 1767.2 763.8 3615.8 3415.7 2203.7 
Min 20.0 16.0 -429.0 14.8 3.3 -3761.8 27.3 18.0 -9931.4 
Max 1014.0 1047.0 277.0 11231.8 12970.2 1738.3 17506.6 20892.2 4152.9 
Skewness 1.27 1.26 -0.38 3.52 5.15 -2.05 2.14 3.28 -1.37 
Kurtosis 1.55 2.25 0.74 15.22 32.73 8.76 4.98 13.67 4.29 
t-test  11.52 10.61 -2.23 5.42 4.11 -3.32 7.24 5.60 -3.19 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0291 <.0001 <.0001 0.0014 <.0001 <.0001 0.0022 
Wilcoxon 1208 1208 -353 1208 1208 -706 1208 1208 -603 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0338 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit that were in place at session’s close (N = 127) 
Mean 346.6 338.7 -7.9 2078.5 1857.5 -221.0 4449.9 4261.7 -188.2 
Median 240.0 245.0 -14.0 809.7 533.3 -112.5 1971.8 1472.5 -247.6 
Std. Dev. 338.6 344.8 245.5 3951.7 4324.6 2349.5 10833.5 12045.3 5356.1 
Min 20.0 16.0 -622.0 4.2 3.3 -7973.2 62.4 18.0 -22593.0 
Max 2196.0 2172.0 1248.0 33994.2 33966.2 15841.1 108784.6 113325.6 42039.2 
Skewness 2.54 2.93 1.47 5.05 5.44 3.00 7.64 7.20 3.62 
Kurtosis 8.76 11.21 7.13 34.75 34.58 21.95 69.90 59.01 33.29 
t-test  11.54 11.07 -0.36 5.93 4.84 -1.06 4.63 3.99 -0.40 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.7176 <.0001 <.0001 0.2911 <.0001 0.0001 0.6928 
Wilcoxon 4064 4064 -458.5 4064 4064 -1627 4064 4064 -1289 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.2716 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0017 
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Table 4.8. Measures of market quality before and after lower price-limit hits 
 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for five market quality measures in the pre- and post-thirty minute windows centered on price-limit hits triggered by 
hitting a lower price limit. The market quality values and tests thereof that are reported in the third column for each measure are based on the paired difference in the post- minus 
pre-windows for each price-limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the hits in the last 30 minutes of 
the first and second sessions, and the hits that are still in place at the end of a session’s trading. T- and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated 
p-values are presented in the table. 
 Prop. quoted spread (%) Prop. effective spread (%) Share Depth (000) Dollar Depth (000 TRY) Composite Liquidity (x10,000) 
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit (N = 328) 
Mean 1.2482 2.3277 1.0795 3.9890 5.6251 1.6350 232.1 185.4 -46.8 367.2 279.6 -87.6 0.0144 0.0130 -0.0013 
Median 0.8639 0.9120 0.0419 3.2260 3.8763 0.6160 55.7 40.7 -5.0 111.2 79.4 -18.8 0.0013 0.0022 0.0004 
t-test  21.859 3.5212 1.6332 30.118 8.4050 2.4356 8.9037 9.4019 -3.4530 6.2223 5.6928 -2.7028 2.6784 5.4415 -0.2290 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.1034 <.0001 <.0001 0.0154 <.0001 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 <.0001 0.0072 0.0078 <.0001 0.8193 
Wilcoxon 26978 26978 10651 26978 26978 8045 26978 26978 -11132 26978 26978 -13115 26978 26978 9611 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit during first 30 minutes of first session (N = 133) 
Mean 1.2216 3.3888 2.1673 4.1206 6.1474 2.0267 208.8 173.3 -35.4 383.8 309.0 -74.8 0.0250 0.0138 -0.0113 
Median 0.9060 0.8438 0.0568 3.2302 3.4629 0.3539 63.4 42.0 -6.8 130.9 91.1 -26.0 0.0013 0.0020 0.0001 
t-test  15.819 2.1211 1.3562 19.353 3.8314 1.2586 6.1834 6.1744 -1.7635 4.6936 4.2690 -1.7997 2.0036 3.5961 -0.8592 
  p-value <.0001 0.0358 0.1773 <.0001 0.0002 0.2104 <.0001 <.0001 0.0801 <.0001 <.0001 0.0742 0.0472 0.0005 0.3918 
Wilcoxon 4456 4456 639 4456 4456 -29 4456 4456 -1860 4456 4456 -2268 4456 4456 418 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.1523 <.0001 <.0001 0.9493 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3504 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit during last 30 minutes of first and second session (N =59) 
Mean 1.2302 1.4892 0.2589 3.4066 5.5972 2.1905 299.4 163.9 -135.5 601.0 272.7 -328.3 0.0120 0.0114 -0.0006 
Median 0.8262 0.9356 0.0725 2.5003 5.1454 2.1873 65.6 39.4 -15.4 128.3 77.6 -45.9 0.0010 0.0034 0.0016 
t-test  7.5908 10.571 2.0583 10.757 19.263 7.3797 3.9928 4.4889 -2.9989 2.6865 3.0410 -2.4140 1.2858 4.8409 -0.0615 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0441 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 0.0040 0.0094 0.0035 0.0190 0.2036 <.0001 0.9511 
Wilcoxon 885 885 638 885 885 733 885 885 -774 885 885 -826 885 885 749 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting lower price limit that were in place at session’s close (N = 79) 
Mean 1.2558 4.9624 3.7065 3.7072 8.9910 5.2838 140.8 87.9 -52.9 294.3 150.9 -143.5 0.0054 0.0135 0.0081 
Median 0.8654 0.9055 0.0747 2.8964 4.7556 1.9079 38.6 14.8 -6.7 82.1 38.8 -26.2 0.0023 0.0054 0.0025 
t-test  10.114 1.8508 1.3811 14.306 3.3706 1.9844 4.2844 4.1768 -3.2183 2.1005 2.5294 -1.7188 4.4242 5.3255 3.0927 
  p-value <.0001 0.0680 0.1712 <.0001 0.0012 0.0507 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 0.0389 0.0134 0.0896 <.0001 <.0001 0.0028 
Wilcoxon 1580 1580 412 1580 1580 1009 1580 1580 -1109 1580 1580 -1143 1580 1580 911 




Table 4.9. Measures of market quality before and after upper price-limit hits 
 
This table reports various summary statistics for estimates for five market quality measures in the pre- and post-thirty minute windows centered on price-limit hits triggered by 
hitting a upper price limit. The market quality values and tests thereof that are reported in the third column for each measure are based on the paired difference in the post- minus 
pre-windows for each price-limit hit. Panels A, B, C and D present the results for the full sample, the hits in the first 30 minutes of the first session, the hits in the last 30 minutes of 
the first and second sessions, and the hits that are still in place at the end of a session’s trading. T- and Wilcoxon tests of the means and medians, respectively, and their associated 
p-values are presented in the table. 
 Prop. quoted spread Prop. effective spread Share Depth Dollar Depth Composite Liquidity 
 Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. Pre- Post- Dif. 
Panel A: All price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit (N = 267) 
Mean 1.08464 1.0561 -0.0284 3.2752 4.3703 1.095 295.2 266.1 -29.1 397.0 334.9 -62.1 0.0032 0.0098 0.0066 
Median 0.7087 0.7504 -0.0100 2.7040 3.8955 1.0321 71.3 49.3 -6.3 178.2 128.2 -16.5 0.0006 0.0009 0.0001 
t-test  12.417 22.533 -0.3799 24.707 33.884 8.1933 7.9968 7.1706 -1.5680 7.4968 8.3227 -2.2567 4.0821 2.5323 1.7292 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.7043 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1181 <.0001 <.0001 0.0248 <.0001 0.0119 0.0849 
Wilcoxon 17889 17889 -3425.5 17889 17889 10499 17889 17889 -6219 17889 17889 -5410 17889 17889 7261 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0062 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit during first 30 minutes of first session (N = 77) 
Mean 1.5061 1.2223 -0.2837 4.2702 3.9788 -0.2910 374.7 435.4 60.8 501.9 555.0 53.1 0.0081 0.0163 0.0082 
Median 0.9347 0.8220 -0.0710 3.4590 3.3880 -0.0640 100.1 99.3 5.6 172.4 180.7 18.1 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0001 
t-test  5.5368 11.386 -1.1125 12.579 16.035 -1.0364 5.1383 4.6874 1.1846 3.1823 4.6541 0.6775 3.0736 1.4248 0.7276 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.2694 <.0001 <.0001 0.3033 <.0001 <.0001 0.2398 0.0021 <.0001 0.5001 0.0029 0.1583 0.4691 
Wilcoxon 1502 1502 -890 1501.5 1501.5 -128.5 1502 1502 226 1502 1502 493 1502 1502 -517 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5177 <.0001 <.0001 0.2548 <.0001 <.0001 0.0114 <.0001 <.0001 0.0079 
Panel C: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit during last 30 minutes of first and second session (N =69) 
Mean 0.6636 0.8567 0.1930 2.4264 4.6914 2.2650 121.2 71.2 -50.0 316.8 192.8 -124.0 0.0010 0.0136 0.0126 
Median 0.6368 0.7411 0.0114 2.2648 4.4800 2.2130 55.5 26.8 -14.6 193.1 100.6 -65.1 0.0003 0.0015 0.0007 
t-test  21.536 18.647 4.9714 20.445 24.236 10.463 5.7564 5.5321 -3.9347 6.4182 5.7408 -3.8857 5.27444 1.7491 1.6223 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 0.0848 0.1094 
Wilcoxon 1207.5 1207.5 632.5 1207.5 1207.5 1131.5 1207.5 1207.5 -919.5 1207.5 1207.5 -917.5 1207.5 1207.5 1077.5 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel D: Price-limit hits triggered by hitting upper price limit that were in place at session’s close (N = 127) 
Mean 1.1388 1.0594 -0.0794 3.0289 4.8720 1.8430 334.4 241.2 -93.1 504.9 365.6 -139.3 0.0024 0.0025 0.0001 
Median 0.7229 0.8083 -0.0070 2.3887 4.4329 1.9365 99.1 55.7 -26.1 204.7 124.3 -51.7 0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 
t-test  6.7823 17.321 -0.5175 14.747 29.106 9.798 5.8291 5.4683 -4.0802 4.9881 5.1422 -2.6952 2.1991 7.0148 0.1198 
  p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.6057 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0080 0.0297 <.0001 0.9048 
Wilcoxon 4064 4064 -151 4064 4064 3591 4064 4064 -2646 4064 4064 -2386 4064 4064 2961 





Table 4.10. Volatility and mean return changes around lower price-limit hits using trade-by-trade returns 
This table reports mean and median estimates for the means and variances in the pre- and post-windows centered on lower limit hits using trade-by-trade returns. 
The means and medians are obtained from an ARIMA(1,0,0) or AR(1) model given by                    and an ARIMA(0,0,1) or MA(1) model given by 
                   where   is the correlation between successive return observations in the AR(1) model, and     and     are assumed to be IID normal. The 
mean return is given by           for the AR(1) model and as    for the MA(1) model. The adjusted variance is computed as   
           
    for the AR(1) 
model and as   
           
   for the MA(1) model. The    statistics are reported in panels A1, B1, C1 and D1, and the    statistics are reported in panels A2, B2, 
C2 and D2. First-order   for the MA(1) are given by        
    but are not reported in this table.    , σ, Adj. σ and Mean are in %. 
      
Statistic 
Pre-limit hit Post-limit hit Paired Difference 
   σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ 
Panel A1: All lower price-limit hits, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=321 
mean -0.0552 0.0059 -0.34 -0.0433 0.0073 0.0114 0.0051 -0.37 0.0091 0.0063 0.0666 -0.0008 -0.03 0.0525 -0.0010 
median -0.0360 0.0021 -0.39 -0.0260 0.0026 0.0077 0.0019 -0.40 0.0054 0.0023 0.0445 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0322 -0.0000 
t-test -13.24 10.53 -30.80 -13.08 9.59 4.14 8.65 -39.27 4.03 8.80 12.58 -1.87 -1.74 12.20 -1.62 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0624 0.08 <.0001 0.1069 
Wilcoxon -21898 25841 -24295 -21870 25841 8755 25841 -24925 8661 25841 21421 -3624 -3547 21212 -3864 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0292 0.03 <.0001 0.0200 
Panel A2: All lower price-limit hits, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=319 
mean  0.0055 0.49 -0.0419 0.0074  0.0046 0.51 0.0093 0.0065  -0.0009 0.02 0.0511 -0.0009 
median  0.0019 0.55 -0.0260 0.0026  0.0017 0.54 0.0057 0.0023  -0.0001 0.00 0.0294 -0.0001 
t-test  10.75 28.91 -12.98 9.89  9.41 37.12 4.08 8.48  -2.50 1.08 12.22 -1.46 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0131 0.28 <.0001 0.1461 
Wilcoxon  25520 24757 -22718 25520  25520 25273 8889 25520  -3787 1586 20837 -3659 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0214 0.34 <.0001 0.0262 
Panel B1: Lower price-limit hits during first 30 minutes of first session, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=130 
mean -0.0625 0.0073 -0.30 -0.0521 0.0083 0.0128 0.0041 -0.37 0.0107 0.0049 0.0753 -0.0032 -0.07 0.0628 -0.0034 
median -0.0390 0.0032 -0.32 -0.0310 0.0037 0.0081 0.0019 -0.41 0.0061 0.0024 0.0504 -0.0010 -0.09 0.0380 -0.0010 
t-test -8.01 7.79 -17.19 -8.23 7.42 2.59 5.66 -24.75 2.52 6.11 7.74 -4.82 -3.03 7.74 -4.63 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0106 <.0001 <.0001 0.013 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.02 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon -3418 4258 -4000 -3437 4258 1668 4258 -4051 1677 4258 3442 -1968 -1407 3455 -1964 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.01 <.0001 0.0001 
Panel B2: Lower price-limit hits during first 30 minutes of first session, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=130 
mean  0.0068 0.44 -0.0496 0.0086  0.0037 0.52 0.0107 0.0049  -0.0031 0.08 0.0603 -0.0037 
median  0.0030 0.47 -0.0270 0.0037  0.0017 0.55 0.0059 0.0024  -0.0010 0.06 0.0366 -0.0010 
t-test  7.79 15.72 -8.22 7.29  5.53 24.00 2.52 6.07  -5.01 2.40 7.72 -4.46 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0129 <.0001  <.0001 0.02 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon  4258 4090 -3572 4258  4258 4190 1807 4258  -2028 1065 3437 -1945 




Table 4.10. Cont’d. 
 
Statistic 
Pre-limit hit Post-limit hit Paired Difference 
   σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ 
Panel C1: Lower price-limit hits during last 30 minutes of both sessions, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=58 
mean -0.0451 0.0037 -0.42 -0.0338 0.0052 -0.0025 0.0051 -0.36 -0.0016 0.0063 0.0427 0.0014 0.05 0.0322 0.0011 
median -0.0340 0.0015 -0.47 -0.0230 0.0020 -0.0030 0.0019 -0.38 -0.0020 0.0022 0.0311 0.0002 0.04 0.0218 0.0002 
t-test -6.17 4.61 -16.03 -5.50 4.55 -0.45 4.77 -17.59 -0.38 4.67 4.66 2.27 1.63 4.10 1.45 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6543 <.0001 <.0001 0.7045 <.0001 <.0001 0.0267 0.11 <.0001 0.1517 
Wilcoxon -765 856 -765 -765 856 -84 856 -851 -96 856 599 260 254 565 213 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5119 <.0001 <.0001 0.4529 <.0001 <.0001 0.0435 0.05 <.0001 0.1003 
Panel C2: Lower price-limit hits during last 30 minutes of both sessions, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=58 
mean  0.0033 0.57 -0.0330 0.0049  0.0046 0.50 -0.0024 0.0066  0.0013 -0.07 0.0306 0.0018 
median  0.0013 0.64 -0.0210 0.0019  0.0019 0.51 -0.0030 0.0022  0.0002 -0.15 0.0185 0.0002 
t-test  4.63 13.96 -5.44 4.56  4.90 16.07 -0.55 4.36  2.41 -1.36 3.96 2.05 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.5832 <.0001  0.0193 0.18 0.0002 0.0454 
Wilcoxon  856 799 -842 856  856 851 -134 856  308 -297 560 219 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.3054 <.0001  0.0159 0.02 <.0001 0.0909 
Panel D1: Lower price-limit hits that remained in place at session close, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=79 
mean -0.0553 0.0037 -0.36 -0.0443 0.0045 -0.0067 0.0036 -0.38 -0.0058 0.0044 0.0486 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0385 -0.0001 
median -0.0470 0.0016 -0.39 -0.0360 0.0021 -0.0050 0.0018 -0.38 -0.0030 0.0025 0.0377 0.0001 0.00 0.0294 0.0000 
t-test -8.43 5.46 -15.63 -7.54 5.26 -1.71 7.79 -21.75 -1.82 7.49 6.01 -0.14 -0.64 5.52 -0.20 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0921 <.0001 <.0001 0.072 <.0001 <.0001 0.8921 0.52 <.0001 0.8437 
Wilcoxon -1406 1580 -1499 -1407 1580 -418 1580 -1573 -434 1580 1200 209 -92 1164 152 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0403 <.0001 <.0001 0.033 <.0001 <.0001 0.3101 0.66 <.0001 0.4611 
Panel D2: Lower price-limit hits that remained in place at session close, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=77 
mean  0.0034 0.51 -0.0436 0.0047  0.0033 0.50 -0.0056 0.0045  -0.0001 -0.01 0.0380 -0.0002 
median  0.0014 0.60 -0.0300 0.0021  0.0018 0.51 -0.0050 0.0024  0.0001 0.00 0.0245 0.0001 
t-test  5.35 13.36 -7.20 5.39  7.93 19.39 -1.70 7.38  -0.19 -0.22 5.18 -0.30 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0923 <.0001  0.8482 0.82 <.0001 0.7673 
Wilcoxon  1502 1405 -1412 1502  1502 1497 -427 1502  165 -78 1040 105 




Table 4.11. Volatility and mean return changes around upper price-limit hits using trade-by-trade returns 
This table reports mean and median estimates for the means and variances in the pre- and post-windows centered on upper limit hits using trade-by-trade returns. 
The means and medians are obtained from an ARIMA(1,0,0) or AR(1) model given by                    and an ARIMA(0,0,1) or MA(1) model given by 
                   where   is the correlation between successive return observations in the AR(1) model, and     and     are assumed to be IID normal. The 
mean return is given by           for the AR(1) model and as    for the MA(1) model. The adjusted variance is computed as   
           
    for the AR(1) 
model and as   
           
   for the MA(1) model. The    statistics are reported in panels A1, B1, C1 and D1, and the    statistics are reported in panels A2, B2, 
C2 and D2. First-order   for the MA(1) are given by        
    but are not reported in this table.    , σ, Adj. σ and Mean are in %. 
      
Statistic 
Pre-limit hit Post-limit hit Paired Difference 
   σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ 
Panel A1: All upper price-limit hits, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=265 
mean 0.0504 0.0047 -0.39 0.0385 0.0060 -0.0145 0.0036 -0.41 -0.0106 0.0048 -0.0649 -0.0011 -0.02 -0.0491 -0.0012 
median 0.0321 0.0014 -0.41 0.0230 0.0016 -0.0090 0.0013 -0.43 -0.0060 0.0016 -0.0400 -0.0000 -0.02 -0.0270 -0.0000 
t-test 11.67 8.29 -41.67 11.13 8.37 -7.73 8.89 -51.75 -6.59 8.07 -12.75 -2.53 -1.77 -12.07 -2.19 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.012 0.08 <.0001 0.0292 
Wilcoxon 15963 17623 -17468 16104 17623 -10242 17623 -17347 -10050 17623 -16878 -3272 -2220 -17008 -2760 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0086 0.07 <.0001 0.0269 
Panel A2: All upper price-limit hits, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=265 
mean  0.0043 0.53 0.0370 0.0059  0.0030 0.58 -0.0107 0.0047  -0.0012 0.05 -0.0477 -0.0012 
median  0.0013 0.55 0.0221 0.0016  0.0012 0.59 -0.0060 0.0016  -0.0000 0.05 -0.0270 -0.0000 
t-test  8.20 38.18 11.16 8.40  9.61 44.39 -6.58 8.50  -2.89 3.20 -12.33 -2.31 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0042 0.00 <.0001 0.0219 
Wilcoxon  17623 17601 16394 17623  17623 17608 -10800 17623  -3832 4119 -17171 -2357 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.002 0.00 <.0001 0.059 
Panel B1: Upper price-limit hits during first 30 minutes of first session, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=76 
mean 0.0699 0.0090 -0.35 0.0564 0.0107 -0.0177 0.0046 -0.42 -0.0133 0.0061 -0.0875 -0.0044 -0.07 -0.0697 -0.0046 
median 0.0395 0.0033 -0.38 0.0304 0.0040 -0.0110 0.0016 -0.44 -0.0080 0.0020 -0.0540 -0.0010 -0.09 -0.0410 -0.0010 
t-test 6.03 5.62 -17.53 5.88 5.75 -4.87 5.17 -27.87 -4.54 4.95 -7.18 -3.30 -3.41 -6.77 -3.24 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0015 0.00 <.0001 0.0018 
Wilcoxon 1328 1463 -1453 1339 1463 -1113 1463 -1462 -1119 1463 -1450 -957 -624 -1451 -844 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.00 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B2: Upper price-limit hits during first 30 minutes of first session, ARIMA(0,0,1), N= 76 
mean  0.0083 0.47 0.0548 0.0106  0.0038 0.63 -0.0129 0.0061  -0.0045 0.16 -0.0677 -0.0045 
median  0.0032 0.50 0.0291 0.0039  0.0015 0.65 -0.0080 0.0020  -0.0010 0.12 -0.0400 -0.0010 
t-test  5.52 15.71 5.66 5.79  5.47 26.28 -4.45 5.07  -3.46 5.15 -6.59 -3.18 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0009 <.0001 <.0001 0.0021 
Wilcoxon  1463 1452 1287 1463  1463 1462 -1204 1463  -1044  879 -14470 -838 




Table 4.11. Cont’d. 
 
Statistic 
Pre-limit hit Post-limit hit Paired Difference 
   σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ    σ ρ or θ Mean Adj. σ 
Panel C1: Upper price-limit hits during last 30 minutes of both sessions, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=69 
mean 0.0390 0.0021 -0.38 0.0003 0.0027 -0.0096 0.0019 -0.41 -0.0001 0.0023 -0.0486 -0.0002 -0.03 -0.0004 -0.0005 
median 0.0296 0.0011 -0.39 0.0002 0.0014 -0.0040 0.0011 -0.44 -0.0000 0.0013 -0.0300 -0.0000 -0.04 -0.0002 0.0000 
t-test 8.13 3.73 -24.58 8.1653 3.35 -2.34 4.87 -28.60 -2.0280 5.40 -6.71 -0.79 -1.49 -5.8931 -1.02 
p-value <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 0.0013 0.0224 <.0001 <.0001 0.0465 <.0001 <.0001 0.4348 0.14 <.0001 0.3123 
Wilcoxon 1160 1208 -1208 1160 1208 -416 1208 -1204 -395 1208 -1091 11 -298 -1091 67 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0083 <.0001 <.0001 0.0125 <.0001 <.0001 0.9505 0.07 <.0001 0.694 
Panel C2: Upper price-limit hits during last 30 minutes of both sessions, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=69 
mean  0.0018 0.52 0.0277 0.0026  0.0017 0.55 -0.0079 0.0023  -0.0001 0.03 -0.0357 -0.0004 
median  0.0010 0.53 0.0207 0.0013  0.0010 0.57 -0.0030 0.0013  0.0000 0.05 -0.0220 0.0000 
t-test  4.25 25.25 8.09 3.47  4.83 24.23 -1.94 5.00  -0.50 1.22 -6.17 -1.03 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009  <.0001 <.0001 0.0566 <.0001  0.616 0.23 <.0001 0.3044 
Wilcoxon  1208 1208 1192 1208  1208 1205 -396 1208  4 308 -1126 15 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0169 <.0001  0.9835 0.07 <.0001 0.9317 
Panel D1: Upper price-limit hits that remained in place at session close, ARIMA(1,0,0), N=126 
mean 0.0362 0.0030 -0.41 0.0260 0.0039 -0.0075 0.0032 -0.44 -0.0053 0.0041 -0.0437 0.0001 -0.02 -0.0313 0.0002 
median 0.0249 0.0012 -0.44 0.0177 0.0015 -0.0060 0.0014 -0.45 -0.0040 0.0017 -0.0290 0.0001 -0.02 -0.0210 0.0002 
t-test 8.09 6.21 -32.55 8.04 6.23 -3.17 6.51 -49.11 -3.06 6.34 -9.10 0.58 -1.60 -8.90 0.92 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001 0.0027 <.0001 <.0001 0.5609 0.11 <.0001 0.3584 
Wilcoxon 3619 4001 -4001 3613 4001 -1522 4001 -4001 -1490 4001 -3732 568 -601 -3737 795 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.168 0.14 <.0001 0.0527 
Panel D2: Upper price-limit hits that remained in place at session close, ARIMA(0,0,1), N=126 
mean  0.0027 0.56 0.0258 0.0038  0.0028 0.60 -0.0057 0.0041  0.0001 0.03 -0.0314 0.0002 
median  0.0012 0.57 0.0168 0.0016  0.0013 0.61 -0.0050 0.0017  0.0001 0.04 -0.0210 0.0002 
t-test  6.46 29.96 7.68 6.29  6.87 40.18 -3.30 6.43  0.42 1.71 -8.78 0.95 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0013 <.0001  0.6752 0.09 <.0001 0.3464 
Wilcoxon  4001 4001 3671 4001  4001 4001 -1616 4001  536 659 -3737 776 







Figure 4. 1. Cumulative mean returns for the price-limit hits 
 
This figure plots the cumulative cross-sectional mean returns for four samples of price-limit hits 
differentiated by whether they are triggered by hitting the lower or upper price limits. The cross-sectional 





   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
